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In distributed open systems, such as multiagent systems, new interactions are con-
stantly appearing and new agents are continuously joining or leaving. It is unrealistic
to expect agents to automatically trust new interactions. It is also unrealistic to ex-
pect agents to refer to their users for help every time a new interaction is encountered.
An agent should decide for itself whether a specific interaction with a given group of
agents is suitable or not. This thesis presents a runtime verification mechanism for
addressing this problem.
Verifying multiagent systems has its challenges. It is hard to predict the reliability
of interactions, in systems that are heavily influenced by autonomous agents, with-
out having access to the agent specifications. Available verification mechanisms may
roughly be divided into two categories: (1) those that verify interaction models inde-
pendently of specific agents, and (2) those that verify agent models whose constraints
shape the interactions. Interaction models are not sufficient when verifying dynamic
properties that depend on the agents engaged in an interaction. On the other hand, ver-
ifying agent specifications, such as  models, is extremely inefficient. Specifications
are usually not explicit enough, resulting in the verification of a massive number of per-
missible interactions. Furthermore, in open systems, an agent’s internal specification
is usually not accessible for many reasons, including security and privacy.
This thesis proposes a model checker that verifies a combination of a global inter-
action model and local deontic models. The deontic model may be viewed as a list of
agent constraints that are deemed necessary to share and verify, such as the inability
of the buyer to pay by credit card. The result is a lightweight, efficient, and power-
ful model checker that is capable of verifying rich properties of multiagent systems
without the need for accessing agents’ internal specifications.
Although the proposed model checker has potential for addressing a variety of
problems, the trust domain receives special attention due to the critically of the trust
issue in distributed open systems and the lack of reliable trust solutions. The thesis
illustrates how a dynamic model checker, using deontic/trust models, can help agents
decide whether the scenarios they wish to join are trustworthy or not.
In summary, the main contribution of this research is in introducing interaction time
verification for checking deontic and trust models multiagent interactions. When faced
with new unexplored interactions, agents can verify whether joining a given interaction
with a given set of collaborating agents would violate any of its constraints.
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Computer systems have once been viewed as isolated dedicated systems. Nowadays,
an isolated system is considered to be a powerless system with limited capabilities.
The growth of the Internet has helped promote interconnection, resulting in the growth
of distributed and concurrent systems. Hoping to achieve more intelligent systems, the
latest trend is to move towards open distributed systems, such as multiagent systems1.
However, the increased complexity of these open systems, which now rely on interact-
ing autonomous agents, raises a crucial question on the verification issue: “How can
traditional verification mechanisms be applied to open distributed systems?”
Formal verification is a well established field that has proven to be highly success-
ful when applied to both hardware and software systems. However, this success has
been limited when applied to multiagent systems. The reason is the dynamic nature
of these systems. Traditionally verified systems, whether hardware or software, are
static systems whose specifications are fixed and well defined. Multiagent systems, on
the other hand, are highly dynamic. The entities that compose them, such as agents,
peers, services, etc., may join or leave the system at anytime. New interactions are con-
tinuously appearing. As a result, traditional verification mechanisms seem no longer
suitable to be directly applied to these systems.
This thesis proposes a dynamic approach for verification. The result is an auto-
mated verifier that may be invoked by the agents at interaction time when the condi-
tions for verification are met. This is achieved by making use of a lightweight, efficient,
and fully automated model checker.
1Although the research of this thesis is aimed at distributed open systems in general, the term
multiagent will be used when referring to such systems to emphasise the autonomy of the different
entities composing these systems.
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
Section 1.1 introduces the challenges of multiagent system verification, in view of
the available literature. Section 1.2 presents the proposed approach for overcoming
these challenges. Section 7.3 outlines our claims of novelty. Finally, the structure of
this thesis is presented in Section 1.5, providing the reader with a glimpse of what is
to be expected from each chapter.
1.1 The Challenge
One of the most fundamental issues of multiagent system engineering is to enable pre-
dictable and reliable interactions. The challenge is in achieving this without requiring
a deep standardisation of the way in which the agents are engineered, yet preserving
as much as possible their autonomy in individual reasoning. Two contrasting specifi-
cation approaches have emerged for addressing this problem:
F A top-down approach: In this approach, the focus is on engineering models
of interactions that may be described in a generic process or state-machine lan-
guage. These models explicitly specify how the interaction may be carried out by
the agents. They are detached from individual agents and are typically accessed
when an agent anticipates it wants to initiate or join that type of interaction.
F A bottom-up approach: In this approach, the focus is on engineering highly in-
telligent agents in such detail that they become capable of shaping and directing
interactions. Each agent specification is built locally and independently of other
agents. This is sometimes referred to as the agent’s  layer, which describes
the agent’s beliefs, desires, and intentions.
Following in the footsteps of specification, multiagent system verification mecha-
nisms may roughly be divided into similar categories. Chapter 6 provides a thorough
presentation of the available literature. However, in what follows, we give a brief
overview to these verification mechanisms, which we roughly divide into four cate-
gories. In the first (e.g. Wen and Mizoguchi, 1999; Walton, 2004; Huget, 2002; Cliffe
and Padget, 2002), the verifier is applied to a global interaction model and does not take
into consideration any of the agents involved in such an interaction. In the second (e.g.
Benerecetti et al., 1998; Wooldridge et al., 2002; Bordini et al., 2003b), the verifier is
applied to a group of agents whose internal specifications are expected to shape the
interaction that needs to be verified. In the third (Giordano et al., 2003, 2004), both the
shared interaction model and the private agent models are used in verification. In the
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fourth (e.g. Penczek and Lomuscio, 2003; Woźna et al., 2005; Kacprzak et al., 2004;
Raimondi and Lomuscio, 2007), only the interaction model is verified. However, such
interaction models are usually enriched with a variety of domain specific operators in
order to verify properties about agents’ knowledge, commitments, strategies, etc.
The advantage of the mechanisms of the first category is that the properties verified
against a given interaction model are global properties that will hold for any group of
agents. The problem, however, is that interactions in multiagent systems are strongly
linked to the agents executing them. It is the agents that drive and direct these inter-
actions. The verification of interaction models help ensure the correctness of these
interactions by proving some of their properties. This proves to be very helpful in
many applications, such as mechanism design. However, these properties are static
properties of the interaction. When trying to prove whether a given interaction would
succeed with a given group of collaborating agents, properties marking this success
may be dynamic (by depending on the agents engaged in this given interaction). Ver-
ification mechanisms of the first category are limited to the class of static and agent
independent properties. These usually describe liveness and safety properties of inter-
actions, such as checking for deadlocks, reachability of states, etc.
In the second category, the verifier is applied to the agents’ internal specification,
or their  layer. These approaches tend to verify a much more interesting set of
properties than those tackled by the verifiers of the first category. For example, one
may verify properties about the change of agents beliefs within interactions. However,
these verification mechanisms raise a serious concern by assuming that: (1) the inter-
nal specifications of agents are accessible by the verifier, and (2) these specifications
are comprehensible to the verifier. Both of these assumptions are unrealistic and stand
against the very nature of distributed open systems. In open systems, agents are not
expected to allow access to their  layer, mainly for security, trust, and privacy issues.
For instance, why would a bidding agent want to reveal its bidding strategy? Further-
more, even if an agent did permit some verifier to access its internal specification, this
information is most likely incomprehensible to the verifier. The information required
by the verifier is usually not specified declaratively, but rather implicitly in the proce-
dural implementation of the agent. Also, agents in distributed systems are not expected
to be engineered all in the same way. Each agent is built independently, most prob-
ably following different implementation designs and languages. One may argue that
in closed systems, such strong assumptions could hold. This is true. However, even
then, the agent constraints should be explicit enough to be able to specify and direct
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
the interaction. Usually, these techniques result in a massive number of permissible
interactions, which raises severe efficiency issues. This leads model checkers to hit the
state-space explosion problem fairly quickly.
The literature of the third category has simply combined both mechanisms of the
first and second categories. The verifier can either prove properties of the interaction,
disregarding the agents involved, or require internal agent specifications to prove that
agents can actually perform the actions they are expected to perform.
Mechanisms of the fourth category have the ability to verify compelling proper-
ties of the agents without any need for accessing the agents’ internal specifications.
However, we believe the verification process of such mechanisms are overly compli-
cated and inadequate for fully automated verification. For instance, the system model
is not specified through a clear process calculus, but through a collection of states that
are specified by hand. Also, transition functions should usually be specified to link the
states of the system’s state space together. Of course, this is not an issue when verifying
the system offline. However, this complication in both the specification and verifica-
tion process raises lots of concerns (including efficiency concerns) when verification
needs to be performed by the agents at interaction time, as this thesis proposes.
In summary, verification in the field of multiagent systems has been suffering from
various problems. Some verifiers lack the capability of verifying worthwhile proper-
ties of these dynamic systems. Others have struggled from severe efficiency issues.
Many fell into the trap of over complicating the specification and verification process,
by continuously adding new modalities to their specification languages for every new
notion to be verified. We believe that the majority of these issues are directly linked
to the main challenge presented above, and that may be described as the “interaction
versus agent model” dilemma. The proposed verification mechanism of this thesis is
aimed primarily at addressing this dilemma. The following section provides a gentle
introduction to this proposed mechanism.
1.2 The Proposed Approach
Put differently, the “interaction versus agent model” dilemma of multiagent system
verification may be redefined by the following question: “How can a verifier prove
compelling properties of interactions without relying on the agents specification?” The
verification mechanism of this thesis addresses this issue by distinguishing between an
agent’s internal specification and its deontic one. The deontic model is said to describe
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agents’ general permissions, prohibitions, and obligations. While an agent’s internal
specification cannot and should not be made public, agents might need to make some
of their deontic constraints public. For example, no bidder would be interested in
revealing its bidding strategy, yet it would be highly useful for both the bidder and the
auctioneer to reveal that the bidder can only pay via PayPal.
Using this combination of interaction and deontic models implies that the verifica-
tion mechanism can be more efficient than those that solely verify agent models. This
is because the explicit models of interactions will considerably limit the interaction’s
state-space. Furthermore, the entire verification process is much more realistic. This
is because it does not rely on the agents’ internal specification, but on their deontic
constraints that are made public by the agents and are believed to be crucial for the in-
teraction. Moreover, the addition of this deontic layer enriches the properties that may
be verified, leading to more predictable and reliable results. This is because the veri-
fier does not completely neglect the agents involved and their effects on interactions.
However, this combination of global interaction and local deontic models implies that
verification will need to be performed at interaction time, when the conditions for ver-
ification are met and the related deontic models are obtained.
Interaction time verification is key. This requires a fully automated verification
mechanism that is achieved by making use of automated model checking. In these
highly dynamic systems, the automated verifier may be invoked by the agents at run
time to help them decide whether the new interaction models they wish to join and
the group of collaborating agents they wish to interact with are suitable or not. As an
example, the verifier is applied to the field of trust. The goal is to let the agents verify
whether the scenarios they are about to join could break any of their trust constraints.
1.3 Claims of Novelty
In summary, with the above proposed approach, this thesis presents two major novel
contributions. First, it combines global interaction models to local deontic ones, result-
ing in a new system model architecture. It does this to address the interaction versus
agent model dilemma. The goal is to be able to verify dynamic properties (that usually
rely on the dynamic groups of agents engaged in an interaction) without the need for
internal agent specifications, resulting in a verification mechanism suitable for open
and distributed systems. Second, it introduces interaction time verification for multi-
agent systems. For this to succeed, it is crucial that the verifier be fully automated,
6 Chapter 1. Introduction
lightweight, and efficient. The remaining chapters of this thesis illustrate how this may
be accomplished.
1.4 Requirements and Assumptions
Several assumptions, in terms of both representation and computing resources, are
made in this thesis for the proposed verification mechanism to succeed. In what fol-
lows, we give a list of these assumptions:
F The model checker of this thesis is intended to be used by agents in order to
verify whether a given interaction model along with a given group of collabo-
rating agents is suitable or trustworthy. We assume that the agent can search for
available interaction models, possibly using discovery services (as illustrated by
the OpenKnowledge project (Siebes et al., 2007)). As for the deontic and trust
constraints, we currently assume agents to know the constraints they need to ver-
ify, along with the specific instantiations these constraints require. For example,
if a specific auctioneer agent needs to verify whether the interaction protocol
encourages truth telling on the bidders, the auctioneer should verify this trust
constraint against an interaction model instantiated for one auctioneer agent and
two bidder agents. Chapter 4 elaborates more on this issue.
F The input to the model checker should be specified in the languages of the pro-
posed model checker. For instance, interaction models need to be specified in 
(Section 2.2), deontic constraints in  (Section 3.4.2), trust constraints in 
(Section 4.5), and temporal properties in the µ-calculus (Section 2.3.3). How-
ever, an interesting aspect of these languages is there basic and simple nature.
For instance,  may be viewed as a basic process calculus (Section 2.2.5). The
µ-calculus is a common and traditional temporal logic.  may be described
as a policy language with a basic syntax defined by only two predicates: must
and can. Similarly,  is a trust policy language with a basic syntax defined
by the trust predicate, which is used for specifying whether a given interaction
model or a given agent is trusted or not. Naturally, we assume agents to share the
vocab of these languages. However, the vocab used in the constraints of these
languages does not need to be shared; when necessary, matching or ontology
mapping technologies could be used.
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F For agents to be able to carry out the verification process, our proposed lightweight
model checker, , should be installed. The model checker is compact and
written in less than 200 lines of Prolog code. However, to ensure termination,
the model checker is built on top of the  tabled Prolog system (Sagonas et al.,
1994). The  system requires a bit less than 20 to install. Although we
believe it is safe to assume that the majority of agents will have this commod-
ity, agents that do not have the  and  systems installed may make use
of model checking web services that receive verification requests and return the
results of the verification process. Of course, this raises serious trust concerns.
In such cases, traditional reputation mechanisms may be used for selecting the
appropriate web service.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The rest of this thesis is divided as follows:
F Chapter 2 provides the background needed to attain a better understanding of the
verification mechanism presented in Chapter 3. It provides an introduction to
formal verification in general, and model checking in particular. It also provides
the background needed for understanding the various specification languages of
the proposed model checker.
F Chapter 3 introduces the proposed verification mechanism, resulting in the 
model checker. The work presented in this chapter is largely based on our pub-
lished papers in both the Fifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (Osman et al., 2006b) and the Fourth Inter-
national Workshop on Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies (Osman
et al., 2006a).
F Chapter 4 illustrates how the  system may be applied to the verification of
trust in multiagent systems. The work presented in this chapter is largely based
on our published papers in both the Twentieth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (Osman and Robertson, 2007) and the workshop on Trust
in E-systems and the Grid (Osman, 2007).
F Chapter 5 demonstrates how the  model checker may be used in two dif-
ferent ways. In the first, the model checker is invoked offline from outside an
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interaction model in order to verify the model, along with any other potential
model the first model might link to. In the second, verification is performed at
interaction time by an agent, and the model checker is invoked from within an
interaction model to verify (at run time) potential models that may be executed
from within the first model.
F Chapter 6 presents an overview of the available literature on multiagent system
verification. This is followed by an analysis of the various mechanisms in com-
parison with the proposed mechanism of this thesis. Although it is a bit unusual
to present the literature review towards the end of a thesis, we choose to do this
because we find it more coherent to have one chapter presenting both the lit-
erature review along with a thorough analysis and comparison with our work.
Furthermore, such analysis and comparison can only be fully understood after
gaining an adequate understanding of our work.
F Chapter 7 draws the final conclusions and sets the plan for future work.
Chapter 2
Background
This thesis focuses on the verification of distributed open systems in general, and mul-
tiagent systems in particular. We propose a fully automated verification technique that
may be carried out by the agents when needed. This could be used to aid autonomous
agents in their decision process when answering questions such as: Should I engage in
a given interaction? Whom should I interact with? How should I interact with them?
etc. Formal verification mechanisms may be divided into two main categories: in-
teractive deductive reasoning (or theorem proving) and automated methods (or model
checking). In the first, although certain degrees of automation may exist, the verifica-
tion is generally driven by the user and his understanding of the inference rules and
the system being verified. In the second, the model checker is fed the system to be
verified and the properties it is verified against, and the entire verification process is
fully automated.
In this thesis, we choose model checking as our verification method due to its
full automation. A model checker typically takes in a system model and a property
specification as its input; it then proves whether the specified properties are satisfied in
the given system model. However, for our system, we suggest the addition of yet a third
input: the agent’s deontic constraints. We believe that the verification of interactions,
which heavily depend on the autonomous parties engaged in these interactions, should
take into consideration the various parties’ constraints.
This chapter aims at providing the background needed for understanding the tech-
nical details of this thesis: our model checking technique and its formal specifica-
tion languages. Section 2.1 provides a general overview of the various verification
techniques, focusing on model checking in particular. This is followed by a presen-
tation of the lightweight coordination calculus (), the process calculus used by our
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model checker for the specification of multiagent systems, in Section 2.2. Section 2.3
introduces the µ-calculus temporal logic, our model checker’s property specification
language. Finally, Section 2.4 provides an overview of deontic logic and policy lan-
guages, which is crucial for understanding our proposed deontic based policy language
of Section 3.4.2.
2.1 Formal Verification and Model Checking
This section starts with an overview of available verification methods in Section 2.1.1,
before introducing the technical details of model checking in Section 2.1.2.
2.1.1 Verification Methods: an Overview
Verification methods are usually divided into two main categories: functional (or black-
box) testing and formal verification. Figure 2.1 provides a categorisation of the most
common verification methods. Functional testing usually disregards the internal struc-
ture and mechanism of a system and focuses solely on observing the output when pro-
viding certain valid or invalid input. The two most common techniques in this category
are simulation and testing (Edmund M. Clarke et al., 1999). While simulation is per-
formed on the model of a system, testing is performed on the actual system. Especially
in software development, simulation and testing are the most widely used techniques
for verification today. This is basically due to their cost-efficient approaches for dis-
covering many errors. However, the problem with functional testing is that there is no
guarantee that all the errors are discovered and that the system will behave as intended.
Of course, this raises an alarm in more critical systems. For example, on the 4th of
June, 1996, the Ariane 5 rocket exploded due to a software error: the 64-bit floating
point number was too large to fit into a 16-bit signed integer, causing an operand error.
To ensure the correctness of such critical systems, functional testing is clearly not a
sufficient verification method. There certainly is a need for more formal methods that
could prove the correctness of these systems.
Formal verification methods rely on mathematical proofs for verification. These
methods may roughly be divided into two main categories: deductive reasoning and
model checking. Verification based on deductive reasoning, such as theorem proving,
aims at proving the correctness of a system using axioms and proof rules. Deduc-
tive reasoning is usually performed by an expert in logical reasoning, whose task is to

















Figure 2.1: Verification methods
construct proofs manually, using interactive software tools that would aid the progress
of the proof. However, one single proof may take days or even months to complete.
For this reason, deductive reasoning has not been as widely used as other verification
methods. Another disadvantage of deductive reasoning is that the automated reasoning
process cannot always be guaranteed to terminate. This limits the properties that could
be verified automatically. Nevertheless, despite the limitation on what could automat-
ically be checked and the huge amount of resources that might be used to find a proof,
a strong aspect of deductive reasoning is its capability to reason over systems with an
infinite state, which is usually a limitation in model checking approaches.
Model checking, which is explored in the following section, limits the systems it
can verify to those with a finite state-space. However, this limitation makes model
checking a fully automated verification technique that is guaranteed to terminate with
a yes/no answer. Because of its full automation, and despite its limitation to finite state
systems, model checking is usually preferred to deductive reasoning. When needed,
systems with an infinite space may sometimes be verified by restricting unbounded
data structures to specific sets, or applying some abstraction and induction techniques.
Nevertheless, deductive reasoning remains the preferred technique for the verifica-
tion of sensitive systems, such as security protocols. Moreover, there will always be
examples of properties of infinite systems that cannot be verified via model checking,
but by deductive reasoning. Interestingly, some techniques (e.g. Rajan et al., 1995)
have even embedded deductive reasoners with model checkers. The model checker is
then used to automatically verify the finite state parts of the system in question.
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2.1.2 Model Checking
2.1.2.1 The Model Checking Process
The model checking problem is generally defined as follows: Given a system S and
a formula φ, does S satisfy φ? As a result, the model checking process, illustrated in
Figure 2.2, is divided into three steps: modelling the system, specifying the proper-
ties, and verifying that the system model satisfies the properties specification. In what
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specified via a temporal logic
Result
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Figure 2.2: The model checking process
1. Modelling: The system to be verified must first be modelled in the language
of the model checker. It is a language, often a process calculus, that presents
the system as a finite state transition system. A finite state transition system1 is
usually presented via a state transition graph (or simply a state graph), and is a
type of a non-deterministic finite state machine. In this thesis, the language that
specifies the system model is the  process calculus, which is introduced later
on in Section 2.2.
The challenge of modelling systems depends not only on deciding what aspects
of the system are to be verified, but also on the complexity of the system, the ex-
pressiveness of the description language, and the difficulty of mapping between
the two. The abstraction of the system should make sure that essential factors
are preserved while irrelevant features, which could unnecessarily complicate
the verification process, are omitted.
2. Specification: After modelling the system, one should specify the properties
to be verified in the system. Usually, these are properties of correctness, safety,
1Note that state transition systems, in general, need not be finite; however, model checking usually
focuses on finite state systems only.
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liveness, etc. Traditionally, these properties have been specified via some tempo-
ral (or modal) logic. Temporal properties distinguish themselves from other log-
ics by introducing temporal features to the properties describing the behaviour
of a system. Safety and liveness properties can then be specified by using tem-
poral operators of the form it will never be true, it will eventually be true, etc.
The model checker of this thesis uses the µ-calculus temporal logic for property
specification. The µ-calculus is introduced in Section 2.3.
The specification stage is tricky and has its challenges. Formal verification is
usually preferred to functional testing when there is a need to formally prove the
correctness of the system and rule out any possible errors. However, how do we
know if the property specification list is complete? That is, how do we know that
the specification describes all the properties that the system should satisfy? This
remains an open issue.
3. Verification: After modelling the system and specifying the properties that
should be satisfied by that system, both the system model S and the property
specification φ are fed to the model checker for verification. The model checker
is essentially an algorithm that decides whether the system S satisfies the prop-
erty φ, usually expressed as S |= φ. Some model checkers also provide a counter
example, or a trace, when the property is not satisfied.
The model checking algorithm of this thesis constitutes the basis of our research.
Our model checking approach and algorithm is presented in Chapter 3. How-
ever, the remainder of this section provides an overview of model checking tech-
niques, their complications, and the different approaches for dealing with such
complications.
Note that the verification stage has also got its share of challenges. Allegedly,
model checking is a fully automatic verification mechanism. In practise, how-
ever, the model checker may return false results due to incorrect modelling or
even incorrect property specification. An error trace is usually helpful in fix-
ing these common problems. Also, in theory, a model checker should always
terminate with a yes/no answer. In practise, however, it is common for a model
checker to fail in returning a yes/no result. This usually happens when the size of
the model is too large to be handled by the available memory resources, known in
model checking as the state-space explosion problem. Section 2.1.2.3 addresses
this problem.
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2.1.2.2 Model Checking Techniques: Local versus Global
There are two main techniques by which model checking may be performed (Müller-
Olm et al., 1999):
Global Model Checking: Given a finite system model S and a formula φ, deter-
mine the set of states in S that satisfy φ.
Local Model Checking: Given a finite system model S , a formula φ, and a state
si in S , determine whether si satisfies φ.
In global model checking, the property is verified against each state of the system.
The system is said to satisfy the property if its initial states are all elements of the set
of states satisfying the property. In local model checking, the model checker attempts
to verify whether the initial state(s) of the system, usually indicated as s0, satisfies
property φ. To do this, the model checker looks at the immediate neighbouring states
of s0, as required by the formula, and so on. However, instead of traversing the entire
state-space, the model checker terminates when a (dis-)satisfaction of φ is established.
For example, if the property states that no pay money action should ever occur in the
system, and the first transition s0 performs towards it neighbouring state is pay money,
then the model checker terminates with a negative result after inspecting only the first
state.
2.1.2.3 The State-Space Explosion Problem
The state-space explosion problem is defined as the problem of running out of re-
sources when trying to verify a property against a massive state-space. Most model
checkers have different techniques implemented for dealing with the state-space ex-
plosion problem.
Some approaches that deal with this problem focus on building only part of the
state-space. For example, sometimes extra branches leading to the same state are cre-
ated in a state-space by simply rearranging the order in which actions are executed.
Partial order reduction techniques aim at reducing the state-space by reducing those
wasteful branches. Abstraction techniques are used to replace a system by a simpler
one in which many details, irrelevant to the property to be verified, are dropped out.
Symbolic approaches are another way of dealing with the state-space explosion
problem. The idea is to use implicit, rather than explicit, representation of the states
and transitions, such as the use of binary decision diagrams (). Temporal properties
are then verified against a  representation rather than the huge state-space.
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2.2 Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC)
As illustrated in Section 2.1.2.1, a state transition system is typically used by model
checkers for describing the system model. However, there are different types of state
transition systems. The most common are Kripke structures (Kripke, 1963) and La-
belled transition systems (Milner, 1989). A Kripke structure is a tuple (S ,R, L), where
S is the set of states, R is a transition relation R ⊆ S × S that defines the transitions
between states, and L is a labelling function L : S → 2AP, where AP is a set of atomic
propositions that represent basic local properties of system states. When model check-
ing Kripke structures, the sets S and AP are usually finite. On the other hand, a labelled
transition system () is a tuple (S , A,→), where S is a set of states, A is a set of ac-
tions (or labels), and→ is a transition relation→: S ×A×S that defines the transitions
between states. Usually, a transition (s, a, s′) ∈→ is presented as s
a
−→ s′. When model
checking labelled transition systems, the sets S and A should be finite.
Note that while Kripke systems use labels to associate states with sets of atomic
propositions, labelled transition systems use labels to associate transitions with actions.
The combination of both, which makes use of labels attached to both states and tran-
sitions, have been described in the literature as labelled kripke structures () (Chaki
et al., 2005), doubly labelled transition systems () (Nicola and Vaandrager, 1995),
Kripke modal transition systems (Kripke ) (Huth et al., 2001), etc.
In this thesis, the system model is represented as a labelled transition system.
Labelled transition systems are usually specified via a process calculus. Our model
checker’s specification language is also a process calculus: the lightweight coordi-
nation calculus (). While we explain our choice for using  in Chapter 3, this
section provides an introduction to the lightweight coordination calculus ().  is
introduced in Section 2.2.1, its syntax and semantics are presented in Section 2.2.2,
the process of executing  interactions is illustrated in Section 2.2.3, the goal of
achieving coordination via  is discussed in Section 2.2.4, and finally, a comparison
between  and other process calculi is provided by Section 2.2.5.
2.2.1 What is LCC?
 is a language, based on logic programming (Robertson, 2004c), that provides
means of achieving coordination in distributed systems. It approaches the coordina-
tion problem through the enforcement of a strict notion of social norms (Robertson,
2004a). These control what actions different agents can perform, when they can per-
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form such actions, under what conditions may these actions be carried out, etc. Of
course, these rules are associated with roles rather than physical agents; and agents
can play more than one role in more than one interaction. This provides an abstrac-
tion for the interaction model from the individual agents that might engage in such an
interaction. Nevertheless, agents’ autonomy is preserved in a sense that it is up to the
agents to decide: (1) whether or not to join an interaction, and (2) in what direction
to drive these non-deterministic interaction models. The first case is dealt with by the
agent’s decision making process, which is outside the scope of the  specification.
The second is achieved in  by making use of constraints whose satisfaction relies
on the knowledge of the particular agent playing that role at that specific time.
 follows a process calculi approach for the specification of social norms. Each
role is associated with a process. Each process definition is a specification of a labelled
transition system, which indicates the actions the role can perform: what messages
can be received, what messages can be sent, in what order may these messages be
transmitted, and under what conditions may these actions occur.
For modelling multiagent systems, many methods have used the concepts of social
norms (e.g. Greaves et al., 2000; Esteva et al., 2001, , etc.), several others have used
transition graphs and process calculi (e.g. Esteva et al., 2002), logic programming (e.g.
Clark and McCabe, 2003), etc. However, to our knowledge,  is the only process
calculi that is used both in the specification of multiagent systems as well as in the
execution of their interactions. For instance, the  process calculus has been used
by Walton (2004) for the specification and verification of multiagent interactions. The
ambient calculus has been used by Esteva et al. (2002) for the specification and verifi-
cation of electronic institutions. The π-calculus has been used by Jiao and Shi (1999).
The ψ-calculus was introduced by Kinny (2002) for agent specifications. Similarly,
Hartonas (2003) introduces another process calculus for specifying agents and their
workspace. However, unlike , none of these process calculi have been used in the
executable model.
Furthermore,  provides a lightweight method that has only two basic engineer-
ing requirements from agents: (1) to be able to extract the current state of the interac-
tion and the agent’s next permissible action(s), and (2) to have an appropriate constraint
solver for dealing with  constraints. After presenting the  syntax and semantics
in Section 2.2.2, Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 discuss these two lightweight requirements
in more detail.
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2.2.2 Syntax and Semantics
The  interaction framework is the set of clauses specifying the expected message
passing behaviour associated with the various roles of an interaction. Its syntax is
presented by Figure 2.3.
Framework := {Clause, . . .}
Clause := Agent :: ADe f
Agent := a(Role, Id)
ADe f := ADe f then ADe f | ADe f or ADe f | ADe f par ADe f |
Agent [← C] | Message | null [← C]
Message := M ⇒ Agent [← C] | [C ←] M ⇐ Agent




null represents an event which does not involve message passing (or a “do nothing” event),
Term is a structured term in Prolog syntax,
Id is either a variable or a unique agent identifier, and
[X] denotes the occurrence of either zero or one instance of X.
Figure 2.3: LCC syntax
A framework, or an interaction model, is composed of a set of clauses. A clause
gives each agent role a definition that specifies its acceptable behaviour.  agents are
defined by their roles and identifiers. When defining interaction models, it is common
to specify the role while keeping the agent identifier as a variable. This allows the
interaction model to be instantiated by different agents, each running its own instance
of the interaction. The agent’s behaviour may be defined in terms of three different
classes of atomic actions. First, an agent can send or receive messages (M⇒A, M⇐A),
which we sometimes refer to as message passing actions (). Second, an agent
can take on a different role. Third, an agent can do nothing, which is usually used
when the agent needs to perform internal computations. Internal computations are
sometimes referred to as constraints, or non message passing actions (-). Complex
agent behaviour may then be built on top of these three classes of atomic actions using
the sequential (then), choice (or), parallel composition (par), and conditional (←)
operators. The conditional operator is used for linking constraints to atomic actions.
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LCC Example: We take the following scenario from Robertson (2004b) to illus-
trate the use of  as a specification language for achieving coordination in multiagent
systems. The example illustrated in Figure 2.4 presents a scenario in which a work-
shop organiser, playing the  role organiser, asks another agent, playing the  role
headhunter, for the appropriate people on that workshop topic. It then locates those
people in the network by consulting with an agent playing the role finder. Finally, it
engages in a discussion with these people in order to achieve a schedule that would
suit everyone’s time constraints.
When the interaction starts, the organiser needs to know in advance what the work-
shop subject A is, who the headhunter agent H is, and who the finder agent F is. The
interaction starts when the organiser sends a message to the headhunter asking it to
inform it of the experts in subject A. The organiser then receives a set S of the suitable
people for subject A. It then takes the role of a locator to obtain the location of those
people, followed by the role of a time coordinator to coordinate the workshop’s time
schedule with respect to the time constraints of these people.
In order to locate people, the organiser (playing the role locator(F,S,L)) sends a
message to the finder agent F asking it for the location of one of the people, after which
a reply is received specifying the web location of the person in question. A recursion
is performed over the entire list of people S until the web location of all those people
have been obtained.
In order to coordinate the proposed schedule with the people involved in the work-
shop, the organiser (playing the role time coordinator(S,L, A, [T |T ],Tw)) tries to co-
ordinate one proposed schedule after the other. For each proposed schedule T , it takes
the role time proposer to ask the people about their availability. This is done recur-
sively over the entire list of people S. If the final result is ok, then the time coordinator
role would have completed successfully. Otherwise, the time coordinator role tries to
repeat the whole process for another proposed schedule of the set T .
The headhunter has a simple role: when a message is received asking about the
appropriate people for a given subject, a reply should be sent back with a list of people’s
names, based on the headhunter’s knowledge.
The finder agent also has a simple role: when a message is received asking for the
location of the agent associated with some person, a reply is sent back with the  of
that person, based on the finder’s knowledge. However, the finder’s role is recursive.
This is because, in a single run of the interaction, the finder may recursively be asked
to find the location of other agents.
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a(organiser(A,H, F),O) ::
ask(best people(A))⇒ a(headhunter,H) then
in f orm(best people(A,S))⇐ a(headhunter,H) then
a(locator(F,S,L),O) then
a(time coordinator(S,L, A,T ,Tw),O)← times(T ).
a(locator(F,S,L), L) ::
ask(locate(Xp))⇒ a( f inder, F)← S = [Xp|Sr] ∧ L = [Xl|Lr] then




null← S = [] ∧ L = [].
a(time coordinator(S,L, A, [T |Tr],Tw), X) ::
a(time proposer(S,L, A,T,R), X) then
null← R = ok ∧ Tw = T
or
a(time coordinator(S,L, A,Tr,Tw), X)← R = not ok
 .
a(time proposer([P|Sr], [L|Lr], A,T,R), X) ::
ask(available(T ))⇒ a(person(P), L) then
 in f orm(available(T ))⇐ a(person(P), L) thena(time proposer(Sr,Lr, A,T,R), X)

or




ask(best people(A))⇐ a(organiser(T,H, F),O) then
in f orm(best people(A,S))⇒ a(organiser(T,H, F),O)← choose persons(A,S).
a( f inder, P) ::
ask(locate(Xp))⇐ a(Role, L) then
in f orm(located(Xp, Xl))⇒ a(Role, L)← likely location(Xp, Xl) then
a( f inder, P).
a(person(P), X) ::
ask(available(T ))⇐ Agent then
in f orm(available(T ))⇒ Agent ← am available(T )
or
in f orm(unavailable(T ))⇒ Agent ← am unavailable(T )
 .
Figure 2.4: LCC scenario: a workshop scheduler
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The role of the person contacted by our organiser to coordinate the time schedule
with is also simple: if asked whether its schedule is free for a specific time/date T , the
person replies with either available or unavailable messages.
2.2.3 LCC Interaction Execution
One of the two  engineering requirements is for agents to be able to extract the
current protocol state, spot and perform their next permitted move(s), and save the
new protocol state. This is easily achieved in  by applying a set of rewrite rules
presented in Figure 2.5. The basic idea is that at the very beginning of the interaction,
the agent makes a copy of the generic role definition by instantiating it with its own
Id. When a new message is received, the agent looks up the appropriate role definition
and performs its permitted actions. It then marks those actions as closed to help it
spot its protocol state in the future. It then saves this modified role definition in the
current protocol state, replacing the old one. All of this is achieved through one simple
mechanism: applying the  rewrite rules.
The rewrite rules of Figure 2.5 are applied exhaustively to achieve a full expansion
of a clause. An agent A with protocol definition A :: B is expanded to A :: E if B can
be expanded to E. The term A1 or A2 can be expanded to E if either A1 or A2 can
be expanded to E, given that the unexpanded part has not already been closed. For
terms of the form A1 then A2, either A1 is expanded, or A2 is expanded if A1 has already
been closed. A1 par A2 is expanded to E par A2 if A1 expands to E, to A1 par E if A2
expands to E, or to E1 par E2 if both A1 and A2 expand to E1 and E2, respectively.
M⇐ A←C is marked closed if the the constraint C can be satisfied and the message
M is an element of the set of incoming messages Mi. M⇒A←C is marked closed if
the constraint C is satisfied. In this case, the message M is added to the set of outgoing
messages O. The term null←C is marked closed if the constraint C is satisfied. The
term a(R, I)←C is expanded to a(R, I) :: B if the constraint C is satisfied and the clause
a(R, I) :: B appears in the protocol P.
2.2.4 Coordination in LCC
Robertson (2004a) describes the coordination mechanism in  as follows. An agent
A engaged in interaction I receives the following tuple (I,M,R, A,P), where M is the
message, R is the role the agent should be playing in interaction I, and P is the proto-
col. The protocol consists of a set of  clauses CF that defines the protocol frame-
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A :: B
Mi,Mo,P,O

























−−−−−−−−−−−→ E1 par E2 if A1
Mi,Mn,P,O1
−−−−−−−−→ E1 ∧ A2
Mn,Mo,P,O2
−−−−−−−−→ E2
C ← M ⇐ A
Mi,Mi−{M⇐A},P,∅
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c(M ⇐ A) if (M ⇐ A) ∈ Mi ∧ satis f ied(C)
M ⇒ A ← C
Mi,Mi,P,{M⇒A}
−−−−−−−−−−−→ c(M ⇒ A) if satis f ied(C)
null ← C
Mi,Mi,P,∅
−−−−−−−→ c(null) if satis f ied(C)
a(R, I) ← C
Mi,Mi,P,∅
−−−−−−−→ a(R, I) :: B if clause(P, a(R, I) :: B) ∧ satis f ied(C)
where,
Mi represents the set of incoming messages,
Mo represents the modified set of incoming messages,
P represents both the generic and instantiated protocol, and
O represents the set of outgoing messages.
Also, satis f ied(C) is said to be true if the agent can satisfy C,
clause(P, X) is said to be true if the clause X appears in the dialogue framework of protocol P, and
a protocol term is closed in the following cases:
closed(c(X))
closed(A or B) ← closed(A) ∨ closed(B)
closed(A then B) ← closed(A) ∧ closed(B)
closed(A par B) ← closed(A) ∧ closed(B)
closed(X :: D) ← closed(D)
Figure 2.5: LCC rewrite rules
work, a set of clauses CS that defines the current protocol state, and a set of clauses
defining the common knowledge. The protocol framework is the original protocol
which remains unchanged throughout an interaction. The protocol state consists of
those clauses which are constantly modified to keep track of the current protocol state.
Common knowledge in  is the knowledge needed to carry out a given interaction
protocol. It is specific to the given interaction.
Upon receiving a tuple (I,M,R, A,P), the agent checks whether there exists a copy
of its own protocol state in CS by checking for a clause matching its role and Id. If
such a clause does exist, then it is retrieved, the rewrite rules described by Figure 2.5
are applied, and the new protocol state replaces the old one in CS . However, if such a
22 Chapter 2. Background
clause does not exist, then the agent’s original clause is retrieved from CF and the new
protocol state obtained by applying the rewrite rules is saved in CS . Finally, messages
that need to be sent to other agents will be sent along with the modified protocol P.
Note that in non-linear interactions, where several agents may send different messages
simultaneously, each agent will have to save its own protocol state locally.
In conclusion,  addresses the challenge of achieving coordination in a modular
way that has a very low impact on engineering agents by imposing only two engi-
neering requirements: agents should have (1) a protocol expander, and (2) a constraint
solver. The protocol expanding mechanism has already been introduced above. The
constraint solver is what is needed to allow agents to solve  constraints. Note that
 is neutral to both the protocol expansion mechanism and the choice of mechanism
for communicating between agents. Although it is a logic programming language,
two forms of deployment mechanisms have been implemented: Java and Prolog based
mechanisms.  may also be considered neutral to the choice of constraint solver;
however, we note that if different constraint solvers were addressing the same con-
straint in different manners, then this could raise coordination problems.
2.2.5 LCC and Process Calculi: a Comparison
Since our main goal is model checking multiagent systems, we focus on the process
calculi nature of . Process calculus is a calculus used for defining concurrent sys-
tems. The concept of process calculus emerged with Robin Milner’s work on , the
Calculus for Communicating Systems (Milner, 1989). During this time, Hoare also
started working on , Communicating Sequential Processes (Hoare, 1985). Both 
and  laid down the foundations on which process calculi that followed is based
on. In what follows, we present a comparison between , , , and the π-
calculus(Milner, 1999), the most common process calculus, followed by a general
overview of some features provided by other process calculi in comparison with .
Table 2.1 draws a comparison between the notations of the main four process calculi.
2.2.5.0.1 Definition/Recursion Operators. The operator used for defining pro-
cesses (or agents in ) is common to all four process calculi of Table 2.1. It is defined
as ‘::’ in , ‘def=’ in  and π-calculus, and ‘=’ in . The left hand side is usually
the process’ name (or agent’s name in the form of a(Role, Id) in ), while the right
hand side is a term constructed using the remaining operators. Note that if the process’
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LCC CCS CSP π-Calculus
Definition /
A :: ADe f P def= PDe f P = PDe f P def= PDe f
Recursion
Prefix A then B a.P a→ P a.P
Sequential A then B P; Q
Choice A or B P + Q
(a→ P | b→ Q)
P + QP u Q
P  Q
Concurrency /
A par B P | Q
P ‖ Q
P | Q
Parallelism P 9 Q




Relabelling P[ f ] L : P
Replication !P
Input Action M ⇐ A [← C] a(x) a?x a(x)
Output Action M ⇒ A [← C] ā(x) a!x ā(x)
Empty Action /
null [← C] NIL S TOP 0
Empty Process
Table 2.1: LCC and other process calculi: a rough comparison
name on the left hand side reappears in the right hand side, then this is a specification
of recursion.
2.2.5.0.2 Prefix Operators. The prefix operator is also common to all four cal-
culi. It specifies that a certain action is succeeded by a given process. It is defined as
‘then’ in , ‘.’ in  and π-calculus, and ‘→’ in .
2.2.5.0.3 Actions: Input/Output/Empty. Before we proceed with the remaining
operators, we first introduce the various notions of actions. In , actions could either
be: (1) general interaction events, such as the ticking of a clock, which is represented
via an action label ‘tick’, or (2) a communication event, such as input ‘a?x’ and output
‘a!x’ actions, where ‘x’ is the transmitted data and ‘a’ is the name of the channel the
data is transmitted through.
In  and π-calculus, interaction events are treated as input and output actions.
Hence, actions in  and π-calculus are either input ‘a(x)’, output ‘ā(x)’, or silent τ
actions. If no data is transmitted, then ‘x’ is dropped and the input and output actions
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are represented via the channel names ‘a’ and ‘ā’, respectively. This is usually used
to specify synchronisation through signalling. The τ action is used to synchronise the
input and output actions, forcing them to occur simultaneously. τ is discussed in more
detail in Section 2.2.5.0.6, when addressing the concurrency issue.
 actions could be input ‘M⇐A’ or output ‘M⇒A’ actions. In , the message
M is a structured Prolog term. It could either be used as signals for synchronisation or
for transmitting complex data structures. However, the concept of τ does not exist in
. This is basically due to the fact that  is not only a specification language but
an executable language as well. This implies that it is not enough to state that input
and output actions should occur in parallel; the details of these actions should also be
specified. Furthermore, multiagent systems use networks that are not 100% reliable for
transmitting messages: messages may be lost, delayed, or delivered in a wrong order.
Therefore, it is impossible to guarantee, and hence to specify, that a sent message will
instantly be collected. Also note that instead of specifying the direction of flow of
messages through the specification of the channel through which a message M is sent,
 requires the specification of the agent A which the message is sent from/to. This
requires the specification of the agent’s role and Id. In distributed open system, such as
multiagent systems, agents should be capable of sending/receiving messages to/from
any other agent in the system: restrictions on who can send messages to whom should
be dealt with at a higher level by the agents themselves. Therefore, each agent is
assumed to have channels connecting it to all other agents in the system, which makes
channels synonymous with agents’ roles and Ids.
 also allows the specification of agents’ internal actions. Internal actions, also
referred to as non-message passing actions (-), are actions performed by the agent
on its own without the need to communicate with other agents. This usually represents
internal computations, specified by attaching constraints ‘[← C]’ to other input/output
actions. If only internal actions are to be performed, then the constraints would be
attached to either the empty action ‘null’ or the action of taking on a different role
‘a(Role, Id)’. Note that ‘null’ in  differs slightly from the ‘NIL’ of , ‘S TOP’ of
, and ‘0’ of the π-calculus. While ‘null’ is an empty action, which may be succeeded
by other actions, ‘NIL’, ‘S TOP’, and ‘0’ are empty processes that can not be followed
by any other action, hence symbolising the very end of a process.
2.2.5.0.4 Sequential Operators. As opposed to the prefix operator that only
permits actions to be succeeded by processes, the sequential operator allows the spec-
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ification of processes being succeeded by other processes. This operator is unique to
 and . Note that ‘then’ in  is used both as a prefix and a sequential operator,
while ‘;’ is the sequential operator of .
2.2.5.0.5 Choice Operators. In , there are three different choice operators.
The first is the deterministic choice operator ‘|’, which is used for specifying the choice
between actions as opposed to the choice between processes. This is basically due to
the fact that the initial actions should be distinct. Hence, it is used as follows ‘(a →
P | b → Q)’, where a , b. However, if the choice is between two actions which are
essentially the same (a = b), then the non-deterministic choice operator ‘u’ is used on
processes as follows ‘P u Q’. This implies that the environment cannot influence the
choice of processes, hence the name non-deterministic choice. Finally,  also defines
a more general choice operator ‘’ which is used to represent both deterministic ‘|’
and non-deterministic ‘u’ choice operators. On the other hand, the choice operators,
‘+’ of  and the π-calculus and ‘or’ of , do not differentiate between external
choices affected by the environment and internal ones. In , choices may or may
not be affected by the agents. We believe that explicitly specifying the entity behind
making the choice, whether it is the environment, the agents, etc., is irrelevant since it
does not affect the flow of interactions in multiagent systems.
2.2.5.0.6 Concurrency, Restriction, and Concealment Operators. Concur-
rency is achieved by having several processes acting in parallel. In , two operators
are used to express concurrency. The parallel operator ‘‖’ is used when actions com-
mon to both processes may only occur simultaneously. An example of this is having
the actions of sending and receiving a message occur in parallel, as opposed to sequen-
tially. The interleaving operator ‘9’ is used when processes are concurrent, but their
common actions are not necessarily synchronised. In , the actions common to two
processes are labelled by the same action name. In  and π-calculus, these common
actions are also labelled by the same action name, but they are described as actions
and their co-actions, with the co-actions having an additional bar above their actions’
name. When synchronisation is necessary in  and π-calculus, the occurrence of one
action and its co-action may be labelled as the action τ. This implies that both actions
are synchronised and their details are concealed from the outside world. Although 
does not define a τ action, it does provide a concealment operator ‘\’ for concealing
actions from the outside world. The  and π-calculus’ concurrency operator ‘|’ is
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used to represent the interleaving operator ‘9’ of . If certain actions and co-actions
should be synchronised without being concealed, then the restriction operator ‘\’ is
used. Therefore, the parallel operator of  in conjunction with its restriction operator
‘\’ becomes similar in functionality to parallel operator ‘‖’ of , with respect to the
restricted actions.
The  parallel operator ‘par’ is equivalent to that of . However, there is no
equivalence in  to the τ action of  and no explicit definition of synchronisation
through a restriction operator such as the ‘\’ of . When synchronisation is necessary
in , it may be explicitly specified in the process’ definition, possibly using signals
and/or acknowledgements. Using such methods, we believe  provides a more re-
alistic approach for dealing with synchronisation in distributed open systems. This is
because of two reasons. First, we assume that there is no shared information between
agents other than by message passing, making message passing the only method for
synchronisation. Second, communication in distributed open systems does not make
use of dedicated channels, as is the case of traditional process calculi systems, but be-
tween agents and through less reliable networks. When communication is performed
through a network instead of a dedicated channel, there is no way of controlling many
aspects of communication, such as the delivery of messages, the order of messages
received, etc. Therefore, synchronising a message output action with its message input
co-action is not realistic.
2.2.5.0.7 Relabelling Operators. Relabelling is used by both  and . In
, it is specified as ‘P[ f ]’, where f is the function that performs the relabelling.
In  , it is specified as ‘L : P’, where L is the set of labels used for relabelling.
Relabelling actions is useful for constructing a system from similar processes operating
concurrently. However, the issue of relabelling is irrelevant to , where messages
are directly sent from/to agents with specific roles and Ids, as opposed to common
channels. Therefore, even if there exists more than one agent playing the same role in
an interaction, then the messages sent by/to these agents can always be distinguished
through the agents’ unique Ids. This eliminates the need of relabelling in .
2.2.5.0.8 Replication Operator. While recursion is defined as having infinite
sequential occurrences of the same process, replication is defined as having infinite
concurrent occurrences of the same process. In π-calculus, replication is specified by
‘!P = P | P | P | ...’. In , the replication operator does not exist basically due to the
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restricted use of the concurrent operator on which replication is based.
Multiagent systems are viewed as a collection of agents working in parallel. The
use of replication seems appealing for several scenarios. For example, in an auction
system, it would be convenient to be able to specify that there is exactly one auctioneer
and an indefinite number of bidders acting concurrently. In , this cannot be made
explicit; such a specification is implicit in the auctioneer’s definition, for example,
which is responsible for sending invites to bidders. At the beginning of the interac-
tion, one copy of each generic agent role definition is sufficient. As other agents start
joining the interaction (such as bidders in an auction system), they instantiate the ap-
propriate generic agent role definition by binding it to their unique Id and add this new
instantiated process to the pool of concurrent process.
Since this thesis is concerned with the verification of multiagent system interac-
tions, it is important to note the effect of replication on the verification process. Ideally
it would be interesting to prove that certain properties hold, for instance, for an infinite
number of bidders. In practise, this depends on the verifier’s capability of dealing with
infinite processes. For model checking, the technique used for verification in this the-
sis, the system model that needs to be verified should be a finite system. This implies
that only a finite set of parallel processes may be used, regardless of whether these
processes use sequential recursion resulting in an infinite behaviour. As a result, our
verification process uses the concurrent operator only at the final stage of specification,
after all processes (or agent definitions) have already been specified. It is used as a way
of constructing an instance of the interaction model by specifying which agents/roles
will be playing in parallel.
2.2.5.0.9 Additional CSP Operators. Table 2.1 omits several of the least com-
mon features of . Unlike ,  was initially designed with the issue of addressing
failure in mind. Some of these features deal with interrupts and catastrophes, and offer
recovery methods, such as restarting and making use of checkpoints.  does not al-
low the specification of possible reaction to failure. The decision of what to do next is
left entirely for the individual agents. Nevertheless, the coordination mechanism of 
provides a copy of the interaction’s current state-space along with the generic one. This
helps agents to pinpoint the exact point of failure and decide their next move based on
that. Mechanisms addressing failure could then be built on a higher level, making use
of the available current and generic state-spaces. For example, Osman (2003) explores
the possibility of allowing agents to backtrack in  to other more successful paths
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of the state-space when necessary; however, it does not tackle the problem of agents
not always being able to backtrack after certain internal actions have already been exe-
cuted and committed to. Hassan et al. (2005) provides a constraint failure mechanism
that allows agents to restrict rather than simply instantiate  constraints, resulting
in interactions which are less likely to break. McGinnis and Robertson (2004) pro-
vide a mechanism for dynamically adapting  interactions to increase the chance of
successful termination.
Some of the other features of  are those of using assignment, conditionals, and
loops. The  syntax and its use of constraints allows the specification of such features
in a straightforward manner.
2.2.5.0.10 π-Calculus and Dynamic Processes. The π-calculus in Table 2.1
looks extremely similar to . The π-calculus, developed by Milner, Parrow, and
Walker, is in fact based on Milner’s . The main difference the π-calculus introduces
is the concept of dynamic process. In , data is communicated between processes via
channels. In the π-calculus, ports (or channels) may also be communicated between
processes. This implies that the system can now evolve as its configuration changes.
This is similar to using variables in  for specifying the agent to communicate with.
Since messages are sent to agents with specific roles and Ids, then the role and Id may
be specified as a variable whose value is computed and possibly exchanged at run time.
2.2.5.0.11 Features of Other Process Calculi. Several flavours of , , and
π-calculus have emerged. New languages, originally based on these three languages,
have also been introduced. Each of these brought forward new concepts not dealt with
by its predecessors. Samples of these new concepts are the use of timeouts, prioritis-
ing actions, examining stochastic behaviour, considering an agent’s ambience, etc. In
, these features are not explicitly defined. When necessary, a quick fix would be
to incorporate many of these features by specifying them in terms of  constraints.
Timeouts, for instance, may be inserted as constraints wherever necessary in an inter-
action’s state-space. Priorities could be specified as constraints affecting the agent’s
choice of actions based on the agents’ preference. As for the notion of ambience, it
is worth noting that the various benchmark scenarios of this thesis were successfully
specified in with no need for ambient specification. For instance, rather than having
to invest in new notation,  allows the specification of environmental changes for a
role within the role’s definition by making use of the role’s parameters. Nevertheless,
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a version of  incorporating the notion of ambient is currently being studied by the
 funded OpenKnowledge project (Joseph et al., 2006).
2.3 Modal and Temporal Logic
As illustrated in Section 2.1.2.1, modal and temporal logics are typically used by model
checkers to specify the properties to be verified in a given system model. This sec-
tion provides a general introduction to modal and temporal logic, focusing on the µ-
calculus, our model checker’s specification language.
Logic is used to determine the validity of arguments and propositions, aiming at
proving which are true and which are false. But how do traditional logics, such as
propositional logic, deal with propositions of the form “it is possible that the U.S. will
attack Iran over its nuclear program”. Modal logic is a logic that extends propositional
logic by allowing the specification of the necessity and possibility modalities; hence,
allowing inference over such arguments. In addition to the logical operators of propo-
sitional logic ¬, ∧, ∨,→, and⇒, the two modal operators  and ^ are introduced for
representing necessity and possibility, respectively. The semantics of modal logic are
then defined in terms of possible worlds. P is true iff P is true in all possible worlds.
Similarly, ^P is true iff P is true in some possible world 2.
Modal logic has helped define various ideas in terms of modalities resulting in dif-
ferent classes of modal logic, where each class has its own interpretation of the  and
^ operators. For instance, deontic logic is the logic of obligations, permissions, pro-
hibitions, etc. It deals with statements such as ‘one must do this’ and ‘one may do
that’. These are defined in terms of the  and ^ modal operators, requiring a slightly
different interpretation of these operators with a new set of axioms. Another example
is temporal logic, which deals with the temporal information about propositions. Tem-
poral logic deals with statements of the form ‘it will always be true that” and ‘it will
eventually be true that’. Again, this temporal information may be viewed as a different
interpretation of the modal operators. Similarly, epistemic logic (logic of knowledge),
doxastic logic (logic of belief), and many others have also been defined in terms of the
 and ^ modal operators.
In this thesis, we make use of both temporal and deontic logic. We give an overview
of temporal logic in this section, followed by an overview of deontic logic in Sec-
2Some studies, such as Blackburn and van Benthem (2006), have been interested in the relationship
between modal logic and first-order logic.
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Syntax:




E |= Φ1 ∧ Φ2 iff E |= Φ1 and E |= Φ2
E |= Φ1 ∨ Φ2 iff E |= Φ1 or E |= Φ2
E |= [K]Φ iff ∀F ∈ {E′ : E
a
−→ F and a ∈ K}. F |= Φ
E |= 〈K〉Φ iff ∃F ∈ {E′ : E
a
−→ F and a ∈ K}. F |= Φ
Figure 2.6: Hennessy-Milner Logic: syntax and semantics
tion 2.4. The temporal logic used by our model checker is the µ-calculus, an extension
of the modal logic: Hennessy-Milner Logic (). Therefore, we provide an overview
of  in Section 2.3.1, followed by a general introduction to temporal logics in Sec-
tion 2.3.2, and a specification of the µ-calculus in Section 2.3.3.
2.3.1 Hennessy-Milner Logic
The Hennessy-Milner Logic () (Hennessy and Milner, 1980) is a logic for describ-
ing the capabilities/actions of processes. Its syntax and semantics are presented in Fig-
ure 2.6. The syntax implies that  formulae may be constructed using the boolean
connectives ∧ and ∨, the modal operators box and diamond, and the truth constants
tt and ff. In , the box and diamond operators are defined in the context of an
explicitly specified action K: [K]Φ and 〈K〉Φ. Note that the Hennessy-Milner Logic
was later on extended to the modal logic M3, by letting K represent a set of actions
instead of a single action. In the modal logic M, the set −K abbreviates A − K, where
A is the universal set of actions. Similarly, the set − abbreviates A − ∅.
 formulae are used to describe properties of processes. A process E either
satisfies a modal formula Φ (E |= Φ) or not (E 6|= Φ). Therefore, the semantics of 
formulae are better understood in the context of their satisfaction.
The syntax implies that the property tt is always satisfied, whereas ff is never
satisfied. The property Φ1 ∧Φ2 is satisfied at a process E, if both properties Φ1 and Φ2
are satisfied at E. Similarly, Φ1 ∨ Φ2 is satisfied at a process E, if either property Φ1
3The syntax and semantics of  and the modal logic M are taken from Stirling (2001).
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or Φ2 is satisfied at E. [K]Φ is satisfied at E if for every action a ∈ K that E can take
to F, Φ will be satisfied at F. In other words, the box operator [K]Φ implies that it is
necessary that any action a ∈ K will lead to the satisfaction of property Φ. Similarly,
〈K〉Φ is satisfied at E if there exists at least one action a ∈ K that E can take to F andΦ
is satisfied at F. In other words, the diamond operator 〈K〉Φ implies that it is possible
for an action a ∈ K to occur, leading to the satisfaction of property Φ.
Note that  is a modal logic. It expresses the capability of performing actions in
the immediate next step. However, there is no way of describing temporal properties,
such as the capability of the clock to continuously tick forever. Temporal notations and
temporal logics are introduced in the following section.
2.3.2 Temporal Logics: an Overview
Temporal logic is a logic that is concerned with representing and reasoning about tem-
poral information. In temporal logic, time is viewed as a sequence of states, repre-
senting the “flow of time”. The logic allows reasoning about temporal properties of
propositions by studying which states these propositions are valid at.
Modern temporal logic is based on the Tense Logic of Arthur Prior (Prior, 1955),
which is based on modal logic. In addition to the logical operators, Prior introduced
four modal operators, namely P, H, F, and G, for representing what has been true in
the past, what has always been true in the past, what will be true in the future, and what
will always be true in the future.
Several extensions were made to the Tense Logic. Amongst these were the intro-
duction of the S and U temporal operators for representing ‘p is valid since q’ and ‘p
is valid until q’, respectively. Later on, the next temporal operator X was introduced to
specify that a proposition holds in the immediate time step, i.e. in the next state.
All of the above operators model temporal properties in a deterministic world.
Temporal logics that focus on deterministic worlds are called linear temporal logics.
To account for non-determinism, branching into the future is made possible by in-
troducing two branching operators, A and E, that act as quantifiers over the different
paths/branches. A stands for for all paths, while E stands for there exists a path.
Table 2.2 presents the various temporal operators used, the languages that use them,
and a simple description of each. Note that the most popular and widely used tempo-
ral logics are the linear time logic  and the branching time logics , *, and
µ-calculus (Kozen, 1983; Edmund M. Clarke et al., 1999, p. 27-32). Table 2.2 only
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focuses on the original Tense logic along with  and . * is excluded because
it is an extension of  that uses the same operators, but extends the syntax by allow-
ing the operators to be freely mixed4. The µ-calculus is also excluded by Table 2.2
simply because it uses a completely different syntax. The next section introduces the
µ-calculus, our model checker’s branching temporal logic.
Operator Name Used by Description
Pα Past Tense It has, at some time, been the case that α was true.





It will, at some time, be the case that α is true.
Gα Globally Tense, ,

It will always be the case that α is true.
αUβ Until ,  It will always be the case that α is true until β is true.
And β should become true at some point.
W Weak Until  It will always be the case that α is true until β is true. But
β need never be true.
αRβ Release , If α becomes true, then β need not be true anymore.
Nα /Xα Next ,  In the next state, it will be the case that α is true.
Aα All/Always  In all paths, it will be the case that α is true.
Eα Exists  There exists a path where it will be the case that α is true.
Table 2.2: Temporal operators
2.3.3 The Modal µ-Calculus
In Section 2.3.1, we saw that modal logic allows us to specify properties of immedi-
ate capabilities and necessities. However, it was unable to express enduring traits of
processes, such as those representing properties of the form ‘it is always the case that’.
The temporal logics discussed in Section 2.3.2, introduced new operators to describe
long term, or even infinite, features of processes. The main two operators that express
these are the G and F operators, representing ‘it will always be the case’ and ‘it will
eventually be the case’, respectively. The minimal set of operators depends on the spe-
cific logic. In , for example, all operators may be defined in terms of terms of AG
and EG.
4Unlike *,  applies strict rules on the mixing of  operators. For example, operators should
occur in pairs having one branch operator (such as A or E) followed by a state operator (such as F, G,
etc.).
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The µ-calculus, however, takes a different approach in addressing temporal proper-
ties. It may be viewed as an extension to the Hennessy-Milner Logic. It basically uses
the Hennessy-Milner Logic for representing the immediate capabilities and necessities.
It then builds on top of this using a form of recursion to achieve a representation of long
term and infinite features. The recursion of the µ-calculus is achieved by making use
of fixpoint operators. Despite its simple syntax, the result is a rich logic with powerful
features. However, there is one major drawback for using the modal µ-calculus. This
is best described by Bradfield and Stirling (2001, p. 9), which provides moral support
for the newcomers to this field:
Fixpoint logics are notorious for being incomprehensible. Indeed, it has
been known for several reasonably expert people to spend an hour or two
trying to work out whether a one line formula means what it was intended
to mean. Furthermore, a full understanding of the mathematical intrica-
cies of the modal mu-calculus requires familiarity with mathematics that,
although not difficult, is not covered in most undergraduate mathematics
or computer science programmes; this can be a source of irritation for the
practitioner new to the area. Fortunately, one can get a very good intuitive
understanding, which is even provably equivalent to the formal semantics,
without knowing the full details. Moreover, this intuition is all but essen-
tial for understanding the deep theory as well.
Despite this drawback, the modal µ-calculus has been the focus of interest of many
researchers in the field of verification. This is for two main reasons. First, the logic
is so simple yet so rich that it subsumes most temporal languages used today, such as
, , , , -∆, and * (Mateescu and Sighireanu, 2003; Leucker et al.,
2003). Second, efficient model checking algorithms are already available for this logic
(Edmund M. Clarke et al., 1999, p. 97).
Section 2.3.3.1 introduces the syntax and semantics of the µ-calculus. This is fol-
lowed by Section 2.3.3.2, which aims at providing a basic understanding of the cal-
culus. Finally, Section 2.3.3.3 introduces a subset of the calculus, the alternation-free
µ-calculus, which is the subset used by our model checker.
2.3.3.1 Syntax and Semantics
Figure 2.7 presents the syntax and semantics of the modal µ-calculus. The syntax
extends that of the Hennessy-Milner logic (Figure 2.6) by introducing propositional
variables (Z) along with the least and greatest fixed point operators (µZ and νZ, re-
spectively).
34 Chapter 2. Background
Syntax:




E |=V Z iff E ∈ V(Z)
E |=V Φ1 ∧ Φ2 iff E |=V Φ1 and E |=V Φ2
E |=V Φ1 ∨ Φ2 iff E |=V Φ1 or E |=V Φ2
E |=V [K]Φ iff ∀F ∈ {E′ : E
a
−→ F and a ∈ K}. F |=V Φ
E |=V 〈K〉Φ iff ∃F ∈ {E′ : E
a
−→ F and a ∈ K}. F |=V Φ
E |=V νZ.Φ iff E ∈
⋃
{E ⊆ P : E ⊆ {E ∈ P : E |=V[E/Z] Φ}}
E |=V µZ.Φ iff E ∈
⋂
{E ⊆ P : {E ∈ P : E |=V[E/Z] Φ} ⊆ E}
Figure 2.7: Modal µ-calculus: syntax and semantics
Most of the satisfaction rules are similar to those of  of Figure 2.6. However,
a valuation function V is introduced to assign to each variable Z a subset of processes
V(Z) that satisfy this variable (or property). Therefore, we say state E satisfies Z
(E |=V Z), if and only if E is an element of V(Z). Note that the satisfaction of a
property Φ at a given state E is now defined as E |=V Φ, as opposed to E |= Φ in ,
since satisfaction is now relative to the valuation V of the propositional variables that
appear in the property Φ.
The modal µ-calculus’ main extension to  is the addition of the least and great-
est fixed point operators. A state E is said to satisfy property µZ.Φ if E is an element
of the least fixed point solution of Φ, which is the intersection of all prefixed points.
Similarly, E is said to satisfy the property νZ.Φ if E is an element of the greatest fixed
point solution of Φ, which is the union of all post-fixed points. Note that V[E/Z] is the
valuation that maps E to Z, but otherwise agrees with V. The following section aims at
providing an intuitive understanding of the least and greatest fixed point operators of
the modal µ-calculus.
2.3.3.2 An Intuitive Understanding
2.3.3.2.1 Fixed Points In summary, a fixed point of a function is a point whose
value remains unchanged (i.e. fixed) after applying the function to it. For example,
the function f (x) = x2 has two fixed points: x = 0 and x = 1, where f (0) = 0 and
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f (1) = 1. In what follows, we provide some basic definitions of the various types of
fixed points.
Consider the function f on a lattice (S,⊆). A fixed point of the function f is a value
x, such that x = f (x). A pre-fixed point of the function f is a value x ∈ S , such that
f (x) ⊆ x. Similarly, a post-fixed point of the function f is a value x ∈ S , such that
x ⊆ f (x). Note that a fixed point of f is both a pre-fixed and post-fixed point of f . The
least fixed point of the function f is a fixed point that is less than or equal to all other
fixed points, according to some partial order. It is defined as
⋂
{x ⊆ S : f (x) ⊆ x}.
Similarly, the greatest fixed point of the function f is a fixed point that is greater than
or equal to all other fixed points, according to some partial order. It is defined as⋃
{x ⊆ S : x ⊆ f (x)}.
2.3.3.2.2 Extending HML with Fixpoint Operators Let f be defined as
f [Φ,Z](E) = {E ∈ P : E |=V[E/Z] Φ}; i.e. f is a function that takes a set of states E
as its input and outputs the set of states E ∈ P that satisfy the property Φ with respect
to the valuation V. Stirling (2001, p. 94–97) presents a proof of the monotonicity
of f followed by a sample proof of the Knaster-Tarski theorem that guarantees the
existence of a unique least and greatest fixed points of f . The Knaster-Tarski theorem
is an important theorem to the µ-calculus because it guarantees the existence of unique
least and greatest fixed point solutions for monotonic functions on complete lattices
(P,⊆).
The modal µ-calculus extends the Hennessy-Milner Logic with recursion. Recur-
sion forms the essence of the modal µ-calculus. Equations of the form Z def= Φ, where
the variable Z reappears in the right hand side of the equation, are used to specify
temporal properties of processes. Such equations have unique greatest and least fixed
point solutions, the solutions of the monotonic function f [Φ,Z]. The functions that
compute these least/greatest fixed point solutions are called the least/greatest fixpoint
operators and are defined as µZ.Φ and νZ.Φ, respectively.
2.3.3.2.3 Exercise As an exercise, this section provides an example that makes
use of pre and post fixed points. Readers with the necessary mathematical background
on this subject may find this section helpful. Other readers may directly skip to the
following section (Section 2.3.3.2.4).
Let us define the  formula EFΦ using the fixed point operators. EFΦ specifies
that there exists a path in which Φ is eventually satisfied. It is easy to define the
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appropriate recursive modal equation: Z def= Φ ∨ 〈−〉Z, where Φ does not contain Z,
i.e. Z is unbound (or free) in Φ. This equation implies that either Φ is satisfied at the
current state or something can happen which satisfies Z, and so on. The tricky question
is this: which fixed point solution of this equation best describes EFΦ? To find the
right solution, we compute both the pre and post fixed points accordingly:
Pre-fixed Points f [Φ ∨ 〈−〉Z,Z](E) ⊆ E
= {E ∈ P : E |=V[E/Z] Φ ∨ 〈−〉Z} ⊆ E
= {E ∈ P : E |=V Φ ∨ E |=V[E/Z] 〈−〉Z} ⊆ E
= {E ∈ P : E |=V Φ ∨ ∃a ∈ K. ∃F ∈ E. E
a
−→ F} ⊆ E
= if E ∈ P and (E |=V Φ or ∃a ∈ K. ∃F ∈ E. E
a
−→ F) then E ∈ E
Post-fixed Points E ⊆ f [Φ ∨ 〈−〉Z,Z](E)
= E ⊆ {E ∈ P : E |=V[E/Z] Φ ∨ 〈−〉Z}
= E ⊆ {E ∈ P : E |=V Φ ∨ E |=V[E/Z] 〈−〉Z}
= E ⊆ {E ∈ P : E |=V Φ ∨ ∃a ∈ K. ∃F ∈ E. E
a
−→ F}
= if E ∈ E then E |=V Φ or ∃a ∈ K. ∃F ∈ E. E
a
−→ F
The pre-fixed point solution implies that a set of processes E ⊆ P is a set that
contains all states E satisfying Φ. It then builds on top of that by adding all states E
which do not necessarily satisfy Φ, but can perform some action a to some state F that
does satisfy Φ. And so on. Therefore, the set E possesses the property of performing a
finite number of actions until Φ is eventually satisfied. In , this would be defined as
EFΦ (Stirling, 2001, p. 98). The post-fixed point solution implies that a state which is
an element of E could either satisfyΦ or it could perform some action a to another state
in E. While the pre-fixed point solution always contains states that satisfy Φ (if E |=V
then E ∈ E) and then builds on top of that by adding the states that can reach those
that satisfy Φ, the post-fixed point does not. This keeps the possibility of performing
actions infinitely often without ever reaching a state satisfying Φ open. In , this
would be defined as EFΦ ∨ EG〈−〉tt (Stirling, 2001, p. 98).
Note that the direction of the implication constitutes the main difference between
pre and post fixed point solutions. Therefore, Bradfield and Stirling (2001) suggest
that instead of using recursive equations of the form Z def= Φ ∨ 〈−〉Z, one should think
of recursion in the form of either X ⇐ Φ ∨ 〈−〉X or Y ⇒ Φ ∨ 〈−〉Y . The first defines a
pre-fixed point, stating that ‘if a state satisfies Φ ∨ 〈−〉X, then it satisfies any solution
X′ of the equation’. On the other hand, the second defines a post-fixed point, stating
that ‘if Y ′ satisfies any solution of the equation, then it surely satisfies Φ ∨ 〈−〉Y’.
Interestingly enough, the Knaster-Tarski theorem guarantees the existence of unique
2.3. Modal and Temporal Logic 37
pre and post-fixed points. Furthermore, the greatest post-fixed point and the least pre-
fixed point of a monotonic function are essentially the greatest and least fixed points.
Bradfield and Stirling (2001) argue that one may continue to use the logic presented
above by selecting between pre and post fixed point solutions, and yet use the notation
of the least and greatest fixed point operators µ and ν, respectively.
Going back to the main question raised by this example, one concludes that the
property defined as ‘there exists a path in which the property Φ eventually holds’ is
expressed as µZ.Φ ∨ 〈−〉Z in the modal µ-calculus. Whereas the formula νZ.Φ ∨ 〈−〉Z
represents the property defined as ‘there exists a path where either Φ is eventually
satisfied or actions may be performed infinitely often’.
2.3.3.2.4 Basic Intuition Bradfield and Stirling (2001, Section 3.2) provide us
with yet another basic intuitive understanding to the complex modal µ-calculus. In
conclusion, they argue that with a little refinement one may understand fixpoint oper-
ators and the µ-calculus accordingly: “ν means looping, and µ means finite looping”.
This notion of looping versus finite looping is the main difference between the two
formulae discussed above: νZ.Φ ∨ 〈−〉Z and µZ.Φ ∨ 〈−〉Z. As we saw in the previous
example, µZ.Φ ∨ 〈−〉Z specifies that recursion could occur, but it should be finite be-
cause Φ will eventually be true. However, νZ.Φ ∨ 〈−〉Z specifies that recursion could
be infinite with Φ never being true.
2.3.3.2.5 A Note on Negation The monotonicity of a function is one of the basic
requirements for guaranteeing a unique least/greatest fixed point solution. As a result,
to preserve monotonicity, negation is usually avoided in the µ-calculus (it may only be
permitted under strict conditions, as explained by Stirling (2001, p. 101)). Neverthe-
less, the absence of negation is not a major issue, since the complements of formulae
(marked with ‘c’) are already defined in the logic:
ttc = ff ffc = tt Zc = Z
(Φ ∧ Ψ)c = Φc ∨ Ψc (Φ ∨ Ψ)c = Φc ∧ Ψc
([K]Φ)c = 〈K〉Φc (〈K〉Φ)c = [K]Φc
(νZ.Φ)c = µZ.Φc (µZ.Φ)c = νZ.Φc
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2.3.3.3 The Alternation Free µ-calculus
Alternation depth in the µ-calculus represents the number of nested alternating least
and greatest fixed point operators. A widely used subset of the modal µ-calculus is the
alternation-free µ-calculus, µMA, which permits dependence of fixed points as long as
they are of the same kind. It was first introduced by Emerson and Lei (1986), and may
be summarised as follows (Stirling, 2001, p. 126):
Φ ∈ µMA iff if µY. Ψ1∈S ub(Φ) and νZ. Ψ2∈S ub(Φ)
then Y is not free in Ψ2 and Z is not free in Ψ1
In order to better understand the alternation-free µ-calculus, Figure 2.8 provides a
graphical representation of the following two logical statements:
νZ1.Φ1(Z1, νZ2.Φ2(Z1,Z2, µY1.Ψ1(Y1, µY2.Ψ2(Y1,Y2)))) (2.1)
µY.Φ(Y, νZ.Ψ(Y,Z)) (2.2)
νZ1.Φ1(Z1, νZ2.Φ2(Z1, Z2, µY1.Ψ1(Y1, µY2.Ψ2(Y1, Y2))))











Figure 2.8: Alternation versus alternation-free µ-calculus formulae
Figure 2.8 helps illustrate the occurrence of variables within sub-formulae. Grey
boxes represent variables that are bound within their sub-formula, while black boxes
represent variables that are free within their sub-formula. Note that for logical state-
ment 2.2, Y is a free variable in sub-formula νZ.Ψ and a bound variable in sub-formula
µY.Φ. This contradicts the definition of an alternation-free formula. As for logical
statement 2.1, Figure 2.8 shows that Z1 is a free variable in sub-formula νZ2.Φ2; how-
ever, this does not contradict the definition of alternation-free, since Z1 is not a bound
variable in any sub-formula of the form µX.φ. Similarly, Y1 is also a free variable in
sub-formula µY2.Ψ2, but it also does not exist as a bound variable in any sub-formula
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of the form νX.φ. Therefore, logical statement 2.1 fulfils the alternation-free require-
ments.
In other words, we can summarise that a formula Φ is considered to be alternation-
free if ‘no sub-formula Ψ of a formula Φ contains both a free variable X bound by a
µX in Φ as well as a free variable Y bound by a νY in Φ’ (Bollig et al., 2002).
But what about the expressive power of µMA? Bradfield (1998) has proven that
the expressive power of the µ-calculus does indeed grow with the alternation depth of
its formulae. In other words, the complexity of these formulae is measured by their
alternation depth, and the complexity of model checking such formulae is exponential
in the alternation depth (Edmund M. Clarke et al., 1999, p. 108). Nevertheless, it has
also been proven that most common modal and temporal logics, such as , , ,
may be expressed in the alternation-free µ-calculus with alternation depth 1 (Mateescu,
2003), and a maximum of alternation depth 2 is required to express * and  for-
mulae (Leucker et al., 2003). As a result, the user need not bother with notoriously
complex µ-calculus formulae with an alternation depth greater than 2. The expres-
sive power of the alternation free µ-calculus and its existing efficient model checking
algorithms has turned the µMA into a popular specification language in the field of
software and hardware verification.
2.4 Deontic Logic and Policy Languages
Similar to traditional model checkers, the model checker proposed by this thesis uses a
process calculus () for specifying system models and a temporal logic (µ-calculus)
for the property specification. These languages were introduced earlier in Sections
2.2 and 2.3, respectively. However, Chapter 3 introduces yet a third input to our pro-
posed model checker: the agent’s constraints. These constraints are specified via a
deontic based policy language (), introduced in Section 3.4.2. This section aims at
providing the background behind the  language, starting with a modest introduc-
tion to deontic logic (Section 2.4.1) followed by a brief overview of policy languages
(Section 2.4.2).
2.4.1 Deontic Logic
Deontic logic is the logic of duties. It deals with concepts like permissions, prohi-
bitions, obligations, etc. It may be viewed as one way of defining social norms by
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specifying who can do what. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy5 states that
deontic logic is the logic that deals with notions of what is:
permissible (permitted) must
impermissible (forbidden, prohibited) supererogatory (beyond the call of duty)
obligatory (duty, required) indifferent / significant
gratuitous (non-obligatory) the least one can do
optional better than / best / good / bad
ought claim / liberty / power / immunity
In practise, however, research on deontic logic has focused on only five of these
notions: permissions, prohibitions/forbiddance, obligations, gratuitousness, and indif-
ference. This section follows this common line of research by focusing on these five
deontic operators.
2.4.1.1 The Deontic Operators
Deontic logic may be viewed as a special type of modal logic. An act a that is obliga-
tory can be defined in terms of the modal logic necessity operator a. What is permis-
sible, or possible, can be defined in terms of the modal logic possibility operator ^a,
which is equivalent to ¬¬a. What is forbidden is viewed as that act whose negation
is obligatory , i.e. it may be defined in terms of ¬a. What is gratuitous is that which
is not obligatory, i.e. it is defined as ¬a. Finally, what is indifferent is both possible
and gratuitous, i.e. it is equivalent to ¬¬a ∧ ¬a.
In what follows, we use the operators O, P, F , G, and I to represent obligations,
permissions, forbiddance, gratuitousness, and indifference, respectively. It is common
to pick one of the first four operators to be the basic operator, and define all remaining
operators in terms of it. In this chapter, we choose the obligation operator O to be our
basic operator. The remaining four operators are then defined as follows:
Pa ≡ ¬O¬a
F a ≡ O¬a
Ga ≡ ¬Oa
Ia ≡ ¬O¬a ∧ ¬Oa
5The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entry on deontic logic may be
found at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-deontic/. Inter-
esting remarks on the challenges of defining deontic logic may be found at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-deontic/challenges.html.
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To achieve a better understanding of the deontic operators we refer to set theory.
If actions were divided into sets according to what is permissible P, obligatory O,









Figure 2.9: Deontic sets
There are two main sets P and G describing what is permissible and what is gratu-
itous, respectively. The set of obligatory actions O is equivalent to the complement of
G in P. Similarly, the set of forbidden actions F is equivalent to the complement of
P in G. Finally, the set of indifferent actions I is essentially the intersection of sets P
and G.
2.4.1.2 Axioms and Rules
There are various systems defining deontic logic: Mally (1926)’s deontic logic, von
Wright (1951, 1971)’s dyadic deontic logic, Hilpinen (1971)’s standard deontic logic,
etc. Each of these specifies its own set of axioms and rules. We do not intend to
provide a complete survey of deontic logic systems; however, to provide an insight
of these systems, we introduce the semantics of the Standard Deontic Logic (), the
“benchmark system of deontic logic”6. The axioms and rules of  are presented in
Figure 2.10.
The first axiom (TAUT) is common to all logics. The second (K) is a well known
property of modal logics in general. In the context of deontic logic, it specifies that
if there is an obligation to p → q and there is an obligation to p, then there is an
obligation to q. The third axiom is called (D) for deontic7; it states that if there is
6As described by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
7In fact, the standard deontic logic  is sometimes simply referred to as system KD or even system
D, in reference to its axioms.
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Axiom1 : All tautologous wffs of the language (TAUT)
Axiom2 : O(p→ q)→ (Op→ Oq) (K)









Figure 2.10: SDL: the system’s axioms and rules
an obligation to p then p must be permitted, i.e. there is no obligation for ¬p. The
inference rules of this logic are the propositional calculus modus ponens rule (MP)
and the obligation necessitation rule (O-NEC), which states that if p holds then the
obligation to p also holds.
Several theorems and rules may be derived from the system presented in Fig-
ure 2.10. For instance, the following rule
p→ q
Op→ Oq







Applying the same proof to the tautology p→ p ∨ q results in the corollary Op→
O(p ∨ q). However, Ross (1941) identifies a paradox resulting from this corollary. He
points out that this corollary results in statements such as “If I ought to mail a letter,
then I ought to mail or burn it”, which is clearly unacceptable.
The paradox presented above is only one of the numerous paradoxes of deontic
logic. Deontic logic systems are famous for the paradoxes they raise. However, we
do not dwell on these, since this thesis does not make use of a deontic logic system,
but focuses on the general concepts and ideas of deontic logic. In other words, our
definition of deontic logic follows the basic, and possibly over simplified, definition
that focuses solely on the categorisation of obligations, permissions, and prohibitions.
Section 3.4.2, which defines our deontic based policy language, revisits this issue dis-
cussing why such paradoxes are irrelevant to our work.
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2.4.2 Policy Languages
Policy languages have been used widely in hardware systems and networks for se-
curity reasons, trust negotiation, access control, authorisation, etc. Sloman (1994)
defines policies to be “one aspect of information which influences the behaviour of
objects within the system”. Damianou et al. (2002) categorises policies into two types.
The first is the obligation policies for managing actions. These are usually event trig-
gered condition-action rules. The basic concept is that specific events trigger specific
actions, and the actions may only be executed if a predefined set of conditions is satis-
fied. The second type is the authorisation policies, which are usually used for access
control. Deontic concepts that are based on permissions and prohibitions are usually
used here. Since it is not practical to define policies relating to individual agents, poli-
cies are defined in the context of roles and organisational groups. For this reason,
policy languages may be viewed as yet another method for the specification of social
norms.
Policy languages have been defined for dealing with a variety of issues. For exam-
ple, the  policy language (Jajodia et al., 1997) is strictly a security policy. Ponder
(Dulay et al., 2002) addresses both security and management issues. The Rei pol-
icy language (Kagal et al., 2003) is a general purpose policy language that supports
security issues, management, conversations, etc. Policy languages, like any other pro-
gramming language, may be logic-based (e.g.  (Jajodia et al., 1997), Rei’s Prolog
implementation (Kagal et al., 2003),  (Hayton et al., 1998)), object-oriented (e.g.
Ponder (Dulay et al., 2002), RuleML(Boley, 2003)), based on markup languages (e.g.
Rei’s  implementation(Kagal et al., 2003), (Oasis, 2003),  (Herzberg et al.,
2000)), etc.
The literature contains a huge collection of policy languages with different colours
and flavors. Nevertheless, all policies are essentially (in their simplified form) a tuple
of the form (S ,O, 〈S ign〉A) which permits or prohibits — depending on the sign of A —
a subject S from executing an action A on an object O. Obligations are usually even-
triggered rules. Additionally, conditions may be attached to these rules. Available
policy languages are basically more specialised versions of the above, each with its
own conflict resolution mechanism.
In Section 3.4.2, we propose a deontic based policy language for modelling agent
constraints. However, to help the reader acquire a taste of existing policy languages,
we introduce two of the literature’s languages: Ponder and Rei.
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2.4.2.1 Ponder
Ponder is a policy language used for access control as well as defining other actions
agents may perform. The basic unit in a system is an object which could be an agent, a
resource, or a person. Objects are then grouped into domains. This provides a hierar-
chical structuring of objects. Policies are applied to objects as well as domains. There
are four different types of policies whose rules are presented by Figure 2.11. Note that
the meaning of each rule is described under the “Description” column.
Policy Type Abstract Form Enforced by Description
Authorisation + S → T.A ? C Target Subject S is authorised to invoke
action A on target T if condition
C holds.
Authorisation − S →| T.A ? C Target Subject S is not authorised to in-
voke action A on target T if con-
dition C holds.
Refrain S |→ T.A ? C Subject Subject S must refrain from in-
voking action A on target T if
condition C holds.
Delegation + G [S → T.A]→ H ? C Policy System Given an existing authorisation
policy S → T.A, then the set
of grantors G ⊆ S are authorised
to create a new authorisation pol-
icy H → T.A if the condition C
holds, delegating their authorisa-
tion to a set of grantees H.
Delegation − G [S → T.A]→| H ? C Given an existing authorisation
policy S → T.A, then the set of
grantors G ⊆ S are not authorised
to create a new authorisation pol-
icy H → T.A if the condition C
holds.
Obligation E, S → M ? C Subject On event E, subject S is obliged
to execute method M if condition
C holds.
Figure 2.11: Ponder’s basic policy types
Ponder creates different policies for different domains. For example, the negative
authorisation policy is used by targets to protect themselves against unauthorised sub-
jects, while refrain policies are enforced by subjects who want to avoid certain targets,
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such as untrusted resources.
Authorisation and refrain rules are usually used to specify access control policies.
Obligations may also be specified through event triggered rules. These are especially
helpful for managing the system and controlling the system behaviour. Delegation
policies are used to specify who can introduce specific policies to the system.
Conflicts between policies may arise. One solution is to explicitly define prece-
dence rules. Another is to rely on more general rules, such as giving a negative autho-
risation a precedence over positive authorisations. Meta policies may also be used to
test for conflicts and define application specific precedence rules. Please refer to Dulay
et al. (2002) for further information on Ponder and its meta policies.
2.4.2.2 Rei
Rei is based on deontic concepts. It includes constructs for rights, prohibitions, obli-
gations and dispensations. It allows the specification of different kinds of policies:
security, privacy, management, conversations, etc. Figure 2.12 presents the structure
of the Rei policy language, excluding meta information (meta policies).
Policies are specified via a set of has constructs that assign policy objects to entities
(or subjects). There are four kinds of policy objects: rights, prohibitions, obligations,
and dispensations. All policy objects are composed of an action and a set of conditions
that need to be satisfied for this action to take place. Conditions may be compound,
making use of the and, or, and not logical operators. Actions are usually defined
through an identifier, a target object, a set of pre-conditions to be satisfied, and a set
of post-conditions/effects that should hold as a result of the action being performed.
However, a different type of actions also exist in Rei. These are known as speech
acts, which are common in the field of multiagent systems. They are composed of a
sender, a receiver, as well as a right or another action. They are used to allow a sender
to delegate its right to someone else, request a right, revoke someone’s right, or even
cancel earlier requests. As normal actions, speech acts also require the sender to have
the right to send a given speech act.
Again, conflicts between policies may arise. Similar to Ponder, Rei uses meta poli-
cies to resolve conflicting policies by either giving priorities for one rule over the other
(e.g. overrides(A, B)), or by specifying precedence rules. Precedence rules define
whether positive or negative modalities holds. In a positive modality, precedence is
given to rights and obligations over prohibitions and dispensations. The opposite is
true in a negative modality.
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Policy := {has(S ub ject, PolicyOb ject), . . .}










S peechAct := delegate(S ender,Receiver, right(Action,Conditions)) |
request(S ender,Receiver, right(Action,Conditions)) |
request(S ender,Receiver, Action) |
revoke(S ender,Receiver, right(Action,Conditions)) |
cancel(S ender,Receiver, right(Action,Conditions)) |
cancel(S ender,Receiver, Action)
ActionDe f := action(ActionName,TargetOb jects, PreConditions, E f f ects)





E f f ects := Conditions
S ender := S ub ject
Receiver := S ub ject
where,
Term is a structured term in Prolog syntax,
ActionName is a unique action identifier, and
S ub ject and TargetOb jects are either variables or unique object identifiers.
Figure 2.12: Rei’s policy structure
Chapter 3
Multiagent System Verification: the
MCID Model Checker
This thesis is concerned with the problem of obtaining predictable, reliable interac-
tions between group of agents in open environments. The most popular approaches
to this in practise have been to model interaction protocols and to model the deontic
constraints imposed by individual agents. Both of these approaches are important, but
their combination creates the practical problem of ensuring that interaction protocols
are meshed with agents that possess compatible deontic constraints. The main question
this thesis addresses is: “Given an interaction model and an agent with given deontic
constraints wishing to participate in that model, could that combination work?” This
is essentially an issue of property checking dynamically at run time. To check whether
the agent may successfully engage in such a protocol, the agent is allowed to specify its
requirements from the interaction and to prove that these requirements are not violated
by anything that can be currently inferred from the interaction model. This chapter
shows how model checking can be applied to this problem.
The chapter opens with a discussion of modelling multiagent systems () in Sec-
tion 3.1. This is followed by a motivating scenario in Section 3.2. The design and
implementation plans of the verifier are presented in Section 3.3, followed by the ver-
ifier’s specification languages in Section 3.4, the technical details of the verification
process in Section 3.5, and a conclusion in Section 3.7.
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3.1 MAS Modelling: an Interaction Based Approach
One of the most fundamental issues of multiagent system engineering is to enable pre-
dictable, reliable interactions. The challenge is in doing so without requiring a deep
standardisation of the way in which the agents are engineered, yet preserving as much
as possible their autonomy in individual reasoning. It is not plausible that agents, built
independently and with no agreement on forms of interaction, could be predictably
reliable. Researchers have searched for ways of standardising some aspects of coordi-
nation in the hope that this small amount of standardisation would provide predictabil-
ity sufficient for important tasks. Two contrasting approaches to this problem have
emerged.
Specification of global interaction models: The first approach focuses on engi-
neering the system in such a way that it is capable of providing reliable interactions
without having to deal with the complication of engineering the various agents that
might engage in such interactions. It does so through the specification of explicit
models of interactions, describing how the interaction may be carried out. These are
detached from individual agents and are typically accessed when an agent anticipates
it wants to initiate or join such an interaction. Organisational approaches (Horling and
Lesser, 2005), electronic institutions (Esteva et al., 2001), and distributed dialogues
(Robertson, 2004b) are all examples of such approaches.
Specification of agents’ local constraints: The second approach focuses on en-
gineering intelligent autonomous agents that are capable of shaping and controlling
interactions through the explicit specification of their constraints. These constraints
are imposed by individual agents on the actions they will or will not allow. They are
typically accessed when a specific interaction is anticipated with the individual agent.
They are built locally for an individual agent through  models (Mascardi et al.,
2005), deontic constraints (Meyer and Wieringa, 1993), policy languages (Damianou
et al., 2002), etc.
Just as in human societies, we believe both approaches are important; therefore, we
propose a system model that meshes them together. In human societies, for instance,
there exists a set of social norms described via organisational rules, contracts and deals,
judiciary laws, etc. As humans, we also have a choice in deciding who to interact
with and how to interact with them. For example, it is up to the person to decide
whether they will have an  internet connection or not. However, if they do, then
this implies that they agree to ’s terms and conditions. This shows that autonomous
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individuals with private constraints will still need to abide to global ‘social’ constraints
when interacting with others.
This thesis focuses on open and distributed systems, whose entities are autonomous
agents. In such systems, various agents may join or leave the system at any time. Inter-
actions become the backbone that holds the system together. Agents group themselves
into different, and possibly multiple, interactions. Figure 3.1 provides an example of a
collection of agents that are grouped into three different interactions (or scenarios).











Figure 3.1: Proposed MAS model: a 2-layered architectural model
Due to the dynamic nature of the system, we believe interaction groups should be
created dynamically and automatically by the agents. It is the agents’ responsibility
to group themselves into various scenarios. There should be no higher layer for coor-
dination, control, synchronisation, etc. As a result, multiagent systems are modelled
through two layers only: the interaction and agents layers.
The interaction model specifies the rules and constraints on the interaction, which
indicates how exactly the interaction may be carried out. It is specified via a generic
process or state-machine language, and it is independent of the agents that might en-
gage in the interaction. The agents’ model specifies the rules and constraints on the
agents. These are the agents’ permissions, prohibitions, and obligations; therefore,
we call this model the deontic model. Note that for one scenario there is one global
interaction model and several local deontic models.
We propose the 2-layered architectural model approach while taking into consid-
eration the issue of verifying such systems, which is the main goal of this thesis. Sec-
tion 3.3 presents the advantages of using such a model for multiagent system verifica-
tion. However, we first provide a motivating example in Section 3.2, which is used for
illustration purposes in the remainder of this chapter.
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3.2 Motivating Example
The example used throughout this chapter is a slightly modified version of the travel
agent use case of He et al. (2004). Figure 3.2 presents an overview of the interaction.
While the customer agent interacts with the travel agent, the latter contacts airline
Web services and queries a hotel directory to provide the customer agent with a list
of available flights and hotel offers. Also, the travel agent communicates with a credit












Figure 3.2: Travel agency scenario: an overview (He et al., 2004)
Figure 3.3 defines the interaction model corresponding to the communication be-
tween the customer and the travel agent (IMCT of Figure 3.2). The interaction starts
when a customer agent C provides the travel agent T with its vacation’s start date S D,
end date ED, and its destination D. The travel agent forwards this information to the
airline Web services As for retrieving a list of possible flights FL, which is forwarded
to the customer agent. After the customer selects a flight Fx, the travel agent searches
the hotel directory HD and sends a detailed list of hotel options HL back to the cus-
tomer. The customer selects a hotel option Hx, the travel agent computes the total
amount T A to be paid, and the customer sends back its payment details PD. The travel
agent verifies the payment details with the credit card Web service CD, which provides
a reason R for payment failure, if any. If the payment is authorised, the travel agent
pays the appropriate airline A and hotel H, and confirms the booking by sending the
receipts Furl and Hurl back to the customer. Otherwise, the customer is informed of
the failure and it might either choose to quit the interaction or retry the payment. Note
that for the purpose of keeping the example simple and clear, we assume no errors in
retrieving the list of flights and hotels. We also assume the customer will always select
flight and hotel options from the lists provided by the travel agent. However, we do
model the possible failure in the customer’s payment activity.
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compute(C, get vacation details(SD, ED, D)) transmit(C, T, vacation details(SD, ED, D))
transmit(T, C, available flights(FL))compute(C, select flight(FL, Fx))
compute(T, query(HD, SE, ED, D, HL)) transmit(T, C, available hotels(HL))
transmit(C, T, chosen hotel(Hx))compute(T, compute payment(Fx, Hx, TA))
interact(T, As, query airlines(SD, ED, D, FL))
transmit(C, T, chosen flight(Fx))
compute(C, select hotel(HL, Hx))
transmit(T, C, due payment(TA, CD))
compute(C, pay(TA, CD, PD))
transmit(T, C, fail payment(PD, R))
transmit(C, T, payment(PD))
interact(T, CD, verify payment(PD, R))
transmit(C, T, quit)
transmit(T, C, confirm booking(Furl, Hurl))
interact(T, , pay services(Fx, Hx, Furl, Hurl))








agent A1 engages in another interaction with
agent A2 to fulfil goal G
agent A computes constraint C
agent A1 transmits message M to agent A2
Figure 3.3: Travel agency scenario: interaction’s state graph of IMCT of Figure 3.2
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In addition to the interaction rules of Figure 3.3, the agents involved in this in-
teraction may also lay down their own set of restrictions: their deontic constraints.
Figure 3.4 provides a sample of such rules. For instance, while the travel agent should
be capable of accessing the hotel directory, the hotel directory might place a constraint
permitting only members of the Student and Youth Travel Association () to access
it (deontic rule D1 of Figure 3.4). The customer should also be a customer of the
selected credit card Web service, otherwise it will not be capable of making any pay-
ments (deontic ruleD2 of Figure 3.4). For transmitting payment details, the customer
might not be capable of using any encryption other than the OpenPGP encryption (de-
ontic ruleD3 of Figure 3.4). The travel agent might require the credit card Web service
to authenticate itself with a X.509 certificate (deontic ruleD4 of Figure 3.4). Note that
these rules address various issues, such as access control (deontic rule D1), authenti-
cations and trust issues (deontic ruleD4), security issues (deontic ruleD3), etc.
D1 : The hotel directory allows the travel agent to query it only if it is a member of .
D2 : The credit card web service requires the customer of the travel agency scenario to be its own
customer for it to be capable of making a payment.
D3 : The customer can not perform any encryption other than OpenPGP.
D4 : The travel agent requires that the credit card web service to be capable of authenticating itself
with a X.509 certificate.
Figure 3.4: Travel agency scenario: some deontic constraints
Now assume that the customer agent is ignorant of the available services in the
system. Therefore, it approaches a broker agent for finding suitable agents for this
scenario. With the broker being responsible for finding suitable agents, it should also
be capable of verifying at interaction time that the protocol it has instantiated with these
agents is likely to work. This implies that it should verify that the agents it has selected
are compatible with each other as well as compatible with the given interaction model.
For example, trying to ally the customer agent with a travel agent that does not have
access to a hotel directory will result in a scenario failure, regardless of whether the
interaction protocol itself is error free or not. As a result, the verifier should handle both
interaction and deontic constraints, and should be capable of operating automatically at
run time. The broker can then use such a verifier to verify an instance of the interaction
protocol, i.e. the interaction protocol instantiated for the selected group of agents.
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3.3 Multiagent System Verification
After presenting an overview of multiagent system models in Section 3.1 followed by a
motivating example in Section 3.2, we now present an overview of our proposed model
for verifying multiagent systems. We first discuss the reasons behind our decision to
verify multiagent system models designed according to the 2-layered architectural 
model of Section 3.1. This is followed by a presentation of the design and implemen-
tation plans for building such a verifier.
3.3.1 Verification of Interaction and Deontic Models
Verifying multiagent systems has traditionally focused on verifying systems built via
one of the two approaches presented in Section 3.1. Verifying interaction models (e.g.
Walton, 2004; Wen and Mizoguchi, 1999) is important, yet not sufficient on its own
when one is interested in verifying dynamic properties depending on the agents en-
gaged in the interaction. It is essential to make sure the interaction model is reliable;
however, predicting the success of interactions is impossible in such cases, since this
is usually highly affected by the autonomous agents executing the interaction. On
the other hand, verifying solely the agents’ constraints, such as their  model (e.g.
Wooldridge et al., 2002; Bordini et al., 2003b, etc.), is a highly complex task. The
global interaction is usually built from the implicit interaction constraints within agent
specifications. If the constraints are not explicit enough to specify and direct the inter-
action (and, in distributed open systems, usually they are not), then this may result in
verifying possibly an infinite number of permissible interactions. Furthermore, these
verification techniques assume that the agents’  model may be accessible to the ver-
ifier. This might be feasible in closed systems were all agents have been engineered in
the same way and allow their  models to be made public. However, this is very hard
to achieve in distributed open systems, where agents could not and should not permit
access to their  models. It is not likely that an agent would make its goals, inten-
tions, and plans public. More importantly, it would not be easy for agents to extract
such information from their specification. Usually this information is not specified
declaratively, but rather it is implicit in the procedural implementation of the agent. Fi-
nally, we believe verification should not be about predetermining how agents will act in
response to each action. Instead, verification should simply focus on whether conflicts
might arise from a given interaction model with a given set of collaborating agents.
For this, we distinguish between an agent’s  layer and its deontic one. While the
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 layer is inaccessible, the deontic one specifies the constraints that the agents might
want to make public. For instance, while a bidder agent in an auction system should
not reveal its bidding strategy, it would be important to make some of its constraints
public, such as its inability to pay via PayPal. Figure 3.5 illustrates the three layers
affecting an interaction. Note that our proposed 2-layered architectural model neglects
the inaccessible  layer.
- shared between agents during a given interaction
- deals with sending/coordinating messages
- local to each agent
- may be provided to other agents when necessary
- deals with obligations, permissions, and prohibitions
- local to each agent
- cannot be provided to other agents




Figure 3.5: The 3-architectural layers affecting interactions in MAS
Verifying the combination of global interaction models along with the agents’ local
constraints in distributed open systems is more efficient than solely verifying agents’
constraints, since we now have an explicit interaction model that limits the number
of possible interactions. Moreover, the results of such a verification method are more
predictable and reliable, since they take into consideration the current agents engaged
in the given interaction and how they might affect and direct this interaction. Of course,
this requires verification to be performed by the agents at run time when the conditions
for verification are met and the related deontic models are obtained.
3.3.2 The Verifier’s Design and Implementation Plans
As illustrated by the travel agency scenario of Section 3.2, the broker agent will need to
verify the interaction protocol against the selected agents’ deontic rules, so that a team
of collaborating agents is reached. In general, in distributed open systems consisting of
autonomous agents, it is necessary for agents to be capable of automatically verifying
at run time dynamic interaction and deontic models of multiagent systems. Figure 3.6
illustrates the plan for implementing such a verifier.
We choose model checking from amongst other verification techniques, such as
those presented by Section 2.1.1, because it provides a fully automatic verification
process which could be carried out by the agents at interaction time. The result is the
 verifier for model checking interaction and deontic models.
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interaction model
deontic models
a process calculus: lcc
a policy language: dpl




Figure 3.6: Verifier’s design and implementation plans
Our system model is a bundle of interaction and deontic rules. For specifying inter-
action protocols, which deal with coordinating messages between agents, we choose
a process calculus. Process calculus is a calculus for representing concurrent and dis-
tributed processes. It accounts for the non-deterministic and non-terminating nature of
these processes. Its success in efficiently describing the rules for coordination makes it
especially appealing for specifying interaction protocols of multiagent systems. Policy
languages, on the other hand, have been widely used in hardware systems and networks
for expressing deontic rules: the rules of obligations, permissions and prohibitions.
Policy languages address issues such as security, trust specification, authorisations,
etc. This makes them good candidates for specifying agents’ deontic rules.
Section 2.1.2 has already introduced the model checking mechanism in detail. In
summary, the model checking problem may be defined as follows: “Given a finite
transition system S and a temporal formula φ, does S satisfy φ?” Both the system
model and the property specification are fed to the model checker for verification. The
model checker is essentially an algorithm that decides whether a model S satisfies a
formula φ. Figure 2.2 provided an overview of a typical model checker’s input. This
now needs to be modified, since our system model is composed of both an interaction
and a deontic one. Figure 3.7 presents the modified version illustrating ’s design.
We note that one of the main contributions of this thesis lies in the addition of this new






specified via a process calculus: lcc
Deontic Model:
agents constraints on other agents’ actions
specified via a policy language: dpl
Temporal Properties:
temporal constraints on the interaction model
specified via a temporal logic: µ-calculus
Result:
True/False
Figure 3.7: MCID’s design
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After laying down the foundations for our proposed model checker, Section 3.4
presents the specification languages selected for specifying the interaction model, the
deontic model, and the temporal properties fed to the model checker. It is followed by
a presentation of the model checking algorithm and formal semantics in Section 3.5.
3.4 Specification Languages
This section introduces the specification languages used by the  model checker.
The first is the  process calculus for specifying interaction models, the second is the
 policy language for specifying deontic constraints, and the third is the µ-calculus
for specifying interactions’ temporal properties.
3.4.1 Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC)
3.4.1.1 Why Choose LCC?
What is required is a language for specifying interaction models of multiagent sys-
tems. The literature provides a variety of solutions that deal with specifying and regu-
lating interactions. These are mainly driven by the concept of following social norms
(e.g. Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1995), such as having contracts and commitments (e.g.
Dignum et al., 2002), organisational approaches (Horling and Lesser, 2005), electronic
institutions (Esteva et al., 2001), distributed dialogues (Robertson, 2004b), etc. Hav-
ing agents playing roles is a central issue in many of these approaches. The idea is
that actions, tasks, and duties, along with constraints, are assigned to roles instead of
agents. This provides an abstraction level of actions and specifications independent of
the particular agents engaged in the given interaction. Agents may then play different
roles and engage in different scenarios. For example, one agent might play the role of
a bidder in some auction system, and the role of a seller in another.  is also based
on the concept of agents playing roles and sharing a dialogue framework for achieving
distributed coordination. It defines the interaction protocol without having to specify
details of agents involved in this interaction, which is a requirement specified in Sec-
tion 3.1. Nevertheless, the agents’ autonomy in  is preserved with the heavy use
of constraints. So while an  interaction protocol is independent of and deployed by
possibly any agent, the constraints in  provide means for the agents to influence and
direct the interaction as they please.
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Since the interaction model is intended to be verified via a model checker (for rea-
sons specified in Section 3.3), then the natural way to specify such a model is via a
process calculus (also for reasons specified in Section 3.3). Process calculi are usually
used for modelling concurrent systems, providing a way for abstracting the interac-
tion and synchronisation details from the low-level technical details of the system. For
this reason, process calculi have not been traditionally used in building the executable
models of these systems. However, since  was created for the purpose of specifying
solely interaction models, it was decided that the same language is to be used in the
executable model as well. This makes  an ideal candidate for our model checker’s
description language. Having the executable model fed directly to the model checker
avoids the complexity of modelling the system in another language and the possibility
of introducing errors in doing so. Eliminating this step also contributes to the remark-
ably small size of the model checker. Furthermore, some properties to be verified may
require the agents to automatically invoke the verifier at run time when the conditions
for verification are met. The  protocol, capturing the actual system to be verified,
is directly fed to the model checker. Given the nature of ’s clause expansion mech-
anism (Section 2.2.3), agents are capable of automatically extracting the current state
of the interaction and directly feeding it to the model checker when necessary.
3.4.1.2 Syntax and Semantics
We refer the reader to Section 2.2.2, where the syntax and semantics of  have been
thoroughly illustrated. Figure 2.3 provided a summary of this. As an example, the
following section presents a specification of the travel agency scenario in .
3.4.1.3 Example: the travel agency scenario
To illustrate the specification of multiagent systems via , let us consider a section of
the travel agency scenario. Figure 3.8 models the interaction between the customer
and the travel agent described earlier in Figure 3.3. The first two clauses specify
the interaction rules of the two roles played by the customer agent: customer and
paying customer. The interaction starts when the agent retrieves its vacation details:
the vacation’s start date S D, end date ED, and destination D. It then sends these de-
tails to the travel agent, receives a list of available flights FL, selects an appropriate
flight Fx, sends its selected flight to the travel agent, receives a list of available hotel
options HL, selects a hotel Hx, sends its selected hotel to the travel agent, receives
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a(customer(T ),C) ::
vacation details(S D, ED,D)⇒ a(travel agent( , , ),T )
← get vacation details(S D, ED,D) then
available f lights(FL)⇐ a(travel agent( , , ),T ) then
chosen f light(Fx)⇒ a(travel agent( , , ),T )← select f light(FL, Fx) then
available hotels(HL)⇐ a(travel agent( , , ),T ) then
chosen hotel(Hx)⇒ a(travel agent( , , ),T )← select hotel(HL,Hx) then
due payment(T A,CD)⇐ a(travel agent( , , ),T ) then
a(paying customer(T A,CD,T ),C).
a(paying customer(T A,CD,T ),C) ::
payment(PD)⇒ a(veri f y payment( , , , ),T )← pay(T A,CD, PD) then
( con f irm booking(Furl,Hurl)⇐ a(veri f y payment( , , , ),T )
or ( f ail payment(PD,R)⇐ a(veri f y payment( , , , ),T ) then
( a(paying customer(T A,CD,T ),C)← repay(T A,R,CD)
or quit ⇒ a(veri f y payment( , , , ),T )← ¬repay(T A,R,CD) ) ) ).
a(travel agent([As],HD,CD),T ) ::
vacation details(S D, ED,D)⇐ a(customer( ),C) then
a(query airlines([As], S D, ED,D, FL),T ) then
available f lights(FL)⇒ a(customer( ),C) then
chosen f light(Fx)⇐ a(customer( ),C) then
null← query(HD, S D, ED,D,HL) then
available hotels(HL)⇒ a(customer( ),C) then
chosen hotel(Hx)⇐ a(customer( ),C) then
due payment(T A,CD)⇒ a(customer( ),C)← compute payment(Fx,Hx,T A) then
a(veri f y payment(CD, Fx,Hx,T A),T ).
a(veri f y payment(CD, Fx,Hx,T A),T ) ::
payment(PD)⇐ a(paying customer( , , ),C) then
a(veri f y payment2(PD,CD,R),T ) then
( ( a(pay services(Fx,Hx, Furl,Hurl),T )← R = success then
con f irm booking(Furl,Hurl)⇒ a(paying customer( , , ),C) )
or ( f ail payment(PD,R)⇒ a(paying customer( , , ),C)← ¬R = success then
( a(veri f y payment(CD, Fx,Hx,T A),T )
or quit ⇐ a(paying customer( , , ),C) ) ).
Figure 3.8: Travel agency scenario: LCC interaction model of Figure 3.3
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the bill of amount T A to be paid via credit card CD, and finally takes a different role
paying customer for paying its bill. The role paying customer is responsible for re-
trieving the payment details, e.g. credit card number, expiry date, etc. Then it either
receives a message confirming its bookings (con f irm booking), or a message inform-
ing it of the reason R for the payment’s failure. In the latter case, the agent might either
decide to retry its payment (a(paying customer(T,CD),C)) or send a quit message to
the travel agent to conclude the interaction.
Similarly, the last two clauses specify the travel agent’s rules governing its interac-
tion with the customer. To keep the example simple and short, Figure 3.8 omits role
definitions dealing with interactions between the travel agent and the other agents in
the system, e.g. query airlines, get airline replies, and pay services. Appendix A.1.1
presents a complete and more realistic version of the travel agency scenario.
3.4.2 Deontic-Based Policy Language (DPL)
Section 3.4.1 presented the  language used for specifying interaction models. In this
section we propose a deontic-based policy language () for specifying the agents’
deontic constraints.
3.4.2.1 Designing DPL
Agents usually have constraints on the actions they can or cannot perform in a given
interaction. What is needed then is to link the deontic operators to the context of an
interaction’s state-space. Note that instead of choosing one of the available deontic
based policy languages, we decide to design and define a new language that could
directly be mapped to our interaction models. A comparison between  and other
policy languages is provided in Section 3.8.
From Section 2.4.1, we know that deontic logic is based on the following five main
operators: P for permission, O for obligation, F for forbiddance or prohibition, G
for gratuitousness or what is non-obligatory, I for indifference or what is optional.
Usually, one of the operators is taken as a basic operator and the remaining four are
defined in its term. In what follows, we define the operators in terms of the permission
operator P as follows: Pa (action a is permitted), Oa ≡ ¬P¬a (action a is obligatory),
F a ≡ ¬Pa (action a is forbidden), Ga ≡ P¬a (action a is gratuitous), and Ia ≡
(Pa) ∧ (P¬a) (action a is indifferent).
We interpret these operators in the context of  interaction models. For example,
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instead of talking about permissions in general, we state the actions a particular agent
is permitted to do with respect to a particular interaction. The state-space, specified via
the  process calculus, is a representation of the various worlds that may be realised.
Each path in the state-space represents a possible world that may unfold. We define
the relation of the deontic operators to the interaction model’s state-space as follows1:
F Permission: action a is permitted if there exists at least one world/path where a
is realisable
F Obligation: action a is obligatory if a is realisable in all worlds/paths
F Forbiddance: action a is forbidden if a is not realisable in all worlds/paths
F Gratuitousness: action a is gratuitous if there exists a world/path in which a is
not realisable
F Indifference: action a is indifferent if there exists a world/path where a is real-
isable and there also exists a world/path where a is not realisable
Figure 3.9 provides a graphical representation of the relation between the deontic
sets and the occurrence of the deontically constrained actions in an interaction’s state-
space. Note that if an action is realisable in a path, then the action may occur at some
node in this path. However, if an action is not realisable in a path, then the action





path in which action a is performed
path in which action a is not performed
node at which action a can be performed
node at which action a cannot be performed
KEY
Figure 3.9: Relating deontic sets to the occurrence of actions in a state-space
1This definition stems from the definition of the deontic operators in Section 2.4.1.1.
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3.4.2.2 Syntax and Semantics
We introduce a deontic-based policy language for specifying the five deontic oper-
ators P, O, F , G, and I. Figure 3.10 presents the language’s syntax. The deon-
tic rule is specified by one of the following predicates: must(Agent, Action, S ign) or
can(Agent, Action, S ign). ‘S ign’ could take one of the following two values: ‘+’ and
‘−’. As in , the ‘Agent’ is specified by a role and a unique identifier: a(Role, Id).
The ‘Action’ could either be a message passing action () or a non-message passing
action (-). An  is also specified in the  format: Message ⇐ Agent and
Message ⇒ Agent. An - represents some internal action or a computation the
agent performs. Just like ‘Role’ and ‘Message’, an - is also a structured Prolog
term.
DeonticRule := must(Agent, Action, S ign) [← Condition] |
can(Agent, Action, S ign) [← Condition]
Agent := a(Role, Id)
S ign := + | −
Action := MPA | N−MPA
MPA := Message⇐ Agent |
Message⇒ Agent





Figure 3.10: DPL syntax
Negative permissions, which represent both obligations ‘¬P¬a’ and forbiddance
‘¬Pa’, are specified via the ‘must’ predicate of our policy language. For example, if
an agent is obliged to perform action ‘a’, then we say: must(agent, a,+). However, if
the agent is forbidden to perform ‘a’, then we say: must(agent, a,−).
On the other hand, positive permissions, which are either normal permissions ‘Pa’
or gratuitousness ‘P¬a’, are specified via the ‘can’ predicate of our policy language.
For example, if an agent is permitted to perform the action ‘a’ in a given interaction
model, then we say: can(agent, a,+). However, if the agent is gratuitous towards per-
forming ‘a’, then we say: can(agent, a,−). As for indifference, it is defined as the
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conjunction of gratuitousness and permissions, i.e. a conjunction of negative and pos-
itive ‘can’ predicates. We note that the semantics of these  predicates are better
understood in the context of the occurrence of actions in interaction models, as illus-
trated by Section 3.5.3.1.
Additionally, conditions may be attached to these rules. The square brackets around
‘[← Condition]’ imply that zero or one occurrence of this term is permitted. Condi-
tions are usually composed of Prolog terms, and may possibly contain temporal prop-
erties. If a temporal property is used, then its syntax should follow the µ-calculus
syntax of Figure 2.7. The addition of temporal properties to the conditions increases
the richness of the properties that may be verified. For instance, one agent may decide
that it can make a payment only if the interaction guarantees that a receipt will be sent.
3.4.2.3 Example: the travel agency scenario
In this section we specify the deontic constraints of Figure 3.4 in . The results
are presented in Table 3.1. The first constraint, D1, states that the travel agent can
query the hotel directory (query(HD, , , , )) only if it is a member of the student
youth travel association ‘syta’. Querying the hotel directory should be an option in
this interaction, since the customer is interested in booking a hotel. Therefore, the
‘can’ predicate is used.
Similarly, constraintD2 states that the customer can make a payment (pay( ,CD, )),
and for it to be able to pay, it should be a customer of the appropriate credit card ser-
vice. However, it should not be obligatory for the customer to pay in every single path
that may unfold. Therefore, the ‘can’ predicate is used again.
Constraint D3 states that the customer should not send any payment messages
(payment( ) ⇒ a( , )) if it performs its encryption in anything other than OpenPGP.
A negative ‘must’ rule is therefore used.
# DPL specification
D1 can(a(travel agent( , , ),T ), query(HD, , , , ),+)← member(T, syta).
D2 can(a(customer( ),C), pay( ,CD, ),+)← customer(C,CD).
D3 must(a(customer( ),C), payment( )⇒ a( , ),−)← encrypt(X) ∧ X , openPGP.
D4 must(a(credit card,CD), ,+)← authenticate(x.509).
Table 3.1: Travel agency scenario: DPL specification of deontic rules of Figure 3.4
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ConstraintD4 states that for the credit card web service to engage in this interaction
(in other words, for it to be able to perform any action, which is specified via the
underscore variable ‘ ’), it should be capable of authenticating itself via the X.509
certificate. The ‘must’ predicate is used to ensure this.
3.4.3 µ-Calculus
Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 have presented the languages used for specifying the interac-
tion and deontic models, respectively. The interaction model lays down the rules of the
interaction. The deontic constraints are constraints on what the agents can or cannot
do. However, we still need a language for specifying the properties expected from a
given interaction model. These will be used to verify whether the selected interaction
model fits certain requirements, usually describing liveness and safety properties. In
model checking, these properties need to be expressed in a temporal logic. For this,
we choose the µ-calculus, which has been introduced earlier in Section 2.3.3. This
section discusses the reasons behind our selection and provides examples of temporal
properties that could be verified for our travel agency scenario.
3.4.3.1 Why Choose the µ-Calculus?
What is needed is a branching time temporal logic for specifying properties of ’s
state-space. The literature provides us with several languages to select from; however,
we choose the µ-calculus for one main reason: its simplex syntax. In µ-calculus, the
branching operators are expressed in terms of the traditional modal operators. The
necessary modal operator  expresses the A temporal operator, which stands for ‘for
every path in the state-space’. The possible modal operator^ expresses the E temporal
operator, which stands for ‘there exists a path in the state-space’. All remaining tem-
poral operators referring to time in a given path, such as next N, finally/eventually F,
globally G, until U, and release R2, are expressed in terms of recursion in the µ-calculus.
Recursion is specified through the use of fixed point operators.
As illustrated by Figure 2.7, the µ-calculus is a logic with a concise syntax and
expressive and powerful semantics. This is essentially the result of adding simple re-
cursion operators (the fixpoint operators) to the basic  and ^ modalities. Our model
checker is a logic-based one written in  tabled Prolog. This implies that the core of
the model checker, which is responsible for proving the satisfaction of properties in a
2Section 2.3.2 presents an overview of the temporal operators A, E, N, F, G, U, and R.
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given system model, is achieved by performing a direct translation from the µ-calculus
semantics of Figure 2.7 to the model checker’s satisfaction rules of Figure 3.16. The
result is is a neat and compact model checker with a simple and straightforward algo-
rithm. Section 3.5.2 discusses the model checker’s algorithm in more detail.
To avoid undesirable looping behaviour, the use of  Prolog restricts the model
checker to the alternation-free µ-calculus (Ramakrishna et al., 1997). That is because
formulae with alternation result in loops through negation, which are not easily handled
by . In the alternation-free µ-calculus, nesting of minimal and maximal fixed-point
operators is prohibited, as illustrated by Section 2.3.3.3. However, despite this lim-
itation, the alternation-free µ-calculus remains expressive enough to subsume many
common temporal logics, such as  and  (Leucker et al., 2003). Moreover, the
complexity of model checking is known to grow exponentially with the alternation
depth (Leucker et al., 2003). For this reason, we believe the use of alternation-free
µ-calculus to be a good trade-off.
3.4.3.2 Syntax and Semantics
The syntax and semantics of the µ-calculus have been discussed in detail in Sec-
tion 2.3.3. Figure 2.7 provided a summary of this. However, it is important to note
that a slight modification has been introduced to the original language. The set of ac-
tions ‘A’ does not represent message input and output actions only, but non-message
passing actions (-) as well, which are essentially agents’ internal computations.
These are specified by ‘#(C)’, where ‘C’ is a constraint to be satisfied by the agent.
This is important for verifying interaction models written in , which considers such
constraints as actions to be performed by the agents.
The following section provides an example of a possible temporal property that
may be verified for the travel agency scenario.
3.4.3.3 Example: the travel agency scenario
It is important to verify whether interaction models are reliable or not. For example,
in the travel agency scenario, one important property to verify is whether the customer
will always receive a receipt after it makes its payment. This is expressed by Prop-
erty 3.1.
νX. [−]X ∧ [out(payment( ), a(customer( ), ))]
( µY.(〈−〉tt ∧ [−]Y) ∨ 〈in(con f irm booking( , ), a(customer( ), ))〉tt)
(3.1)
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Property 3.1 states that every time a payment is sent by the customer
([out(payment( ), a(customer( ), ))]) the following sub-formula should hold:
µY.(〈−〉tt∧[−]Y)∨〈in(con f irm booking( , ), a(customer( ), ))〉tt. This sub-formula
states that either a booking confirmation is received (〈in(con f irm booking( , ),
a(customer( ), ))〉tt), or something can happen (〈−〉tt) and the sub-formula should
hold again for everything that happens ([−]Y). The use of the least fixpoint operator
(µY) guarantees termination, which implies that the booking confirmation will even-
tually be received. Furthermore, Property 3.1 is always satisfied in the state-space
because for every action that can happen in the interaction the property is said to be
satisfied again at the next state ([−]X), and this may continue infinitely often (νX).
While Property 3.1 fails for the interaction model of Figure 3.8, Property 3.2 suc-
ceeds. Property 3.2 states that if the customer agent sends its payment, then it will
either receive a receipt or a reason for payment failure.
νX. [−]X ∧ [out(payment( ), a(customer( ), ))]
( µY.(〈−〉tt ∧ [−]Y) ∨ 〈[in(con f irm booking( , ), a(customer( ), )),
in( f ail payment( , ), a(customer( ), ))]〉tt)
(3.2)
Note that the travel agency scenario presented in this chapter has been simplified
for the purpose of maintaining clarity in our explanation. As a result, the success and
failure of the above properties might have been obvious to the reader. However, real-
istic scenarios are usually a bit more complex. For instance, Appendix A.1.1 provides
us with a more realistic scenario with a richer choice of actions for the agents to select
from. Taking a look at that scenario affirms that the satisfaction of properties, such as
Property 3.1 or 3.2, might not really be very obvious to the agents as well as humans.
3.5 The MCID Model Checker
Sections 3.1 and 3.3 have introduced our system model and our choice of verifier: the
 model checker. Section 3.4 introduced the specification languages used by the
 model checker. In this section, we present the technical details and the formal
semantics of the  system.
3.5.1 MCID’s Technique: Local Model Checking
Examples of the interaction protocol, deontic constraints, and temporal properties fed
to the model checker for verifying the travel agency scenario have been presented in
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Sections 3.4.1.3, 3.4.2.3, and 3.4.3.3. Figure 3.11 illustrates this by providing a fraction






payment(PD)⇒a(verify payment( , , , ),T)
← pay(TA,CD,PD) then
( confirm booking(Furl, Hurl)⇐a(verify payment( , , , ),T)
or ( fail payment(PD,R)⇐a(verify payment( , , , ),T) then
( a(paying customer(TA,CD,T),C) ← repay(TA,R,CD)
or quit⇒a(verify payment( , , , ),T)










νX. [-]X ∧ [out(payment( ),a(customer( ), ))]





can(a(travel agent( , , ),T), #(query( , , , , )), +) ← member(T,stya).
Figure 3.11: Travel agency scenario: MCID’s sample input
Two model checking techniques exist: global and local model checking. In global
model checking, the entire state-space is generated before satisfaction is verified. Only
after all the states have been enumerated, the model checker can start searching for
those states satisfying a given property. On the other hand, local model checking tech-
niques tend to verify whether a single state, the initial state s0, satisfies the property
in question. The state-space is then constructed and traversed at run time as needed.
The system model of Figure 3.11 provides a sample state-graph defining the actions
of the paying customer agent a(paying customer( , , ),C). Figure 3.12 presents a
clearer illustration of this state-graph. Note that this is only a section of the travel
agency scenario’s state-graph, and that the entire state-graph of the system is required
for verification. The ultimate goal of the model checker is to verify whether a temporal
property is satisfied in a given interaction. The state-graph is unfolded into a state-
space and traversed one step at a time until a solution is reached. While the state-graph
has to be finite, the resulting state-space may be infinite, as depicted by the right hand
graph of Figure 3.12.
Local model checking, along with ’s logic-based clause expansion mechanism
for constructing and traversing a state-space, and the µ-calculus use of recursion for
specifying temporal properties, suggest the use of a logic based model checker. Model
checking approaches based on tableaux systems, such as that of Stirling and Walker
























Figure 3.12: Constructing and traversing a state-space
(1991), provide one solution. However, termination in these verification techniques is
a crucial issue. We refer to the model checker for inspiration. The  system (Ra-
makrishnan et al., 2000) is a model checker built on top of  tabled Prolog (Sagonas
et al., 1994). The concept of using tables for caching results in  ensures termination,
avoids redundant sub-computations, and computes the well-founded model for normal
logic programs (Ramakrishna et al., 1997). We rationally reconstruct the  model
checker to suit our requirements. Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 present ’s algorithm,
framework, and formal semantics. Section 3.5.4 discusses the differences between the
 and  systems.
3.5.2 MCID’s Algorithm
The model checker’s algorithm is defined by Figure 3.13. Verification starts when the
set of temporal properties P, the set of deontic constraints D, and the interaction’s
state-space — defined via the tuple 〈N,T 〉, where N is the set of nodes/states and T is
a relation defining the transitions between these nodes/states — is available. The set
of states to be verified, S , is initially set to the empty set ∅; note that the is= operator
assigns the variable on the left-hand side the value of the set on the right-hand side.
Each deontic constraint d is then translated into a temporal constraint t and appended
to the set of temporal properties P. The initial state s0 is retrieved from I and appended
to the set S . Now if the set P is empty, then this implies that verification has completed
successfully. Otherwise, a property φ is retrieved from P to be verified against the
initial state s0. If φ is satisfied at state s0 (s0 |= φ), then the property is said to be
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satisfied in the interaction I, and S is set to ∅ in order to repeat the verification process
all over again for the remaining properties of P. However, if φ fails to be satisfied at s0,
then a transition is made to the next state(s). This new state(s) is added to S so that the
property φ will be verified against it in the next verification cycle. Only if the property
has been checked and failed against all possible states, then the property is said to be
unsatisfied in the interaction.
get I, D, and P
P = ∅ ?
si |= φ ?
∀d∈D. translate(d, t) ∧ P is={t}∪P
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Figure 3.13: MCID’s algorithm
We note that the current  system, which has been designed for run time verifi-
cation of multiagent systems, does not return a counter example if a property fails to be
satisfied. Counter examples returned by model checkers are usually useful for design-
ers in order to pinpoint the errors in their design, so that these errors could be fixed.
However, the  system was designed to be invoked by agents at run time in order
to help agents select appropriate interaction models. The agent is usually interested in
whether a given interaction will be chosen or not. A counter example is therefore not
essential.
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3.5.3 MCID’s Framework and Formal Semantics
As the previous section illustrates, the model checker attempts to satisfy a property at
the initial state of the state-space. If the property is not satisfied, then a transition to
the next state(s) is made, at which the property is checked again, and so on. If we take
a look at the algorithm of Figure 3.13, we notice that there are three main operations
to be performed by the  system. The first is translating deontic constraints into
temporal ones. This has to be performed only once at the beginning of the verification
process. Its details are discussed in Section 3.5.3.1. The other two operations are
proving satisfaction at a given state and performing a transition from one state to the
next. These are discussed in Sections 3.5.3.2 and 3.5.3.3, respectively. Figure 3.14

























Figure 3.14: MCID’s framework
Note that the interaction’s state-graph should always be a finite graph. How-
ever, these graphs may be unfolded into an infinite state-space. To deal with non-
termination, as in the  model checker, we build our system on top of  tabled
Prolog. The predicate responsible for verifying the satisfaction of a given property at
a given state (the ‘satis f ies’ predicate of Figure 3.16), is defined as a tabled predicate.
This means that results of calls to this predicate are cached in a table in the  system.
Every time a call is made to this predicate, the table is searched for results. Only if this
is a new call — a call with a new combination of a state and a temporal property — will
it be resolved against the predicate definition. Caching results implies that each system
state will be visited only once when evaluating a temporal property. This implies that
the model checker will always terminate with an answer in a finite state-graph. Note
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that the  system is dealt with as a black box. We do not need to know the details of
the  system, but we do need a basic understanding of the concept of tables in .
3.5.3.1 Deontic to Temporal Translator
Deontic constraints are specified via the  language of Figure 3.10. However, to
verify whether these constraints will be broken or not, the verifier needs to study the
occurrence of the actions constrained deontically in the given state-space. Since we
are using model checking as our method of verification, then the occurrence of these
actions needs to be specified in a temporal logic. Figure 3.9 has already provided a
mapping between deontic sets and the occurrence of the deontically constrained action
in an interaction’s state-space. This mapping needs to be associated with the general
temporal operators A, G, E, and F, defined in Section 2.3.2. The final result is presented
in Figure 3.15.
path in which action a is performed
path in which action a is not performed
node at which action a can be performed
node at which action a cannot be performed
Ga ≡ EG¬aPa ≡ EFa Fa ≡ AG¬aOa ≡ AFa Ia ≡ EFa ∧ EG¬a
KEY
Figure 3.15: Mapping deontic operators into temporal ones
Mapping  predicates into ’s temporal language, the µ-calculus, is a straight-
forward task. It is based on translating  predicates into general deontic logic rep-
resentation (as presented by the language’s semantics in Section 3.4.2.2), mapping the
deontic logic representation into a temporal one (as presented by Figure 3.15), and
specifying the temporal logic in the µ-calculus (following the µ-calculus syntax and
semantics presented in Section 2.7). Table 3.2 provides the result of this mapping.
Permission in the µ-calculus is specified as follows: µX.〈Action′〉tt∨〈−〉X), which
states that either the action can occur (〈Action′〉tt) or something can happen after
which the property should be satisfied again (〈−〉X). Finally, termination is guaranteed
by the least fixpoint operator (µX). The guaranteed termination implies that the action
Action′ will eventually occur in some path.
Gratuitousness in the µ-calculus is specified as follows: νX.〈−Action′〉X ∨ [−]ff,
which states that either the action in question cannot happen in at least one of the next
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# DPL Predicate µ−Calculus Equivalence
1. can(Agent, Action,+)← Condition. (satis f ied(Condition)
∧ µX.〈Action′〉tt ∨ 〈−〉X) ∨
(¬satis f ied(Condition)
∧ νX.[Action′]ff ∧ [−]X)
2. can(Agent, Action,−)← Condition. (satis f ied(Condition)
∧ νX.〈−Action′〉X ∨ [−]ff) ∨
(¬satis f ied(Condition)
∧ µX.[−Action′]X ∧ 〈−〉tt)
3. must(Agent, Action,+)← Condition. (satis f ied(Condition)
∧ µX.[−Action′]X ∧ 〈−〉tt) ∨
(¬satis f ied(Condition)
∧ νX.〈−Action′〉X ∨ [−]ff)
4. must(Agent, Action,−)← Condition. (satis f ied(Condition)
∧ νX.[Action′]ff ∧ [−]X) ∨
(¬satis f ied(Condition)
∧ µX.〈Action′〉tt ∨ 〈−〉X)
Table 3.2: Mapping DPL predicates into µ-calculus formulae
steps, after which the property should be satisfied again (〈−Action′〉X), or nothing can
happen anymore ([−]ff). This property is satisfied infinitely often (νX). In summary,
it states that there exists a path in which the action Action′ never happens.
Obligation in the µ-calculus is specified as follows: µX.[−Action′]X∧〈−〉tt, which
states that something can happen (〈−〉tt), and for all actions that occur that are differ-
ent from Action′, the same property should be satisfied again ([−Action′]X). Finally,
µX guarantees termination, implying that the action Action′ will eventually occur in all
paths.
Forbiddance in the µ-calculus is specified as follows: νX.[Action′]ff∧[−]X, which
states that action Action′ is not permitted ([Action′]ff), and for every other action that
occurs, the same property will be satisfied again ([−]X) infinitely often (νX).
Furthermore, as illustrated earlier by Section 3.4.2.2 and presented in our transla-
tion in Table 3.2, if the condition of the deontic rule is satisfied, then ‘can’ predicates
with a positive sign are treated as permissions, ‘can’ predicates with a negative sign
as gratuitousness, ‘must’ predicates with a positive sign as obligations, and ‘must’
predicates with a negative sign as forbiddance.
But what if the condition of a  deontic rule is not satisfied? In this case, different
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interpretations may be accepted. For example, if the condition of a permission rule is
not satisfied, do we consider this enough proof for forbidding the action, or do we
require additional rules that explicitly forbid the action before doing so? In our current
implementation, as illustrated by Table 3.2, every time a condition is not satisfied the
negation of the µ-calculus specification should be satisfied. For example, permissible
actions whose conditions have not been satisfied are treated as forbidden actions, and
vice versa. Similarly, obligatory whose conditions have not been satisfied are treated
as gratuitous actions, and vice versa.
3.5.3.2 µ-Calculus Proof Rules
The ‘proof rules’ component of Figure 3.14 takes in an interaction model and a set of
temporal properties. It then proves the satisfaction of these properties in the given inter-
action model. The properties are specified via the µ-calculus temporal language; there-
fore, their satisfaction is proved following the µ-calculus proof rules of Figure 3.16.
The rules are based on the semantics of the µ-calculus language, which were presented
earlier in Figure 2.7. They imply that a state E always satisfies tt (true), and never
ff ( f alse). E satisfies φ1 ∨ φ2 if it satisfies either φ1 or φ2, and it satisfies φ1 ∧ φ2 if
it satisfies both φ1 and φ2. 〈A〉φ is satisfied if state E can make at least one transition
A to state F, such that F satisfies φ. [A]φ is satisfied if for all transitions A that state
E can take to F, then F satisfies φ. Prolog, by nature, computes the least fixed point
solution. Hence, µZ.φ is satisfied if state E satisfies the property φ. The greatest fixed
point, however, is the dual of the least fixed point. Therefore, the greatest fixed point
formula is satisfied if the least fixed point of the negated formula fails to be satisfied.
The translation of these rules into  Prolog is then a straightforward mechanism. The
result is a compact and efficient model checker.
satis f ies(E, tt) ← true
satis f ies(E, φ1∨φ2) ← satis f ies(E, φ1) ∨ satis f ies(E, φ2)
satis f ies(E, φ1∧φ2) ← satis f ies(E, φ1) ∧ satis f ies(E, φ2)
satis f ies(E, 〈A〉φ) ← ∃F. (trans(E, A, F) ∧ satis f ies(F, φ))
satis f ies(E, [A]φ) ← ∀F. (trans(E, A, F)→ satis f ies(F, φ))
satis f ies(E, µZ.φ) ← satis f ies(E, φ)
satis f ies(E, νZ.φ) ← dual(φ, φ′) ∧ ¬satis f ies(E, φ′)
Figure 3.16: µ-calculus proof rules
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3.5.3.3 LCC Transitions Rules
Proving satisfaction may sometime require transitions to be made from one state to the
next (note the occurrence of trans(E, A, F) in Figure 3.16). In such cases, and since the
the state-space is specified via the  language, the ‘transition rules’ component of
Figure 3.14 performs these transitions based on the  transition rules of Figure 3.17.
These rules are based on ’s expansion mechanism, which was presented earlier in
Figure 2.5. They imply that E :: D can perform a transition A to F if D can perform
a transition A to F. E1 or E2 can perform a transition A to F if either E1 or E2 can
perform a transition A to F. E1 then E2 can perform a transition A to E2 if E1 can
perform a transition A to the empty process nil. Otherwise, it can perform a transition
A to F then E2 if E1 can perform a transition A to F. Note that while null is ’s empty
action, nil is used to describe an empty process. An empty action may be succeeded
by other actions; however, an empty process marks the end of the process, implying
that no further actions may be executed. E1 par E2 can perform a transition A to either
F par E2 if E1 can perform a transition A to F, or to E1 par F if E2 can perform a
transition A to F. M ⇐ P can perform a transition in(M) to the empty process nil by
retrieving the incoming message M. M ⇒ P can perform a transition out(M) to nil by
sending the message M. Finally, E ← C may perform some internal computation #(X)
if X is a term in the conjunction of terms C (XinC) and the constraint C is satisfied
(sat(C)).
trans(E :: D, A, F) ← trans(D, A, F)
trans(E1 or E2, A, F) ← trans(E1, A, F) ∨ trans(E2, A, F)
trans(E1 then E2, A, E2) ← trans(E1, A, nil)
trans(E1 then E2, A, F then E2) ← trans(E1, A, F) ∧ F , nil
trans(E1 par E2, A, F par E2) ← trans(E1, A, F)
trans(E1 par E2, A, E1 par F) ← trans(E2, A, F)
trans(M⇐P, in(M), null) ← true
trans(M⇒P, out(M), null) ← true
trans(E←C, #(X), E) ← X in C ∧ sat(C)
Figure 3.17: LCC transition rules
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3.5.4 MCID versus XMC
 was originally based on the  model checker.  was first selected due to its
appealing logic-based nature (see Section 3.5.1). It was then stripped down to its basic
operations, which were later modified to suit our needs, resulting in the  system.
Currently, , like , is built on top of the  tabled Prolog system, which
addresses the critical issue of termination. Unlike , the transition rules of 
are based on the  transition rules. However, similar to , the core of the 
system is based on the µ-calculus proof rules. It is worth noting that , unlike ,
does not use the traditional notion of channels. Process calculi usually make use of
channels, through which messages are passed, to connect processes together. Instead
of using channels,  directly specifies the agent to which the message is sent to. 
implements this by introducing a list of messages Mi. The sending and receiving agent
details are attached to the transmitted messages which are saved in Mi. When an agent
is expecting a message, it searches for it in the list of incoming messages Mi. To keep
things simple and clear, we ignore these details in Figure 3.16.
However, the major difference between the  and  systems is the introduc-
tion of a deontic layer to the  system model. This adds a whole new component to
the verifier for dealing with the deontic constraints (Section 3.5.3.1).
3.6 Results
To verify the travel agency scenario presented in this chapter, the model checker is
fed the  interaction model of Figure 3.8, the  deontic constraints of Table 3.1, and
temporal properties 3.1 and 3.2. However, as illustrated in Section 3.5.3.1, all deontic
constraints are first translated into µ-calculus properties before verification starts.
We note that verification is expected to be carried out by the agents, such as a
broker agent, at run time. In which case, the exact number of agents playing each
role would be known. In our case, the system is verified for one customer agent, one
travel agent, two airline web services, one hotel directory service, and one credit card
web service. The  time and memory usage, from the moment the model checker is
invoked until the results are returned to the user, are presented by Table 3.3. We note
that all the results presented in this thesis have been obtained when running the model
checker on an Intel Core 2, 2GHz machine.
It is not only our proposed model checker’s algorithm that distinguishes our verifi-
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Property # CPU time (in sec) Memory usage (in )
Deontic RuleD1 0.036 2.342
Deontic RuleD1 0.048 2.342
Deontic RuleD1 0.004 0.137
Deontic RuleD1 0.044 1.999
Temporal Property 3.1 0.064 2.518
Temporal Property 3.2 0.064 2.772
Table 3.3: Travel agency scenario: verification results
cation mechanism from others, but the entire system model and property specification.
The combination of interaction and deontic models, one of the main novel contribu-
tions of this thesis, introduces a major distinction between the system models verified
in this thesis and those verified by other model checkers. For this reason, we find it
hard to compare our mechanism to others by simply checking numerical results. Nev-
ertheless, we believe these numerical results are sufficient to prove that interaction time
verification could be indeed possible. As illustrated by Table 3.3, on average, the 
time consumed is a fraction of a second and the memory usage is less than 3. We
believe that having agents wait a fraction of a second before deciding whether or not
to join a given interaction to be a realistic and reasonable waiting time in general. Fur-
thermore, most machines nowadays come with a decent memory storage; hence, a few
megabytes is usually not a problem.
Therefore, we believe that the results of Table 3.3 highlight the efficiency of the
 verifier. This efficiency is the result of many factors. First, verifying an explicitly
defined interaction model considerably limits the interaction’s state-space. Second,
using a logic based model checker contributes to the efficiency in computing complex
data structures. Third, the model checker makes use of the underlying  system for
searching the state-space. Tabling mechanisms in , which caches results in tables,
ensures termination and avoids redundant sub-computations. In conclusion, the result
is a lightweight and efficient model checker that promotes interaction time verification.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a verification technique for predicting and preventing fail-
ure — due to errors within the interaction model, conflicts between the interaction
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protocol and the agents’ rules and requirements, as well as clash of interests between
the agents — as early as possible in multiagent system scenarios. This is made possi-
ble by allowing agents to invoke the model checker at run time for verifying instances
of the interaction protocol.
Having the  specification language as the executable language as well supports
our dynamic model checking requirement. This is made possible due to the clause ex-
pansion mechanism of  (Figure 2.5), which allows agents to automatically retrieve
the current protocol state and feed it to the model checker. Furthermore, the combi-
nation of using the µ-calculus as the model checker’s temporal logic, along with the
logic-based nature of the verifier, results in an extremely compact size model checker.
The entire model checker is built in less than 200 lines of Prolog code3. This makes
 ideal to be used by agents at run time. The system, however, is built on  tabled
Prolog. The actual burden of searching the state-space is, therefore, thrown on the
underlying  system. Last, but not least, the logic-based nature of  provides ef-
ficiency in computing constraints and complex data structures. This is crucial for our
system model, which makes heavy use of constraints and structured terms.
As for the  language presented in this chapter, the language has been kept rel-
atively simple. To some extent,  may be viewed as similar to common policy lan-
guages such as Rei (Kagal et al., 2003),  (Jajodia et al., 1997), Ponder (Dulay et al.,
2002), etc. For instance,  allows the specification of conditions for specifying when
agents can/cannot perform a given action. It also allows the specification of obliga-
tions, through the use of positive ‘must’ predicates. However, the expressiveness of
the language is increased by allowing more complex conditions. Conditions can make
use of the underlying µ-calculus temporal logic and the agent’s constraint language,
which is Prolog in our case. For example, using temporal constraints, one may easily
specify that action A can be performed only if action B has already occurred. Another
interesting aspect of  is that it has been specified for the purpose of verifying deontic
constraints. Therefore, unlike other policy languages, the semantics of  predicates
are better understood with respect to the temporal occurrence of permitted, prohibited,
or obligatory actions in the interaction’s state-space. As a result, a direct mapping
between  predicates and the µ-calculus temporal logic exists. This is essential for
keeping the model checker’s algorithm basic, efficient, and lightweight.
3The model checker’s code is available in Appendix B.
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3.8 Future Work
It is worth noting that the  system may be used in three different ways:
F To find a suitable set of collaborating agents for a given interaction model. This
is useful for addressing collaboration and coalition formation problems.
F To prove the satisfaction of certain properties in a given system. For example,
verifying safety and liveness properties in addition to more interesting ones, such
as properties of trustworthiness.
F To aid agents in their decision process by verifying which actions will result
in the (dis)satisfaction of certain properties. This could be helpful in dialogue
games, negotiation protocols, argumentation, etc.
These three problems are intertwined. This thesis focuses on the first two. For
instance, the temporal properties of Section 3.4.3.3 address the second problem, while
deontic constraints are used to address the first. The third problem is closely connected
to the second as well, yet it addresses a completely different issue from that of finding
collaborating agents. We therefore leave the third issue — using the model checker
for aiding the agents’ decision process — for future work. Considering probabilistic
and stochastic analysis might be useful in tackling these issues. However, we note that
the introduction of such analysis would require significant modifications to the current
model checker.
As an application, we have chosen to focus in this thesis on the issue of trust. This
choice is due to the significance of this problem in distributed open systems, especially
that despite the extensive research in the field of trust, no verification mechanism has
yet addressed this issue. The next chapter illustrates how the  model checker may
be used to verify trust in multiagent systems by verifying the agents’ trust constraints
along with properties of trustworthiness of the interaction model.

Chapter 4
Verification of Trust in Multiagent
Systems
Chapter 3 has introduced an efficient model checking system which has the potential
of addressing a variety of problems, such as proving the correctness of interaction
models, finding suitable collaborating agents, aiding the agent’s decision process in
dialogue games and others, etc. However, due to the criticality of the trust issue in
distributed open systems and the urgent need for practical trust solutions, we choose
the trust domain to be our model checker’s application domain. In this chapter, we
show how the  system may be used by agents at run time to verify whether a
certain interaction is trustworthy and whether the other agents it will be interacting
with are to be trusted in performing their assigned roles.
This chapter opens with an introduction to the issue of trust in Section 4.1. This
is followed by an overview of available trust models and mechanisms for multiagent
systems in Section 4.2. Our proposed trust model is presented in Section 4.3, followed
by a motivating example in Section 4.4. Our proposed trust policy language for the
specification of trust is introduced in Section 4.5. We then revisit our verification
mechanism in Section 4.6, before drawing our conclusions in Section 4.8.
4.1 The Issue of Trust
Trust remains a fundamental challenge for the success of distributed open systems.
Despite much research, the notion of trust remains vague and, as yet, there is no con-
sensus on what exactly trust is. This is because trust may be addressed at different
levels. At the low system level, trust is associated with network security, such as:
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F authentication, for determining the identity of the user entity,
F access permissions, for deciding who has access to what,
F content integrity, for determining whether the content has been modified,
F content privacy, for ensuring only authorised entities can access the content, etc.
At higher levels, the focus is on trusting entities — these could be human users, soft-
ware agents, services, directories, etc. — to:
F perform actions as requested,
F provide correct information,
F not to misuse information,
F execute protocols correctly, etc.
As a result, what is considered to be a trust issue for someone may mean something
completely different for another. For some people, trust may be synonymous with
network security, popularity, reputations, etc. We prefer to inherit a more general
definition of trust. We define the trust issue as the problem of who to interact with,
when to interact with them, and how to interact with them (Ramchurn et al., 2004).
We call this the who/when/how questions of trust.
The complexity of the issue of trust, as we view it, lies neither in the broad spec-
trum of these trust issues nor in the diversity of methods addressing them. The problem
we try to tackle lies in the inability of being able to decide at run-time which issues
should currently be addressed and how to address them. We argue that different envi-
ronments and different scenarios require different strategies for dealing with trust. For
example, under critical circumstances, it may be preferred to distrust new entrants to
the system, i.e. agents with no ratings. However, under less critical circumstances, it
may be favoured, and possibly necessary, to trust any agent with no explicit negative
reputation. Therefore, we leave it to the agent to decide which strategy is most suitable
for a given scenario. Such a decision is usually made for a specific interaction model
with a predefined set of collaborating agents. As a result, we propose a contextualised
trust model that is built on top of existing trust mechanisms, allowing the specification
of more dynamic mechanisms.
Available research has mainly focused on analysing, refining, and developing strate-
gies that address various trust issues at different system levels. We believe all these
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strategies are important. However, it is the agent’s decision process that decides which
strategy is appropriate for a given scenario. The agent’s reasoning layer that selects this
best strategy is outside the scope of this thesis. Our work concentrates on providing
this layer with the formal methods for specifying and verifying these strategies, which
in effect does aid its decision process. We show how the specification and verification
methods of Chapter 3 may be applied to this problem.
Before presenting our contextualised trust model and its specification and verifi-
cation mechanisms, the following section provides an overview of the available trust
models and mechanisms of the literature.
4.2 Trust in Multiagent Systems: an Overview
Much research has been undertaken in the field of trust in multiagent systems aiming
at answering the who/when/how questions of trust. Ramchurn et al. (2004) divides this
work into two categories. The first deals with trust at the individual level and the second
at the system level. Figure 4.1 presents the different trust models and mechanisms at





















































Figure 4.1: Trust models and mechanisms (Ramchurn et al., 2004)
82 Chapter 4. Verification of Trust in Multiagent Systems
F Individual Level Trust: Individual level trust focuses on providing agents with
models that would allow them to compute their trust in others. As a result, the
burden of computation of such models lies on the agent.
G Evolutionary & Learning Models. These models rely on the fact that
agents can interact with each other over a number of encounters, leading
them to learn about each others behaviour with time and improve their
expectations accordingly. Similar to game theory, agents may analyse their
opponents’ previous moves and adapt their strategies in retrospect. This
could result in evolving strategies promoting emerging trust, such as the
Tit for Tat strategy1.
G Reputation Models. In open environments, it is hard for agents to have
interacted sufficiently with the majority of agents in the system. There-
fore, instead of relying on personal previous experience, agents may rely
on other agents’ experiences and their impressions of each other. In order to
achieve this, each agent should be capable of constructing a social network
to be used for retrieving reputations. For aggregating these ratings, agents
should pick strategies that would address questions of the form: What if
agents lie when rating others in order to preserve a certain coalition? What
if the new entrant with no ratings is actually an old one with a bad repu-
tation who has re-entered the system with a new identity? Should all new
entrants be penalised? etc.
G Socio-Cognitive Models. Evolutionary and learning models as well as rep-
utation models are based on agents relying on past experiences and their
outcome for computing their trust in each other. However, relying on past
experience need not be the only solution. For example, agents may analyse
and compute their trust in others based on their belief in the other’s capa-
bility, willingness, persistence, and motivation. For example, knowing that
agent X is capable of selling wine, one may deduce that X is most probably
also capable of selling beer. Another example states that one may believe
that agent Y will carry out a deal simply because it knows that completing
the deal successfully will provide Y with an unmissable reward.
1The Tit for Tat strategy is based on punishment and reward. If the agent defects, it will be punished
with another defection. If it cooperates, it will be rewarded with another cooperative action. Over a pe-
riod of encounters, this will promote emerging trust and both agents will be expected to be cooperating.
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F System Level Trust: System level trust aims at providing the system with the
appropriate mechanisms for preserving a certain level of trustworthiness by driv-
ing agents to perform correctly. As a result, the burden of computation of such
mechanisms lies on the system, as opposed to the agent.
G Trustworthy Interaction Mechanisms. Protocols may be used to guide or
dictate the individual steps of an interaction. These protocols could aim at
encouraging agents to be truthful. For example, while an English auction
encourages truth telling on the auctioneer, a Vickrey auction encourages
truth telling on the bidders2. Of course, these mechanisms assume agents
are abiding to the protocol, which is not always the case. For addressing
the lying agents problem and other collusion issues (such as having bid-
ders cheat by collaborating and sharing information to beat the auctioneer),
additional security mechanisms may be enforced, possibly making use of
cryptographic techniques and other technologies.
G Reputation Mechanisms. Sometimes agents do not bother rate each other
if they do not directly benefit from that. Modelling the reputation mecha-
nism at the system level can help achieve an ‘incentive compatible system’,
for example, by introducing side payments. The reputation model at the in-
dividual level has also raised several issues, many of which are best dealt
with at the system level. For example, to discourage agents from cheat-
ing and re-entering the system with a new identity, the system can make it
costly for agents to change identities.
G Distributed Security Mechanisms. The system should use mechanisms
for addressing issues in the domain of network security, such as identity
proof, access permission, content integrity, content privacy, etc. Certifi-
cates may be used to prove an agent is reciprocative, reliable, and honest.
Organisational approaches of multiagent systems provide means of speci-
fying which agent can perform what actions based on the roles they play.
2In an English auction, all bids are made public, preventing the auctioneer from lying about who
won the item and at what price. In a Vickrey auction, bids are sealed, providing the opportunity for the
auctioneer to lie about who is the highest bidder and/or what is the highest bid. However, the winner of
a Vickrey auction only pays the amount of the second highest bid. This implies that if the bidder bids
a value lower than its true valuation, then the bidder will either risk losing the item altogether or win it
for the same price as bidding its true valuation. This essentially strips the bidder from any incentive for
lying about its true valuation.
84 Chapter 4. Verification of Trust in Multiagent Systems
4.3 A Contextualised Trust Model
After introducing the critical issue of trust and presenting an overview of the available
trust mechanisms, this section proposes a contextualised trust model that is built on top
of these existing models and mechanisms. The problem, as presented in Section 4.1,
is that while one trust mechanism may be preferred for one scenario, it could be inap-
propriate or even useless for another. For example, buying a £12.00 music CD online
requires a completely different approach for dealing with trust from buying a £600.00
Gibson electric guitar. In the first case, the buyer might be satisfied with checking the
general ratings of the seller. In the latter case, even if the seller has very high ratings,
the buyer might still need to inspect many details, answering questions such as: Are the
ratings written by friends of the seller? Are the ratings based on similar transactions?
Is the seller an authorised dealer? Does the system protect the buyer from fraud? etc.
Clearly, different approaches and different mechanisms are needed for dealing with dif-
ferent scenarios. This, we believe, raises a need for a contextualised trust model, which
allows the agent to decide whether the interaction it is about to join and the agents it
will be collaborating with are sufficiently trustworthy. Each agent will then have its
own set of trust rules that restrict when, how, and who to interact with. Of course, the
system may still provide services such as issuing certificates, storing reputations, etc.
However, these services would be distributed with no centralised control behind them.
It is then up to the agent to decide when and how to use such services.
This view of a contextualised trust model is in line with the proposed multiagent
system model of Section 3.1. We view a multiagent system as a collection of interac-
tion models and a group of autonomous agents. These autonomous agents are respon-
sible for grouping themselves into the various interactions. There should be no higher
coordination layer, such as a centralised control centre, that would affect or control
such groups. Each agent will have its own set of rules that it would consult when de-
ciding whether the interaction it is going to join and the agents it will be collaborating
with are trustworthy or not.
Earlier trust models and mechanisms have focused either on models that allow
agents to compute their trust in others (i.e. individual level trust models) or on mech-
anisms that allow the system to enforce rules resulting in a trustworthy environment
(i.e. system level trust mechanisms). Our approach is slightly different since it focuses
solely on what the agent’s trust requirements and constraints are. Nevertheless, these
could impose constraints on both the interaction model and other agents in the system.
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Figure 4.2 provides examples on the specification of trust mechanisms in our pro-
posed contextualised model. The result is two classes of constraints: constraints on
the agents and constraints on the interaction model. For example, if there is a require-
ment that some agent should be enforced to prove its identity (the Distributed Security
Mechanism of Figure 4.2), then this constrains the interaction by expecting it to al-
low the agent to send its  before performing any crucial actions. This also imposes
constraints on the agent by expecting it to be capable of performing  encryptions.
Trusting agent X to perform ac-
tion A relies on X’s history in de-
fecting when performing A.
The evolution of trust should be
encouraged (e.g. reward coordi-





































































Trust in an agent is based on the
ratings of that agent.
Agent X is trusted to perform ac-
tion A only if it is believed that it
is willing to perform this action.
Agent X is trusted only if it has
at least 10 ratings and these rat-
ings are above a certain thresh-
old.
Agents are trusted only if they
can use cryptographic techniques
(e.g. to prevent collusion).
Agent X is not trusted to de-
liver goods if its last few deliveries
were of bad quality.
Agent X is trusted only if it is ca-
pable of performing pgp encryp-
tions.
Agent X is trusted to deliver
dvds only if it is believed that it
is willing to deliver good quality
dvds.
The protocol should encourage


















































































Agents should be enforced to
prove their identity before a crit-
ical action is performed.
The interaction is trusted if each
cooporative action is rewarded by
another cooporative action, and
each defection is punished by an-
other defection (e.g. it models a
Tit for Tat strategy).
The interaction is trusted if it
models a Vickery auction, which
enforces truth-telling on the bid-
ders.
The interaction is trusted only if
it allows the agent to send its
pgp before sending crucial infor-
mation.
The interaction is trusted only if
it forces the agents to send their
ratings at the end of the interac-
tion.
The system should encourage
agents to rate each other. It
should also have mechanisms for
dealing with new entrants (i.e.











































Figure 4.2: Specifying existing trust mechanisms in the contextualised trust model
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4.4 Motivating Example
Consider the auction scenario of Figure 4.3. The interaction starts at state s0 when the
auctioneer A sends an invite to a set of bidders for bidding on an item I with a reserve
price R. Only after the invites have been sent to all bidders will the interaction move to
state s1. The bidders will then send their sealed bids back to the auctioneer. When all
bids are collected, the interaction moves to state s2. The auctioneer informs the winner
of the price V to be paid, moving the interaction to state s3. Finally, the winning bidder






message(a(auctioneer, A), a(bidder, Bi), invite(I, R))
message(a(auctioneer, A), a(bidder, Bi), invite(I, R))
message(a(bidder, Bi), a(auctioneer, A), bid(Bi, Vi))
message(a(auctioneer, A), a(bidder, Bx), win(Bx, V ))
message(a(bidder, Bx), a(auctioneer, A), payment(P ))
message(a(bidder, Bi), a(auctioneer, A), bid(Bi, Vi))
where,
message(A, B,M) represents the transmission of message M from agent A to agent B, and
a(R, I) represents an agent I playing the role R
Figure 4.3: Auction scenario: the interaction’s state graph
Now let us assume that some agent is interested in engaging in the above auction
scenario for either selling or buying some music CDs. Trust issues will automatically
arise on two different levels. These may be summarised by the following two ques-
tions:
F Is the interaction protocol trustworthy?
F In such an interaction, which agents are to be trusted?
Answering the first question allows the agent to pick an appropriate interaction
protocol for selling/buying its item. The appropriateness of an interaction model is
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measured in terms of the satisfiability of certain properties. Traditional properties to
check for are usually liveness and safety properties. The auctioneer may decide that the
interaction protocol is trusted only if it is deadlock free (trust issue T 1 of Figure 4.4).
A much more interesting set of properties is obtained when tackling domain specific
issues. A challenging trust issue to verify is whether or not the interaction protocol
encourages truth-telling on the bidders (trust issue T 2 of Figure 4.4).
T 1 : The interaction model is trusted only if it is deadlock free.
T 2 : The interaction model is trusted only if it encourages truth telling on the bidders, i.e. the bidders
cannot be better off if they bid a value either lower or higher than their true valuation of the item.
T 3 : If the agent knows from previous experience that DVDs from auctioneer X are not original, then
X is not trusted in delivering good quality DVDs.
T 4 : If the auctioneer agent X is not trusted in delivering good quality DVDs, then it is not trusted in
delivering good quality s.
T 5 : Agent X is trusted to take the role of an auctioneer only if it has high ratings. Furthermore, new
auctioneers are not accepted, and more importance should be given to the latest ratings.
Figure 4.4: Auction scenario: some trust issues
Answering the second question allows the agent to select a trusted set of collaborat-
ing agents. For example, one bidder may trust auctioneer X to sell anything but DVDs,
possibly because it knows from previous experience that X’s DVDs are not original.
It may also use socio-cognitive models to deduce that if the DVDs are not original,
then most probably the s will not be as well (trust issues T 3 and T 4 of Figure 4.4).
Another widely used trust mechanism is the use of ratings and reputations. The agents
should be capable of collecting (or having access to) each others ratings. It is then up
to each agent to aggregate these ratings as they see fit. For example, one bidder may
decide not to trust new auctioneers with no selling history, and to give more importance
to recent ratings (trust issue T 5 of Figure 4.4).
The trust issues of Figure 4.4 cover a wide sample of the trust mechanisms of
the literature: from socio-cognitive models (T 4 of Figure 4.4), to evolutionary and
learning models (T 3 of Figure 4.4), reputation mechanism (T 5 of Figure 4.4), and
trustworthy interaction mechanisms (T 2 of Figure 4.4).
Note that our current research does not focus on how an agent selects a trust mech-
anism. Instead, we focus on how an agent may specify and verify its trust constraints.
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For example, while we do not focus on how the agent obtains the ratings of others, we
do require the specification of how will these ratings be aggregated (T 5 of Figure 4.4).
After specifying their trust constraints, agents need to verify whether these constraints
hold in a given system. We show how the  system of Chapter 3 may solve this.
In the remainder of this chapter, our running example will refer to the trust con-
straints of Figure 4.4, which are to be verified against the auction system of Figure 4.3.
The auction system is specified through the  process calculus, as presented by Fig-
ure 4.5. The auctioneer A — knowing the item I, the reserve price R, and the set of
bidders Bs — recursively sends an invite to all bidders of the set Bs. It then takes the
role of auctioneer2 to collect bids, send the winner a message, collect payment, and
deliver the item won. On the other side, each bidder agent receives an invite from the
auctioneer and sends its bid based on its valuation. The winner receives a win message.
It then sends back its payment details P.
a(auctioneer(I,R, Bs), A) ::
a(auctioneer(I,R, Bs, Bs), A).
a(auctioneer(I,R, Bs, Bsi), A) :: invite(I,R)⇒ a(bidder, B)← Bs = [B|T ] thena(auctioneer(I,R,T, Bsi), A)

or
a(auctioneer2(I, Bsi, [ ]), A)← Bs = [ ].
a(auctioneer2(I, Bs,V s), A) ::
append([B,V],V s,Vn)← bid(B,V)⇐ a(bidder, B) then
auctioneer2(I, Bs,Vn), A)← not(all bid(Bs,Vn))
or
win(B1,V2)⇒ a(bidder, B1)
← all bid(Bs,Vn) and highest(Vn, B1, ) and second highest(Vn, ,V2) then





invite(I,R)⇐ a(auctioneer( , , , ), A) then
bid(B,V)⇒ a(auctioneer2( , , ), A)← valuation(I,V) then
win(B,Vw)⇐ a(auctioneer2( , , ), A) then
payment(P)⇒ a(auctioneer2( , , ), A)← payment(Vw, P).
Figure 4.5: Auction scenario: the LCC interaction model
4.5. Trust Policy Language (TPL) 89
Note that we do not go through the details of , since the language has already
been introduced in Chapter 2 and sample  interaction models have been presented
in Chapters 2 and 3. The trust constraints of Figure 4.4, however, need to be specified
in some trust specification language. The following section introduces our proposed
trust policy language.
4.5 Trust Policy Language (TPL)
Chapter 3 introduced the concept of the agents constraints, the deontic model, and
suggested the addition of these constraints to the system model and the property spec-
ifications fed to the model checker. In this chapter, we focus on the agents’ trust
constraints. We therefore propose a domain specific policy language for the specifica-
tion of trust rules, as opposed to general deontic rules. The syntax and semantics of
our trust policy language () is presented in the following section, followed by some
concrete examples.
4.5.1 Syntax and Semantics
Figure 4.6 presents ’s syntax. It states that trust rules may either hold in general
or under certain conditions: TrustS pecs[← Condition]. The interaction’s trustworthi-
ness is modelled by trust(interaction(IP), S ign), where IP identifies the  interaction
model in question. S ign could take the values ‘+’ and ‘−’ to model trust and distrust,
respectively. The agent’s trustworthiness is modelled by trust(Agent, S ign), where the
Agent is specified in terms of its role and Id. Only if the agent is trusted, it can en-
gage in an interaction. Trusting or distrusting agents to perform specific actions is
modelled by trust(Agent, S ign, Action). Actions could either be message passing ac-
tions () — such as sending (Message ⇒ Agent) or receiving (Message ⇐ Agent)
messages — or non-message passing actions (-) — such as performing internal
computations. We also allow actions to take the form of another trust rule (note the
TrustS pecs in the Action definition). This supports the delegation of trust, since it
permits the specification of whether some agent’s trust in others is to be trusted or
not. For example, one can specify that a hospital’s trust in doctors can be trusted:
trust(a(hospital,H),+, trust(a(doctor, id),+)), while a butcher’s trust in doctors is not:
trust(a(butcher, B),−, trust(a(doctor, id),+)).
The conditions attached to trust rules are usually constructed from structured Pro-
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TrustRule := TrustS pecs[← Condition]
TrustS pecs := trust(interaction(IP), S ign) |
trust(Agent, S ign) |
trust(Agent, S ign, Action)
Agent := a(Role, Id)
S ign := + | −
Action := MPA | N−MPA | TrustS pecs
MPA := Message⇒ Agent |
Message⇐ Agent




Role,N − MPA,Message := Term
where,
IP is either a variable or the  of an  interaction model,
Id is either a variable or a unique agent identifier,
Temporal is a unique identifier of a temporal property, specified in the syntax of Figure 2.7,
Term is either a variable or a structured term in Prolog syntax, except for N−MPA terms, which cannot
be variables, and
[X] denotes the occurrence of either zero or one instance of X.
Figure 4.6: TPL syntax
log terms using the ∧ and ∨ logical operators. However, our  syntax allows the
addition of temporal conditions too. These are especially, but not exclusively, useful
for trust rules constraining the interaction model, since trusting an interaction model
usually implies that the interaction model satisfies some temporal properties. Trust rule
T 1 of Figure 4.4 is one example where the condition is a temporal property specified
in the µ-calculus. The following section provides further examples on the specification
of various trust issues.
An interesting aspect of  is that the syntax is very basic, yet very flexible and
powerful. The syntax is simple because the language can describe clear and concise
trust rules stating whether an interaction or an agent is trusted in general or whether
an agent is trusted to perform specific actions. Constraints may also be added to these
rules. However, these constraints make use of the underlying µ-calculus temporal logic
and the agent’s constraint language, which is Prolog in our case. As a result, anything
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that may be expressed in either Prolog or the µ-calculus may be expressed as an addi-
tional constraint in an agent’s trust rule. This results in a flexible and powerful language
with a high degree of expressiveness.
This high degree of expressiveness makes one wonder what the limitations on ver-
ifiable properties are. Two classes of limitations occur: the first is imposed by the
semantics and the second by the verification mechanism. For example, in the first,
the semantics limit agent actions in rules of the form trust(Agent, S ign, Action) to ac-
tions that occur in the interaction model. This is because the occurrence of an action,
whether an  or an - action, needs to be verified in the scope of a given in-
teraction model. Nevertheless, conditions of trust rules could be general Prolog rules
that are unrelated to a given interaction model. These are usually based on the agent’s
knowledge and belief. However, if the condition contained a temporal property, then
this property is usually concerned with the temporal occurrence of actions in a given
interaction model.
In the second class of limitations, the nature of the verifier limits the system to
be verified to a specific instantiation. For instance, model checking requires system
models to be finite. Therefore, the property specification should be verified against a
finite system model with a predefined number of agents. For example, as illustrated in
Section 4.7, the trust constraints in our auction scenario are verified in a system model
with one auctioneer and two bidder agents only. Because the system verified is limited
to a specific instantiation, this sometimes implies that certain variables should also be
instantiated. For example, the next section illustrates how trust issue T 1 needs to be
verified for six different bidding cases. In each, the bidding value of each of the two
bidders is instantiated by the model checker at run time.
4.5.2 Example: the auction system
We take the view that autonomous agents drive and control multiagent systems; there-
fore, we focus in this chapter on the agents’ trust constraints. Nevertheless, these
constraints could either be constraints on the interaction model or constraints on the
agents one wishes to interact with. In the latter case, the constraints can either specify
the agent’s general trust in others or its trust in them performing specific actions. Trust
issues T 1 and T 2 of Figure 4.4 are examples of trust at the interaction level. Whereas
trust issues T 3, T 4, and T 5 are examples of trust at the agent level. In this section,
we show how these trust constraints may be specified in .
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Trust constraints T 3 and T 4 are specified in  in a straightforward manner, as
shown by Properties 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. Property 4.3 states that an agent A play-
ing the role auctioneer is not trusted in delivering s if it is known from experience
that it has failed to do so in the past. Property 4.4 states that if agent A playing the role
auctioneer is not trusted in delivering s, then it is not trusted in delivering DVDs too.
Trust rule T 5, specified in  through Property 4.5, is slightly more complex. The rule
states that agent A is trusted to play the role auctioneer only if it has a selling history
with ratings for at least 50 transactions, and at least 70% of its ratings are positive,
going up to 90% for the latest 20 transactions. The mechanism presented here distrusts
new entrants and focuses on the agent’s latest ratings rather than the overall one.
The conditions for trusting interaction models, however, make strong use of tem-
poral properties. The ‘deadlock free’ property T 1 is modelled in a straightforward
manner, as shown by Property 4.1 of Figure 4.7. Property 4.1 states that the interac-
trust(interaction(IM),−) ←
µZ.([−]ff ∧ ¬completed) ∨ 〈−〉Z.
(4.1)
trust(interaction(IM),+) ←
V ′l <Cl ∧ Cl<Vl ∧ Vl<V ∧ V<Vh ∧ Vh<Ch ∧ Ch<V
′
h ∧
[bid(Bidder,V), bid(Competitor,Cl)]〈win(Bidder, X)〉tt ∧
[bid(Bidder,Vl), bid(Competitor,Cl)]〈win(Bidder,Y)〉tt ∧
[bid(Bidder,V ′l ), bid(Competitor,Cl)]〈win(Competitor, )〉tt ∧
[bid(Bidder,V), bid(Competitor,Ch)]〈win(Competitor, )〉tt ∧
[bid(Bidder,Vh), bid(Competitor,Ch)]〈win(Competitor, )〉tt ∧
[bid(Bidder,V ′h), bid(Competitor,Ch)]〈win(Bidder,Z)〉tt ∧
Y≥X ∧ Z≥X.
(4.2)
trust(a(auctioneer, A),−, deliver(cd, )) ←
know(a( , A), deliver(cd, ), f ail).
(4.3)
trust(a(auctioneer, A),−, deliver(dvd, )) ←
trust(a(auctioneer, A),−, deliver(cd, )).
(4.4)
trust(a(auctioneer, A),+) ←
rating count(a(auctioneer, A),Total) ∧ Total>50 ∧
rating average(a(auctioneer, A), Average) ∧ Average>0.7 ∧
rating latest(a(auctioneer, A), 20, Latest) ∧ Latest>0.9.
(4.5)
Figure 4.7: Auction scenario: TPL trust constraints
4.5. Trust Policy Language (TPL) 93
tion model IM is not trusted if eventually a deadlock occurs. This is specified in the
µ-calculus as µZ.([−]ff ∧ ¬completed) ∨ 〈−〉Z, which states that either no action can
occur ([−]ff) and the interaction has not completed yet (¬completed) or something
can happen (〈−〉Z) that will eventually (µZ) lead to this deadlock.
The propertyT 2, which specifies the encouragement of truth-telling on the bidders,
is more challenging. To prove the protocol encourages truth-telling on the bidders, we
prove that the bidders cannot do any better than bidding their true valuation V , that is
the maximum value they are willing to pay for the item. We do not verify whether the
agent will actually bid its true valuation or not, since it is impossible to predict how
agents will actually act. However, we do verify whether the interaction model provides
an incentive for bidders to lie and bid a different value than their true valuation. To
achieve this, we need to study all possible bidding cases. Note that the bidding cases
take into consideration our current bidder and its competing bidding agent only, since
all remaining bidders do not have any effect on our bidder’s strategy. The bidding cases
are:
F Case 1: The competing agent bids a value Cl which is lower than our bidder’s
true valuation V (i.e. Cl < V), and:
G Case 1(a): our bidder bids its true valuation V
G Case 1(b): our bidder bids a value V− between its true valuation V and the
competing agent’s bid Cl (i.e. Cl < V− < V)
G Case 1(c): our bidder bids a value V−− beneath that of the competing
agent’s bid Cl (i.e. V−− < Cl)
F Case 2: The competing agent bids a value Ch which is higher than our bidder’s
true valuation V (i.e. V < Ch), and:
G Case 2(a): our bidder bids its true valuation V
G Case 2(b): our bidder bids a value V+ between its true valuation V and the
competing agent’s bid Ch (i.e. V < V+ < Ch)
G Case 2(c): our bidder bids a value V++ beyond that of the competing
agent’s bid Ch (i.e. Ch < V++)
Figure 4.8 presents an illustration of the various bidding cases. We have focused
on only six cases, neglecting the case where the bidder may bid a value V+, such that
Cl < V < V+, or the case where it may bid a value V−, such that V− < V < Ch. Also, we
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Case 1: V > Cl
Cl V −V −− V ChV + V ++V
Case
1(c)











Figure 4.8: Bidding strategies: the 6 different bidding cases
have used strict inequalities, overlooking all equality cases. We intentionally neglected
all these cases to keep our example simple and comprehensible; nevertheless, such
additional cases may easily be incorporated as needed in a straightforward manner.
Trust Property 4.2 of Figure 4.8 provides a specification of this trust rule in .
The six bidding cases are specified through six temporal properties of the form:
[bid(Bidder, Bid1), bid(Competitor, Bid2)]〈win(Winner, Price)〉tt
The temporal property is to be interpreted as follows: if the messages bid(Bidder, Bid1)
and bid(Competitor, Bid2) are sent, then eventually the message win(Winner, Price)
will be received, stating who the winner is and at what price the item has been won 3.
We assume the bidder will lose to its competitor in cases 1(c), 2(a), and 2(b), since
it bids a value smaller than that of the competitor. We also assume the bidder to win
in cases 1(a), 1(b), and 2(c), since it bids a value higher than that of the competitor.
Nevertheless, these assumptions can easily be generalised. As a result of our assump-
tions, case 1(a) becomes the only winning case in which the bidder would have had bid
its true valuation V . The item in that case is won for the price X. The trust constraint
requires the interaction model to encourage truth telling on the bidder. In other words,
the interaction model should ensure that the bidder is not better off when winning in
cases 1(b) and 2(c), where the item is won for prices Y and Z, respectively. This is
specified in the  Property 4.2 by the condition Y ≥ X ∧ Z ≥ X. Another option is
to specify the condition as Y ≥ X ∧ Z ≥ V . This slightly modified version states that
if the bidder wins by bidding a lower value than its true valuation, then it will not be
3Note that although the temporal property makes use of the box and diamond modal operators, the
property itself does not follow any proper temporal logic syntax. We feel that presenting the prop-
erty’s actual µ-calculus specification at this point will introduce unnecessary additional complexities.
Therefore, to keep our example simple and clear, we introduce our own simplified interpretation of
the presented syntax. Nevertheless, for the exact specification, we refer the interested reader to Ap-
pendix A.2.2.
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paying a lower price than bidding its true valuation (Y ≥ X). Also, if the bidder wins
by paying a higher value than its true valuation, then it will be paying a value greater
that its true valuation (Z ≥ V), which is the maximum price the bidder is willing to
pay. Clearly, if such conditions hold, then this implies that the bidder should have no
incentive for lying in such auction systems.
In our running example, we verify the trust constraints of Figure 4.7 against the
interaction model of Figure 4.5. For example, the IM in trust property 4.2 is in fact
a reference to the  interaction model of Figure 4.5. The interaction model is said
to be trusted only if the condition of Property 4.2 is satisfied. It is worth noting that
this property is restricted to the auctions domain, yet relatively independent of specific
interaction models it can be verified against. For example, the six cases of Figure 4.8
are inclusive, even for auction systems consisting of more than two bidding agents.
This is because verifying the utility of one agent should take into consideration only
the highest competing agent’s bid — all other bids are irrelevant. Furthermore, the
verification of such a trust rule will terminate with correct results, whether positive
or negative, for any auction protocol that requires agents to place their bids before a
message is transmitted informing who the winner is. It will fail when verified against
more complex auction protocols, such as those selling multiple items and having sev-
eral winners. However, we believe verification would be successful (regardless of the
output) in the most common auctions, such as the English4, Dutch, sealed first-price,
and sealed second-price auctions.
4.6 Verification of Trust in MAS
According to our model, all trust restrictions are imposed by the agents. It is solely the
agent’s responsibility to answer the who/when/how questions of trust. In such highly
dynamic systems, this should be done at run time by deciding whether a given inter-
action model along with a given set of collaborating agents would break any of the
agent’s trust rules. This automated verification process is carried out by the agents,
4While it might be obvious how Property 4.2 would work with interactions where bidders may only
bid once, it might not be clear how such a rule would work with other interactions, such as the English
auction,were bidders may keep on increasing their bids. We note that existential quantifiers should be
used for such cases. For example, if we can say that there exists at least one case in which the bidder
may bid a value less than its true valuation and win the item for a lower price, then this implies that the
protocol no longer encourages truth-telling on the bidder.
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through invoking the model checker of Chapter 3.
As illustrated in Chapter 3, the agent feeds the verifier with the  system model,
the µ-calculus property specification, and the  deontic constraints. However, we
now add a new input: the  trust constraints. In what follows, we revisit the verifica-
tion process of Section 3.5.
The verification process is carried out as follows. The interaction model, the gen-
eral deontic model, the specific trust model, along with any additional temporal prop-
erties are fed to the model checker to be verified. The temporal properties are already
specified in the µ-calculus. The verifier then converts all  and  constraints into
the µ-calculus as well. It then tries to verify each of those properties against the 
system model. For each property, verification starts at the initial state s0 of the interac-
tion model. The model checker tries to verify that the temporal property is satisfied at
s0, following the satisfaction rules of Figure 3.16. If it succeeds, the verifier terminates
and the property is said to be satisfied. Otherwise, the verifier will make a transition(s)
to the next state(s) in the state-space, following the transition rules of Figure 3.17. The
satisfaction of the property is then verified with respect to the new state(s), and the
whole process is repeated all over again until a result is reached. The issue of termi-
nation is dealt with by making use of the  tabled Prolog system, which basically
caches previous results in tables to ensure termination. This was explained in more
detail in Section 3.5.
The modified model checking algorithm is presented in Figure 4.9. Note that the
only difference between this algorithm and that of Figure 3.13 is the addition of a new
input: the set Dt consisting of  trust rules. This requires the  constraints to be
translated into µ-calculus formulae. This step is specified in Figure 4.9 as follows:
∀dt ∈ Dt. translate(dt, t) ∧ P
is
= {t}∪P. The translation, expressed as translate(dt, t),
follows the mapping rules of Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 presents the mapping from  to the µ-calculus. Any trust rule with a
positive sign is automatically satisfied if its condition is satisfied. Such trust rules are
modelled as satis f ied(Condition)∨(¬satis f ied(Condition)∧X). Mappings number 1,
3, and 5 of Table 4.1 are an example. However, if the condition of such a trust rule is not
satisfied, then we assume that the entity in question is not trusted. If the entity in ques-
tion is an interaction model, then the satisfaction of this trust rule should fail. Hence,
X becomes ff in mapping number 1. If the entity in question is an agent, then X be-
comes νZ.[Actions]ff ∧ [−]Z, where Actions = [in(a(Role, Id), ), out(a(Role, Id), ),
#(a(Role, Id), )]. This implies that if the agent is not trusted, then the trust rule is
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get I, D, Dt, and P
P = ∅ ?
si |= φ ?
∀dt∈Dt. translate(dt, t) ∧ P
is
={t}∪P





= P − φ
S
is





ti−→ sn) → (S
is
= {sn} ∪ S)
∃ti. si
ti−→ sn ? S = 0 ?
FAILURE:
interaction I does
not satisfy property φ
SUCCESS:
interaction I does












∀d∈D. translate(d, t) ∧ P is={t}∪P
Figure 4.9: MCID’s algorithm: a modified version incorporating trust constraints
satisfied if and only if the agent does not perform any action in this interaction. Note
that this constraint, which prevents the agent from performing any action, is modelled
in the mu-calculus. [Actions]ff implies that the Actions are not permitted, whereas
[−]Z ensures that this property is satisfied for every path of the state graph and for
every state in that path (νZ). Also note that actions could be input (in(a(Role, Id), )),
output (out(a(Role, Id), )), or internal computations (#(a(Role, Id), )). If the agent is
not trusted to perform a specific action, then X becomes νZ.[Action′]ff ∧ [−]Z, where
Action′ is the specified input, output, or internal computation action.
For negative trust rules, the complement of the logic above applies. If condi-
tions are satisfied, then the entities in question are not trusted. Such trust rules are
modelled as (satis f ied(Condition) ∧ Y) ∨ ¬satis f ied(Condition). Mappings num-
ber 2, 4, and 6 of Table 4.1 are an example. Similar to the above logic, if the un-
trusted entity is an interaction model, then Y becomes ff (see mapping number 2).
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# TPL Predicate µ − Calculus Equivalence
1. trust(interaction(IM),+)← Condition. satis f ied(Condition) ∨
(¬satis f ied(Condition) ∧ ff).
2. trust(interaction(IM),−)← Condition. (satis f ied(Condition) ∧ ff) ∨
¬satis f ied(Condition).
3. trust(a(Role, Id),+)← Condition. satis f ied(Condition) ∨
(¬satis f ied(Condition) ∧ νZ.[Actions]ff ∧ [−]Z).
where Actions = [in(a(Role, Id), ),
out(a(Role, Id), ),
#(a(Role, Id), )]
4. trust(a(Role, Id),−)← Condition. (satis f ied(Condition) ∧ νZ.[Actions]ff ∧ [−]Z) ∨
¬satis f ied(Condition).
where Actions = [in(a(Role, Id), ),
out(a(Role, Id), ),
#(a(Role, Id), )]
5. trust(a(Role, Id),+, Action)← Condition. satis f ied(Condition) ∨
(¬satis f ied(Condition) ∧ νZ.[Action′]ff ∧ [−]Z).
where Action′ =

in(a(Role, Id),M) , if Action = in(M)
out(a(Role, Id),M) , if Action = out(M)
#(a(Role, Id), Action) , elsewhere




in(a(Role, Id),M) , if Action = in(M)
out(a(Role, Id),M) , if Action = out(M)
#(a(Role, Id), Action) , elsewhere
Table 4.1: Mapping TPL predicates into µ-calculus formulae
If the untrusted entity is an agent, then Y becomes νZ.[Actions]ff ∧ [−]Z), where
Actions = [in(a(Role, Id), ), out(a(Role, Id), ), #(a(Role, Id), )]. And if the agent is
not trusted to perform a specific action, then Y becomes νZ.[Action′]ff∧ [−]Z), where
Action′ is the specified input, output, or internal computation action. However, if the
condition of a negative trust rule is not satisfied, then we believe there is not need to
distrust the entity. Therefore, the dissatisfaction of a negative trust rule’s condition is
enough proof that the trust rule is satisfied in the given model.
4.7 Results
The complexity of verifying multiagent systems depends on the complexity of the dif-
ferent roles in the interaction rather than the number of agents involved in such an
interaction, as we illustrate shortly. In Figure 4.5, interaction protocols are defined
in terms of agent roles rather than the individual agents that might engage in these
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interactions. For example, there are two roles for our auction scenario: the role of
the auctioneer and that of the bidder. All bidders then share the same protocol spec-
ification, irrespective of their different local deontic constraints. The complexity of
verifying the five trust constraints of Figure 4.7 depends on the complexity of the auc-
tioneer’s and bidder’s role definitions. Of course, the number of agents playing each
role raise a scalability concern. However, in our auction scenario, if the trust rules are
verified for a set of one auctioneer agent and two bidder agents, then the results will
hold for a set of one auctioneer agent and n bidder agents, where n ≥ 2. The trick is
to know the minimum number of agents required for verifying certain properties of a
given interaction protocol. We note that this is not always trivial and may require ad-
ditional proofs. However, at the time being, we assume such information is provided
with the interaction protocol. We believe this to be an acceptable assumption because
the properties are currently being handcrafted by the same designers who design the
interaction protocol. Therefore, the designer may easily specify the minimum number
of agents required for the verification of each property.
To verify our auction system, we set the scene to incorporate one auctioneer and
two bidding agents. The dynamic model checker is then invoked for verifying the five
trust issues of Figure 4.7 against the auction scenario of Figure 4.5. The  time and
the memory usage, from the moment the model checker is invoked until the results are
returned to the user, are presented by Figure 4.2.
T 1: T 2: T 3: T 4: T 5:
Property 4.1 Property 4.2 Property 4.3 Property 4.4 Property 4.5
CPU time (in sec) 0.017 0.204 0.020 0.021 0.010
Memory usage (in ) 1.327 14.052 1.356 1.376 0.917
Table 4.2: Auction scenario: verification results
Note that results for T 2, in Figure 4.2, differ drastically from others since T 2 is
essentially constructed from 6 temporal properties, while the others are single temporal
properties. Also note that the  time in both the scenarios of Chapters 3 and 4 do
not exceed 1sec. Although these are preliminary results, they do prove that dynamic
verification is in fact possible in such realistic scenarios.
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4.8 Conclusion
Trust is the key to the success of distributed open systems. Most of the work carried
out in the field of trust has focused on developing strategies that would ensure trusted
scenarios. In this chapter, we have presented a mechanism for specifying and verifying
such strategies. Our mechanism allows the agents involved to dynamically and auto-
matically invoke the model checker at run-time, when the conditions for verification
are met, in order to verify whether their trust requirements will be broken or not for a
given scenario with a given set of collaborating agents.
In summary, the novelty of our work is in introducing interaction time verification
and applying it to the field of trust in multiagent systems. This is made feasible by
using a relatively compact (implemented in 200 lines of Prolog code), yet efficient (as
shown by the results of Figure 4.2), dynamic model checker. The main achievement is
that agents, when faced with new and unexplored interaction models, may now verify
whether engaging in such interactions would break their trust constraints.
Also note that the trust specification language presented in this chapter has a very
simple and basic syntax (Figure 4.6). Yet, this syntax is very flexible, and hence,
very powerful. What makes these trust rules very flexible is the addition of conditions.
These could either be defined as Prolog facts and rules or as further temporal properties
that should hold in the given system model, resulting in a very expressive trust policy
language. An additional interesting aspect, is the ease of verification of these rules.
As illustrated by Section 4.6, trust constraints are equivalent to temporal properties
on the interaction model. Even if the constraints are on agents, in practise they are
verified by checking whether (dis)trusted agents perform any illegal actions in a given
interaction. Therefore, all that is needed is the addition of a simple translator to convert
 constraints in µ-calculus formulae, leaving the original model checker intact.
4.9 Future Work
Both the  and  languages presented in Chapters 3 and 4 for defining the agent’s
constraints are simple and basic yet very expressive languages, since they make use of
the underlying constraint specification language used, which is Prolog in our case, and
the µ-calculus temporal logic. The examples presented in this thesis have also proven
the capability of automatically verifying such constraints at run time. However, we
recommend further work to be carried out to test the limits of our model checker. This
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requires a comprehensive study of possible and realistic scenarios, their interesting
temporal properties, and the level of complexity that these could reach. We hope to
answer questions such as: What size of a system model (or state-space) would break
the model checker? What properties can not be verified against a finite system model
with a finite number of agents? If such problems arise, are there any solutions that
would work around them? etc.
Another issue which we overlook is addressing conflicting rules. In traditional
policy languages, this raises a huge concern. For example, one needs to know whether
access should be granted to a given user or not, making conflict resolution a basic
concern for policy languages. However, in our case, we do not use the policy language
to decide on critical actions, such as granting access permissions. We use the policy
language to verify whether certain constraints are satisfied in a given interaction model
or not. We currently do this by verifying all constraints, even if they are conflicting. If
any of the constraints is not satisfied, then the system is not trusted. To illustrate why
conflicting rules are not that critical in our system, consider the following example.
Assume there are two conflicting rules: the first states that the agent is trusted to deliver
DVDs, and the second states that the agent is not trusted to deliver s. The first rule is
always satisfied in any interaction model. The second rule is satisfied in an interaction
model only if the agent does not deliver DVDs, and fails otherwise. In other words,
our system gives precedence to negative rules over positive ones, that is precedence
to prohibitions over permissions. It also assumes that any agent is trusted to perform
any action by default, unless stated otherwise. Future work may illustrate how these
defaults can be changed and how different precedence rules can be applied according
to the verifying agent’s requirements.
Another current concern is the automation of the verification process. We have
presented an automated verification mechanism that could be used by the agents at run
time to aid them select a suitable interaction model and a suitable set of collaborating
agents. However, as illustrated in Section 2.1.2.1, every verification process must be
preceded by modelling and specification processes. We remove the need for a mod-
elling process, since our model checker verifies the actual executable model specified
via the  process calculus. We believe such interactions would be made available by
various services in the system. The agent can then use our proposed model checker to
verify whether a given interaction model is trustworthy or not. The verification process
itself is truly automated; however, a current obstacle preventing full automation is the
specification of the properties that need to be verified. This raises two questions:
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F Can the agent learn which properties are important?
F Can the agent specify such properties in an automated manner?
We hope future work would address these questions. At the moment, we assume
intervention from the agent’s user to specify its required trust constraints. We also
hope that a list of commonly used properties would be made available for agents to
select from and use for verifying their interaction models. Some of these properties
could be general properties, such as properties describing deadlocks. Others may be
domain specific, yet independent of a particular interaction model. Trust property 4.2
is one example which is specific to the auctions domain, but general enough to be
verified against a range of auction interaction models. However, even in the case of
these general or domain specific properties, some tuning should be applied before they
can be verified against a new interaction model. For example, the domain specific
property 4.2 assumes that the message informing the winner W of the price P to be
paid is specified as win(W, P). This message may be specified as in f orm win(W, I, P)
in another interaction model. We believe available research, such as that done on
matching and ontology mapping, may be used to address this issue. At the moment,
we leave this for future work.
Last, but not least, our proposed specification and verification mechanism makes
use of existing trust models. We hope to integrate our trust verification mechanism
with some of these existing trust models. For example, trust property 4.5 defines (in
Prolog) how collected ratings may be aggregated, assuming that a reputation model for
collecting these ratings already exists. We plan to work on linking our verifier to an
existing reputation model in order to achieve a realistic and complete running scenario.
Chapter 5
Verification of an OpenKnowledge
eResponse Scenario
Chapter 3 has introduced the  model checker that may be invoked by agents at
run time for verifying whether certain temporal system properties and agent deontic
constraints hold in a given system model. Chapter 4 illustrated the possible application
of  to the field of trust; agents may verify whether their specific trust constraints (as
opposed to general deontic constraints) will be broken or not. The scenarios verified
in Chapters 3 and 4 are a travel agency scenario and an auction one, respectively.
In the previous chapters, the agents were expected to verify a given interaction
model against a given set of deontic/trust constraints before joining the interaction. In
this chapter, we illustrate how the  system may be used in two different ways. In
the first, the model checker is invoked online by an agent which pauses one interaction
model in order to verify and execute another interaction, before resuming the initial
one. Compared to the scenarios of previous chapters, agents in this new scenario can
verify and execute interactions from within other interaction models. In the second
method, the model checker is invoked offline to verify properties of complex systems
composed of a mesh of interconnected interaction models, as opposed to properties of
a single interaction model. This implies that the verification results of one interaction
may depend on the verification results of others in this mesh of interactions.
The chapter opens with Section 5.1, which provides a brief introduction to the
OpenKnowledge project and its eResponse testbed, from which we obtain the scenarios
used in this chapter. This is followed by a detailed illustration of the scenarios to be
verified and the properties they should be verified against in Section 5.2. Section 5.3
presents the results of our verification process, before concluding with Section 5.4.
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5.1 The OpenKnowledge eResponse Testbed
Section 5.1.1 provides a brief overview to the OpenKnowledge project and the rea-
sons behind our choice of such a testbed. This is followed by an introduction to the
OpenKnowledge flooding eResponse simulation system in Section 5.1.2.
5.1.1 The OpenKnowledge Project: an Overview
OpenKnowledge () is a three years  funded project with participants from Ed-
inburgh, Amsterdam, Barcelona, Trento, Southampton, and the Open University. The
general goal of the project is to achieve practical open and distributed systems in which
agents may participate at low and acceptable costs. To achieve this, the project pro-
poses to shift the focus from the different system entities (such as peers, agents, web
services, etc.) to the interactions that connect these entities together. An interaction,
defining precisely how each agent role may execute its part of the interaction, is speci-
fied through an  interaction model. Issues, such as commitments or semantic agree-
ments, are then dealt with at the interaction level. Grounding such issues to a specific
interaction model facilitates the process of addressing them in a more realistic and dy-
namic approach. The  system provides the methods needed for finding, sharing, and
executing interactions. However, a crucial question is: “how do the agents select their
interactions?” Several methods, making use of matching, reputation, and trust mech-
anisms, are currently being implemented in the  project to address this issue. In this
chapter, however, we show how this issue may be addressed through the analysis of
interactions and the properties they satisfy. Our  system seems to be an appropri-
ate candidate for this job. Furthermore, the  nature of the  system interactions
provide our model checker with the opportunity of verifying richer scenarios.
In this thesis, we are not concerned with the  system architecture and its techni-
cal details. For instance, we are not concerned with how peers search for interaction
models, how peers search for other peers in the network, how  interactions are ex-
ecuted, and so on. The  system offers peers the ability to verify their interactions
before executing them. It assumes the interaction model, along with the properties it
should be verified against, have already been obtained by the peer. To perform the
verification, peers should have the  system installed.
The  system itself is a lightweight system, coded in less than 200 lines of
Prolog. This compact size and the efficient nature of the model checker contribute to
the success of interaction time verification. Nevertheless, our verifier resides on top
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of the  system. The reason behind using the  system is to ensure termination
by making use of its tabling mechanism that effectively caches results in tables. This
issue has been discussed in more detail earlier in Section 3.5. The  system requires
a bit less than 20 to install. We believe it is safe to assume that agents can have
this commodity. In cases where this is not feasible, agents may make use of a model
checking web service that receives verification requests and returns the results of the
verification process.
What interests us in the  system, and what this chapter focuses on, are the vari-
ous  scenarios and how they may be verified. Therefore, for further information
on the OpenKnowledge project and its implementation details, we refer the inter-
ested reader to the published paper by Siebes et al. (2007) and the project website:
www.openk.org.
The  project currently has two testbeds. The first is in the bio-informatics field,
and the second is in the emergency response (eResponse) field. We choose to focus
on the interaction models of the second merely because they provide us with a richer
selection of interactions along with more interesting properties to verify. The following
section provides an overview of the flooding eResponse simulation system1.
5.1.2 The Flooding eResponse Simulation System
The flooding eResponse simulation system, presented in Figure 5.1, is composed of
two major components: the eResponse simulator and the peer network. The simulator
is composed of three peers: the controller, the flood sub-simulator, and the visualiser.
The controller constitutes the core of the simulator; it drives the simulation cycles. It
has one main goal: to keep track of the current state of the simulated world. In order
to achieve that, the controller needs to know what changes are happening to the world
and update its state accordingly. After updating its state, it informs the relevant peers
of these changes. The goal of the flood sub-simulator is to simulate the flood. It is
composed of a set of predefined equations that specify how the flood may evolve with
time. The goal of the visualiser is to present all the changes that are happening in the
world through a graphical user interface.
Simulation is carried out through cycles, or time steps. The simulation steps are
defined as follows:
1The introduction to the  eResponse system provided in Section 5.1.2 is based on a brief section
written by the author of this thesis in the  project deliverable Marchese et al. (2008).























Figure 5.1: The eResponse simulation system
1. The controller coordinates the initial topology of the world with the other simu-
lator peers: the flood sub-simulator and the visualiser.
2. The controller receives information about the changes that have occurred in the
world:
(a) it receives the flood changes from the flood sub-simulator, and
(b) it receives other changes from the peers in the peer network that inflicted
these changes by performing some physical actions. Note that for each
action performed, the controller is also responsible for verifying its validity.
This is discussed shortly in more detail.
3. The controller sends information to the relevant peers about the changes that
have occurred in the world:
(a) it sends a list of all the changes to the visualiser peer, and
(b) for each physical peer in the peer network, it sends the peer the changes
that occurred in its vicinity.
4. The controller updates its time step, and goes back to step 2.
The flow of information between peers is illustrated in Figure 5.1 through the ar-
rows connecting the various peers. These arrows are essentially  interaction mod-
els. Peers in the peer network are of two kinds: physical peers and non-physical peers.
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Physical peers represent peers that interact with the physical world. For example, fire-
men are physical peers since they may perform physical actions. Sensors are also
considered physical peers, since they perceive information from and about the physi-
cal world. A web service, however, does not need to interact with the physical world.
Hence, it is considered to be a non-physical peer.
Non-physical peers do not need to connect to the simulator. They may communi-
cate only with other peers in the peer network. However, it is essential that physical
peers are connected to the simulator’s controller for two reasons. First, they should be
able to sense the changes around them in the world. This is achieved by receiving sen-
sory information about the changes in their vicinity from the simulator’s controller at
every time step, as depicted by step 3(b) of the simulation cycle. Second, they should
inform the simulator of any physical actions they perform. For example, if a fireman
rescues people by transporting them from one site to another, then this should be com-
municated to the controller, which is responsible for keeping track of the current state
of the world. This is depicted as step 2(b) of the simulation cycle.
The interactions of the peer network presented in Figure 5.1 are a representation of
a realistic eResponse scenario (Marchese et al., 2008). Peer P1 represents the firefight-
ers coordinator. The firefighters coordinator is a physical peer; hence, it needs to be
communicating with the controller. However, in this scenario, all that peer P1 does is
request the firefighter peers, P2 and P3, to carry out certain actions. Therefore, peer P1
does not need to inform the controller of any physical actions it performs, since there
are none. Since it still needs to receive sensory information about its vicinity at every
time step, the flow of information is bidirectional: from the controller to the firefighters
coordinator. The firefighters, on the other hand, need to receive sensory information
as well as send the details of their physical actions to the controller. This is depicted
by the double arrow lines connecting the controller peer to both P2 and P3. Note that
peers P2 and P3 are also communicating with P1. In order to perform the action of
transporting people from location L1 to location L2, P3 needs to know the path that
links L1 to L2. It gains this information by communicating with a route service peer,
P4.
Simulator peers are static peers with predefined functionalities. The interaction
models for interacting with the simulator peers are also predefined with respect to the
steps of the simulation cycle. On the other hand, the peer network is dynamic. It is
impossible to predict which peers will be connected in the current simulation, what
actions will they perform, which interactions will be executed, etc. Since the peer
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network provides the peers with the opportunity of selecting their interactions from a
variety of models, we choose to focus on its interaction models. The following section
introduces the eResponse scenario to be verified by our  system. This scenario is
similar to the firefighters scenario presented above.
5.2 An eResponse Scenario
The system model of our eResponse scenario is introduced in Section 5.2.1. This
is followed by Section 5.2.2, which introduces two different ways for applying the
 system, resulting in local online and global offline verification, along with the
properties the system model is verified against.
5.2.1 The System Model
In a flooding eResponse scenario, consider the case where the coordinator of some
firefighters group needs to instruct its firefighters to perform certain actions. We con-
sider this to be the main interaction model that we wish to verify. We refer to this
interaction as interaction IM0. The basic actions that may be requested from fire-
fighters, and are currently accepted by the simulator, are the move, pick, and drop
actions. Pick and drop actions may be trivial, as long as the firefighter is at the
right location and has the capability of picking objects and/or citizens. Performing
the move action is a bit trickier, since it requires the firefighter to know the path it
should take to reach its destination. In a flooding scenario, the status of roads may
change with time, providing an additional challenge for the firefighters. Obtaining
the path between two locations is specified in interaction IM0 as the  constraint:
realise goal(get path(Node1,Node2,Vehicle, Path)). How this constraint is satisfied
at run time depends on the specific firefighter executing that interaction. In what fol-
lows, we present a variety of ways for satisfying such a constraint.
F If the firefighter already knows the path between two nodes, then the constraint
realise goal(get path(...)) is satisfied locally by consulting the firefighter’s knowl-
edge base ().
F If the firefighter does not know the path between two nodes, then it needs to
engage in some other interaction for obtaining such information. We present
two different interactions that could help the agent achieve its goal:
5.2. An eResponse Scenario 109
G In the first interaction, the firefighter asks a route service about the path
linking the two nodes. We refer to this interaction as interaction IM1.
G In the second interaction, the firefighter asks other agents in the network,
possibly its trusted group of friends or agents in its destination’s vicinity,
about the path linking the two nodes. We refer to this interaction as interac-
tion IM2. We note that such an interaction is especially useful in emergency
situations where regular services may fail (for instance, due to heavy traf-
fic), since it allows peers to rely on any other available peer in the network
for help.
This collection of various scenarios, which constitute the main scenario we wish to
verify, is illustrated in Figure 5.2. There are three different interaction models involved
in this example: IM0, IM1, and IM2. The  specification of these interactions are
presented in Figures 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5, respectively.
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Figure 5.2: eResponse scenario: an overview
The interaction model of Figure 5.3 specifies that the peer coordinating other peers’
actions should play the role requester. Given the list of actions, which should explicitly
specify which peer needs to perform which action, the requester peer takes on three
consecutive roles. First, it takes the role requester2, which performs a recursion over
the list of actions. For each action, a message is sent out the appropriate peer asking it
to perform this action. After all the action messages have been sent out, the requester
peer takes the role collector for collecting the results of the peers’ actions. After all
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a(requester(Actions,Results),R) ::
null← get peers(Actions, [ ], PeersS et) then
a(requester2(Actions),R) then
a(collector(Actions, [ ],Results),R) then
a(in f orming completion(PeersS et),R).
a(requester2(Actions),Co) :: action(A)⇒ a(per f ormer, Peer)← Actions = [(Peer, A)|T ] thena(requester2(T ),Co)

or
null← Actions = [ ].
a(collector(Actions,OldResults,NewResults),R) ::
null← Actions = [ ] and NewResults = OldResults
or
result(A,Result)⇐ a(per f ormer, P) then
null← my select((P, A), Actions, Actions2) and my append((P, A,Result),OldResults, IntResults) then
a(collector(Actions2, IntResults,NewResults),R)
 .
a(in f orming completion(PeersS et),R) :: done⇒ a(per f ormer, P)← PeersS et = [P|T ] thena(in f orming completion(T ),R)

or
null← PeersS et = [ ].
a(per f ormer,C) ::
action(transport(O,N1,N2))⇐ a(requester2( ),Co) then
null← at(N1)
or
a(per f ormer2(move(N0,N1, Path0,Vehicle),R1),C)
← at(N0) and not(N0 = N1) and realise goal(get path(N0,N1,Vehicle, Path0))
and route details(Path,Vehicle, Fuel0,Time0)

then
a(per f ormer2(pick(O,N1),R2),C)← at(N1) then
a(per f ormer2(move(N1,N2, Path,Vehicle),R3),C)
← realise goal(get path(N1,N2,Vehicle, Path)) and route details(Path,Vehicle, Fuel,Time) then
a(per f ormer2(drop(O,N2),R4),C)← at(N2) then




action(move(N2))⇐ a(requester2( ),Co) then
a(per f ormer2(move(N1,N2, Path,Vehicle),R),C)
← at(N1) and realise goal(get path(N1,N2,Vehicle, Path)) and route details(Path,Vehicle, Fuel,Time) then




done⇐ a(in f orming completion( ),R).
a(per f ormer2(Action,Result), Id) ::
action(Action)⇒ a(simulator, S )← simulator id(S ) then
ok ⇐ a(simulator, S ) then
null← per f orm(Action,Result).
a(simulator, S ) ::
action(Action)⇐ a(per f ormer2( , ), Id) then
ok ⇒ a(per f ormer2( , ), Id) then
a(simulator, S ).
Figure 5.3: eResponse scenario: the LCC specification of interaction model IM0
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results have been received, the requester takes the role in f orming completion, which
sends done messages to all the peers in order to notify them that no further actions will
be requested in this interaction, signalling the completion of their roles.
The actions that may be requested from peers to perform are of two kinds: (1)
asking a peer to transport someone or something, and (2) asking a peer to move to
another location. To illustrate the first case, consider that the peer is asked to transport
object O from node N1 to node N2. If the peer is not already at node N1, then it should
first move to N1. This is followed by picking up the object, moving to node N2, and
dropping the object at N2. Finally, the results of its action are sent back to the requester
(now playing the role collector) through a result( , ) message. Note that performing
move actions requires the peer to obtain the path it needs to take by satisfying the
constraint realise goal(get path(...)). Similarly, in the second case, when the peer is
asked to perform a move action, the peer will have to get the path it needs to take, play
the role per f ormer2 to perform the action, and send the results back to the requester.
Performing the move, pick, and drop actions is carried out by the role per f ormer2,
which is responsible for coordinating these actions with the simulator’s controller be-
fore they are actually carried out. The role per f ormer2 sends the action to the simula-
tor’s controller, receives the green light from the controller through the ok message, and
finally performs the action by satisfying the  constraint per f orm(Action,Result).
To keep things simple, we currently assume that the simulator will accept all actions.
Of course, this may easily be modified as needed.
a(route f inder(Location1, Location2,Vehicle,UnacceptableRoads, Path), Id) ::
request route(Location1, Location2,Vehicle,UnacceptableRoads)⇒ a(route service,RS )
← route service id(RS ) then
route(Path)⇐ a(route service,RS ).
a(route service,RS ) ::
request route(L1, L2,V,UnacceptableRoads)⇐ a(route f inder( , , , , ), Id) then
route(Result)⇒ a(route f inder( , , , , ), Id)
← f ind route(L1, L2,V,UnacceptableRoads,Result)
or
route([ ])⇒ a(route f inder( , , , , ), Id)

.
Figure 5.4: eResponse scenario: the LCC specification of interaction model IM1
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a(inquirer(Question,Result), I) ::
null← trusted agents(Question, Agents)
or
a(inquirer1(Question, Finders, [ ], Agents), I)← f inders(Question, Finders)
 then
a(inquirer2(Question, Agents,Result), I).
a(inquirer1(Q, Fs, As, FinalAs), I) ::
request suitable peers(Q)⇒ a( f inder, F)← Fs = [F|NewFs] then




null← Fs = [ ].
a(inquirer2(Q,Rs,Result), I) ::
null← empty(Rs) and Result = nil
or
question(Q)⇒ a(responder,R)← Rs = [R|NewRs] then
answer(Result)⇐ a(responder,R)





a( f inder, F) ::
request suitable peers(Q)← a(inquirer1( , , , ), I) then
suitable peers(Q, Ps)⇒ a(inquirer1( , , , ), I)⇐ f etch suitable peers(Q, Ps)
or
suitable peers(Q, [ ])⇒ a(inquirer1( , , , ), I)
 .
a(responder,R) ::
question(Q)⇐ a(inquirer2( , , ), I) then
answer(A)⇒ a(inquirer2( , , ), I)← answer(Q, A)
or
no answer ⇒ a(inquirer2( , , ), I)
 .
Figure 5.5: eResponse scenario: the LCC specification of interaction model IM2
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The interaction model of Figure 5.4 specifies that a peer may take
the role route f inder in order to find the path between two nodes, or locations. The
peer may also include further restrictions on the path by specifying a specific vehicle
type to be used for transportation and/or a list of undesirable roads. The interaction is
simple and straightforward. The route f inder sends a request route message to the
route service peer. After computing the route, the route service sends back the route
details, composed of a list of nodes, to the route finder. If the route service fails in
computing the route, it sends back an empty list.
The interaction model of Figure 5.5 specifies that an inquirer may initiate this inter-
action to ask other peers in the network some question. If the inquirer already knows
the peers to be questioned, then it automatically jumps to role inquirer2. Otherwise,
it takes the role inquirer1, in which it asks a list of f inder peers about the appropriate
peers that can answer its question. For instance, if the question is about the status of a
given road, then the inquirer might need to take the role inquirer1 to ask some service
about the peers in the vicinity of the road in question. After obtaining the list of peers
to be questioned, the inquirer moves to play the role inquirer2. In the role inquirer2,
the peer sends its question to the selected peers, one by one. If an answer is received
from one, then the inquirer terminates its role successfully. However, if no result is
received, then the question is sent to the next peer in the list, and so on. If all peers
have failed to answer the question, then the final result is set to nil.
The f inder peer has a straightforward task. After receiving a request suitable peer
message for a specific question Q, it tries to find out which peers in the network are
best candidates for answering such a question. It then sends the list of candidates back
to the inquirer. If no suitable peers are found, then the f inder peer sends back an empty
list.
The peers being questioned play the role responder in IM2. Their task is also
straightforward. They first receive the question Q from inquirer2. If they have an
answer A, they send it back to inquirer2. Otherwise, they reply with a no answer
message.
5.2.2 The Property Specification
After introducing the system model in the previous section, this section illustrates how
the  model checker may be used to verify such a model. The  system is use
in two different ways: (1) by the agents at run time to verify whether the interactions
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they wish to join do not break any of their constraints, and (2) by the system engineers
for verifying the correctness of the system they have built. In the first, agents jump
from one interaction to the other, verifying each interaction online just before its exe-
cution. In the second, the global mesh of interactions for a given scenario is verified
entirely offline. These two different applications of the verifier, along with the proper-
ties the system model is verified against, are presented in Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2,
respectively.
5.2.2.1 Local Online Verification
In the local online verification method, the model checker is invoked locally by the
agents in order to verify at run time whether the interaction they are about to join
violates any of their deontic (or trust) constraints. In what follows, we present a sample
of the properties the agents may wish to verify interaction IM0 against.
F If some agent is invited to engage in an interaction for performing action X, then
it should first check whether it is actually capable of performing X. For example,
transporting one’s neighbours from one location to another requires the peer to
have access to some vehicle for making this transportation possible. Property 5.1
of Figure 5.6 specifies this deontic constraint in  in a straightforward manner.
F In a flooding scenario, it is normal for someone to be interested in saving itself
and its family and friends first. Different people have different priorities for the
actions they accept to perform. If someone is invited to engage in an interaction
in which it is asked to perform action X, then it should first make sure that per-
forming X does not waste its time allocated for performing more urgent actions.
Property 5.2 of Figure 5.6 specifies this deontic constraint in .
The maximum amount of time the agent is willing to spend on actions in this
interaction is specified as Limit, and obtained through the constraint
my time limit(Limit). The total amount of time that the agent will eventually
spend on actions if it does engage in this interaction is specified as Time, and it
is initially set to zero (Time=0).
For every action the peer might perform, the temporal property increases the
value of Time accordingly. This is done through the following sub-formulae:
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The property, ensuring that an agent may accept to transport its neighbours in interaction IM0 only
if it has the appropriate vehicle to do so, is defined as:
can(a(per f ormer, civilian),
in(action(transport(neighbours(house#23), node1, node2)), a(requester, )),+) ←
have vehicle(VehicleDetails) ∧
capable o f (VehicleDetails, transport(neighbours(house#23), node1, node2)).
(5.1)
The property, ensuring that an agent may accept action requests in interaction IM0 only if it believes
that performing such actions can be realised in an acceptable time frame, is defined as:
can(a(per f ormer, civilian), in(action( ), a(requester, )),+) ←
my time limit(Limit) ∧ Time=0 ∧
µX. ([−]ff ∧ Time≤Limit) ∨
(〈−〉tt ∧
[#(route details( , , ,T ), a(per f ormer, civilian))](Time=Time+T ∧ X) ∧
[−#(route details( , , , ), a(per f ormer, civilian))]X).
(5.2)




[out(action(Action), a( , Id))]µY. (〈−〉tt ∧ [−in(result(Action, ), a( , Id))]Y)
(5.3)
The property, ensuring that the peer asking other peers for information will try to collect more than
one answer in interaction IM2, is defined as:
trust(interaction(IM2),+) ←
µX. [−in(answer( ), a( , ))]X ∧
[in(answer( ), a( , ))]µY. (〈−〉tt ∧
[−{#(empty( ), a( , )), out(question( ), a( , ))}]Y)
(5.4)
Figure 5.6: eResponse scenario: the properties to be verified online
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〈−〉tt ∧
[#(route details( , , ,T ), a(per f ormer, civilian))] (Time=Time+T ∧ X) ∧
[−#(route details( , , , ), a(per f ormer, civilian))] X
which states that an action can occur (〈−〉tt), and for every move action that re-
quires time T to be performed ([#(route details( , , ,T ), a(per f ormer, civilian))]),
Time is increased by T and the property is said to be satisfied at the next state(s)
of the state-space (Time=Time+T ∧ X). If no move action occurs, then Time
is not increased and the property is said to be satisfied at the next state(s) of the
state-space ([−#(route details( , , , ), a(per f ormer, civilian))]X).
When no more actions can be performed ([−]ff), the temporal property verifies
that the total amount of time spent on performing actions is less than or equal to
the time dedicated for performing these actions (Time≤Limit).
F The agent that needs to invite others to perform certain actions may decide
that the interaction model may only be accepted if it is guaranteed that agents
will always send back the results of their actions. Property 5.3 of Figure 5.6
specifies this temporal constraint in the µ-calculus. The property states that
the interaction model is trusted if every time an action( ) message is sent out
([out(action(Action), a( , Id))]) then it is always the case that a result(Action, )
message will be received from the appropriate peer (µY. 〈−〉tt ∧
[−in(result(Action, ), a( , Id))]Y 2 ). Finally, the first part of the temporal prop-
erty, νX. [−]X, states that this property should always be satisfied at every state
of the interaction’s state-space.
Only after successfully verifying the satisfaction of Properties 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 is
interaction IM0 executed. During the execution, one of the performer agents will even-
tually reach a state where it has to satisfy the  constraint: realise goal(get path(...)).
The agent searches the list of interaction models for an appropriate one that would help
it solve the above constraint. We assume it selects IM2 first. Again, before executing
2The µ-calculus property µX. 〈−〉tt ∧ [−A]X states that something can happen (〈−〉tt) and for
every action other than the action A, the same property should hold again ([−A]X). Finally, the least
fixed point operator µX ensures that the recursion should eventually terminate. Basically, this implies
that it is always the case that the action A will eventually occur. Temporal formulae of this form are
used in this chapter by Properties 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.7, and 5.9.
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IM2, the agent will need to verify that this interaction satisfies certain properties. For
example:
F If the interaction allows the agent to ask other agents some question, then the
agent might be interested to know whether the interaction allows it to collect
all replies or not. For instance, in some cases, the agent might have a list of
a hundred friends to ask. However, it might be in a hurry, and would be sat-
isfied with the first reply it receives. In other cases, the agent might be inter-
ested in collecting all replies and selecting the most suitable one itself. Prop-
erty 5.4 of Figure 5.6 provides the µ-calculus specification of the latter temporal
property. It states that every time an answer is received ([in(answer( ), a( , ))])
either the question is sent out again to another peer or all peers have already
been questioned and the list of peers has become an empty list (µY. 〈−〉tt ∧
[−{#(empty( ), a( , )), out(question( ), a( , ))}]Y 2 ). Recursion is specified by
µX. [−in(answer( ), a( , ))]X, which states that for every action that differs from
that of receiving an answer, the property should be satisfied again at the next
state(s) of the interaction’s state-space.
5.2.2.2 Global Offline Verification
The  system may also be used offline by system engineers to verify the correctness
their system. For example
F The system engineer might need to verify that every action requested from a
peer will eventually be performed by that peer. Property 5.5 of Figure 5.7 pro-
vides the µ-calculus specification of this temporal property. It states that for ev-
ery ‘move action’ request that is sent out ([out(action(move(N)), a( , , ))]), it is
always the case that the agent will eventually perform the move (µY.(〈−〉tt ∧
[−#(per f orm(move(N), ), a( , ))]Y) 2 ). Similarly, for every ‘transport ac-
tion’ request that is sent out ([out(action(transport(O, ,N2)), a( , , ))]), it is
always the case that the object will eventually be dropped at the right location
(µZ. 〈−〉tt ∧ [−#(per f orm(drop(O,N2), ), a( , ))]Z 2 ). Finally, the first part
of this property, νX. [−]X, states that the property should hold at all states of the
interaction’s state-space.
While traversing the state-space of interaction IM0 trying to prove the satisfaction
of Property 5.5, the verifier will eventually hit the constraint realise goal(get path(...)).
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The property, ensuring all actions are eventually performed in interaction IM0, is defined as:
νX. [−]X ∧
[out(action(move(N)), a( , , ))]µY. (〈−〉tt ∧ [−#(per f orm(move(N), ), a( , ))]Y) ∧
[out(action(transport(O, ,N2)), a( , ))]µZ. (〈−〉tt∧
[−#(per f orm(drop(O,N2), ), a( , ))]Z)
(5.5)
The property, ensuring that interaction IM1 will terminate for the peer that initiated it, is defined as:
µX. terminates(a(route f inder( , , , , ), )) ∨ (〈−〉tt ∧ [−]X) (5.6)
The property, ensuring that the goal is achieved in interaction IM1 by making sure route information
is sent back to the peer that requested it, is defined as:
µX. 〈−〉tt ∧ [−in(route( ), a(route service, ))]X (5.7)
The property, ensuring that interaction IM2 will terminate for the peer that initiated it, is defined as:
µX. terminates(a(inquirer( , ), )) ∨ (〈−〉tt ∧ [−]X) (5.8)
The property, ensuring that the goal is achieved in interaction IM2 by making sure an answer is sent
back to the peer that asked the question, is defined as:
µX. 〈−〉tt ∧ [−in(answer( ), a(responder, ))]X (5.9)
Figure 5.7: eResponse scenario: the properties to be verified offline
This constraint should be satisfied by the peer for it to proceed with its attempt in per-
forming the requested action. To verify whether the  constraint will be satisfied by
the peer, the model checker has been modified as follows. Every time a constraint
of the form realise goal(Goal) is encountered, the model checker assumes that the con-
straint is satisfied in one of the following two cases: (1) if the peer’s knowledge base
contains appropriate inference tools for dealing with such a constraint, or (2) if there
exists an interaction model that guarantees the satisfaction of such a constraint. In the
first case, our model checker does not attempt to solve the actual constraint by making
use of the peer’s knowledge base. It is sufficient for the model checker to know that the
peer’s knowledge base contains the appropriate Prolog facts and/or rules for address-
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ing such a constraint. In the second case, an interaction model is believed to satisfy
such a constraint only if the peer initiating this interaction is guaranteed to complete its
role successfully and realise the goal it was expected to fulfil. For example, to verify
whether interaction IM1 is sufficient for realising the goal realise goal(get path(...)),
the following two properties should hold:
F The interaction model should guarantee that a route message will eventually be
received from the peer playing the route service role. Property 5.7 of Figure 5.7
provides the µ-calculus specification of this temporal property 2 .
F The goal of initiating interaction IM1 is to obtain the details of the route con-
necting two nodes so that this information may be used in the main interaction
model IM0. However, the route details, even if obtained by the peer in interac-
tion IM1, are not returned to interaction IM0 unless the peer completes its role
successfully in interaction IM1. Hence, there is a need to ensure the success-
ful termination of interactions, or at least the successful termination of the peer
in question. Property 5.6 of Figure 5.7 provides the µ-calculus specification of
this temporal property. It states that either the route finder’s role has terminated
(terminates(a(route f inder( , , , , ), ))), or something can happen and for ev-
erything that happens the property should be satisfied again (〈−〉tt ∧ [−]X).
The least fixed point operator µX ensures that eventually the recursion should be
broken, implying that the termination of the route finder’s role is guaranteed.
Similar to Properties 5.6 and 5.7, which are verified against interaction IM1, Prop-
erties 5.8 and 5.9 are to be verified against interaction IM2. While Property 5.8 spec-
ifies the successful termination of the role inquirer(Question, Answer), Property 5.9
guarantees that an answer to the inquirer’s question is eventually received.
5.3 Results
Two different ways of applying the  model checker have been introduced: local
online verification versus global offline verification. Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 have
presented the various scenarios and properties to be verified in each of these application
methods. The verification results are presented in the remainder of this section.
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5.3.1 Local Online Verification
In our online verification example, the agents are expected to verify their deontic con-
straints before engaging in an interaction. For example, before interaction IM0 is ex-
ecuted, it is verified against Properties 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. Only after the  system
proves the satisfaction of all three properties in interaction IM0, the interaction is ex-
ecuted. During execution, the performer agents will eventually have to satisfy the 
constraint realise goal(get path(...)). We assume one of the performer agents does
not know the path it should take, and needs to engage in some other interaction for
obtaining this information. The execution of interaction IM0 is paused and interac-
tion IM2 is obtained and verified against Property 5.4. The satisfaction fails and the
agent searches for some other interaction model. Interaction IM1 is obtained and ex-
ecuted. After the successful completion of interaction IM1, the agent marks the 
constraint realise goal(get path(...)) of interaction IM0 as satisfied and the execution
of interaction IM0 is resumed.
The  time and the memory usage for verifying each of these properties, from
the moment the model checker is invoked until the results are returned to the peer, are
presented in Table 5.1.
Property #
Verified CPU time Memory usage




Property 5.2 1.608 91.884
Property 5.3 1.772 169.097
Property 5.4 IM2 0.004 0.181
Table 5.1: eResponse scenario: results of online verification
Note that these properties are verified at run time. This implies that the execution of
interactions is sometimes paused, not only for the agent performing the verification but
also for other agents interacting with the verifying agent and waiting for its input. Ver-
ification time is therefore crucial. Fortunately, our results prove that online verification
via the  system is indeed possible and realistic, since the time peers spend wait-
ing for verification results is acceptable. In our worst scenario, verification completes
in less than 2sec. As for the memory usage, the results show that verification could
consume a few hundred bytes, going up to 170 in our worst scenario. Nevertheless,
even the worst case scenario is still considered to be acceptable for many agents. If
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it happens that some minimalist agent needs quick verification results yet lacks the
memory requirements for performing the verification itself, then a web service fitted
with the  verification mechanism may be consulted.
5.3.2 Global Offline Verification
One of the properties any system engineer is interested to verify is whether interac-
tions fulfil their goals. In our flooding eResponse scenario, the system engineer needs
to verify whether interaction IM0 allows all peers to eventually perform the actions
requested from them. This is a temporal property of the interaction that is specified in
the µ-calculus as Property 5.5.
In our offline verification example, the  system is invoked offline to verify
Property 5.5 against interaction IM0. The  time and the memory usage for verify-
ing this property, from the moment the model checker is invoked until the results are
returned to the peer, are presented in Table 5.2.
Property #
Verified CPU time Memory usage
against (in sec) (in )








Property 5.7 0.000 0.041
Table 5.2: eResponse scenario: results of offline verification
As opposed to local online verification, global offline verification is not driven by
the execution of interactions. Nevertheless, the properties verified against one interac-
tion model may still depend on other interaction models. For example, while traversing
the state-space of interaction IM0 trying to prove the satisfaction of Property 5.5, the
model checker will eventually hit the constraint realise goal(get path(...)). The model
checker should be able to verify whether this constraint will be satisfied or not. To
do this, it checks whether there exists an interaction model that the peer may invoke
and that guarantees the fulfilment of the goal get path(...). In our running scenario,
we assume that only two interactions exist that may be used by agents to fulfil the
get path(...) goal. These are interactions IM1 and IM2 of Figures 5.4 and 5.5, re-
spectively. The model checker needs to verify that there exists at least one interaction
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model in which the goal is guaranteed to be realised and the interaction is guaran-
teed to terminate for the initiating peer. We assume IM2 is fetched before IM1. The
model checker automatically verifies IM2 against these two properties, Properties 5.8
and 5.9. Property 5.8 succeeds, since the interaction is guaranteed to eventually ter-
minate for the role inquirer( , ). Property 5.9 fails, since an answer is not guaranteed
to be delivered. Therefore, the model checker moves on to look for other interac-
tion models. IM1 is retrieved and verified against Properties 5.6 and 5.7. Both of
these properties are satisfied; therefore, the model checker concludes that the  con-
straint realise goal(get path(...)) of interaction IM0 can be satisfied by agents at run
time. Proving the satisfaction of Property 5.5 in interaction IM0 is then resumed by the
model checker.
As a result, the verification time and the memory usage for checking Property 5.5 in
IM0 includes the verification time and the memory usage for both checking Properties
5.8 and 5.9 against IM2 and checking Properties 5.6 and 5.7 against IM1.
Finally, we note that although this chapter presents the global verification technique
as a technique to be performed offline by the engineers, the results proves that some
global verification techniques may also be performed by the agents if they wish to
verify global properties spanning several interaction models.
5.4 Conclusion
After introducing the  system in Chapter 3 and its possible application to the field
of trust in Chapter 4, this chapter illustrates the possible use of the  system in two
different ways for verifying an OpenKnowledge eResponse flooding scenario. In the
first, interaction time verification is demonstrated, illustrating how agents may pause
the execution of one interaction in order to verify and execute another interaction,
before going back to fulfilling the previous interaction. Compared to the scenarios of
previous chapters, agents in this new scenario can verify and execute interactions from
within other interaction models. In the second method, the model checker is invoked
offline to verify properties of complex systems composed of a mesh of interconnected
interaction models, as opposed to properties of a single interaction model. This implies
that the verification results of one interaction may depend on the verification results of
others in this mesh of interactions.
A lightweight model checker has resulted in remarkably efficient results in both
verification methods, as presented by Tables 5.1 and 5.2. However, the success of
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our verification mechanism lies in knowing the minimum number of agents needed
to play each role for every property that is verified. For example, interaction IM1
is verified while having one agent play the role route f inder and another play the
route service role. On the other hand, interaction IM2 is verified while having one
agent play the inquirer role and two agents for each of the f inder and responder
roles. We note that knowing the minimum number of agents required for verifying
certain properties of a given interaction protocol is not always trivial and may require
additional proofs. At the time being, the properties are specified by hand. Hence,
the same person specifying the property may specify the minimum number of agents
needed to play each role when verifying that property. We believe it will be hard
for agents to automatically specify properties from scratch. However, in the future,
we hope agents will be provided with a collection of properties that they may choose
from whenever needed. Information, such as the minimum number of agents needed
to play each role, may easily be provided with the property, possibly with a proof for
the suggested number of agents. Agents can then modify such properties as needed to
suit their current interaction model, as discussed shortly. Nevertheless, this raises the
question: “How does the application of one property to a different interaction model
affect the number of agents needed?” Inductive reasoning could provide one solution
for this problem. However, for the time being, we leave this issue for future work.
The complication of the automatic specification process of properties has been
raised earlier in the previous chapter. In what follows, we revisit this issue by pro-
viding more concrete examples from the eResponse scenario. For instance, when the
model checker hits any  constraint of the form realise goal(G), the model checker
might end up searching for other interactions that might lead to the fulfilment of such
a constraint. Every interaction obtained should be verified against two general prop-
erties: (1) the guaranteed termination of the role played by the peer in question, and
(2) the guaranteed realisation of the goal G. The first is specified in the µ-calculus as
µX. terminates(a(my role,my id)) ∨ (〈−〉tt ∧ [−]X), where my role is the role played
by the agent that needs to realise the goal G and my id is the agent’s unique identi-
fier. Properties 5.6 and 5.8 present different instantiations of this property. In these
instantiations, my role is simply replaced with either a(route f inder( , , , , ), ) or
a(inquirer( , ), ). These are the initiating roles of interactions IM1 and IM2, respec-
tively. Before engaging in an interaction, the peer already knows the role it will be
playing. Therefore, the automated specification of such a property for a specific in-
teraction model may be performed in a straightforward manner. However, the second
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property, which guarantees that goal G is fulfilled, is a bit trickier. The property in its
general form is specified in the µ-calculus as µX. 〈−〉tt ∧ [−Action]X, where Action
is the action responsible for fulfilling the goal G. For instance, Property 5.7 replaces
Action with in(route( ), a(route service, )), since the receipt of a route( ) message
from the route service peer signals the fulfilment of the goal get path(...) in interaction
IM1. In interaction IM2, the fulfilment of the same goal is signalled by the receipt of
an answer( ) message from some responder peer, as illustrated by Property 5.9. Spot-
ting the right action is tricky. For peers to be able to specify such properties in an
automated way, the peers will need further tools that would allow them to read and
understand interactions. For instance, one way of achieving this is by spotting the vari-
able in question (that is the variable relating to the goal G) and the actions instantiating
such a variable. We currently leave this complex issue for future work.
Chapter 6
Literature Review
After presenting our proposed verification mechanism in Chapter 3, its possible appli-
cation to the field of trust in Chapter 4, and some results on verifying more realistic
scenarios in Chapter 5, this chapter provides an overview to the various verification
mechanisms in the field of multiagent systems.
In the early 1980’s, model checking emerged as a tool for verifying hardware sys-
tems. Systems were modelled via a process calculus which relies on messages passing
through channels as a way to represent the interaction between the various processes.
After its success as an automatic verification technique for hardware systems, model
checking was then used, since the late 1990s, for verifying software models such as
communication protocols, distributed algorithms, etc. Again, messages and channels
were sufficient to model various software systems such as the Needham-Schroeder pro-
tocol, the Real-Time Ethernet protocol, etc. Since the late nineties and early noughties,
the agent community has become interested in adopting model checking techniques
for verifying multiagent systems. Multiagent systems, however, are a collection of
autonomous agents rather than a set of predefined processes. Process calculus, as we
know it, seems no longer sufficient for modelling such systems. To accommodate
agents’ autonomy in such systems, various logics (and concepts) have been applied
to multiagent system specification, such as epistemic logic (logic of knowledge, un-
certainty and ignorance), doxastic logic (logic of belief and disbelief), alethic logic
(logic of necessity, possibility and contingency), deontic logic (logic of obligation and
permission), and temporal logic (logic of time). This triggers the question of how to
specify, or model, multiagent systems? This question, as this chapter illustrates, is
crucial since it has a huge impact on the verification process.
The chapter opens with Section 6.1, which presents the literature’s different multi-
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agent verification techniques, focusing on those most related to our line of work. This
is followed by Section 6.2, which analyses and synthesises those techniques in com-
parison with that presented in this thesis. The conclusions are drawn in Section 6.3.
6.1 Verification Mechanisms
Generally speaking, there are two main elements to consider when formally verifying
any system: the system to be verified and the property it should be verified against.
These constitute the inputs of model checkers, the predominant verification technique
in the field of multiagent systems. Therefore, we choose to categorise the various
verification mechanisms of the literature based to these two elements. As a result, our
categorisation stems from our view of multiagent system models, in which the model
is split into two layers: the agents layer and the interaction one (Section 3.1).
Table 6.1 divides multiagent verification mechanisms into nine different categories.
The main three categories are presented by the diagonal of Table 6.1. In the first cat-
egory (the top left cell of Table 6.1), the model verified is a purely interaction model
that does not take into consideration any of the agents involved in such interactions.
As a result, the type of properties that may be verified in such a model are properties
of the interaction. These are usually safety, liveness, or fairness properties. Examples
of verifiers in this category are presented in Section 6.1.1. In the second category (the
middle cell of Table 6.1), the model verified is a purely agent model, usually specified
through the agents’ beliefs, desires, and intentions. The type of properties that may
be verified in such categories are those relating to agents’ mental states. These are
usually concerned with agents’ knowledge, beliefs, etc. Examples of verifiers in this
category are presented in Section 6.1.2. In the third category (the bottom right cell of
Table 6.1), the model verified is a combination of interaction and agents models. As a
result, the type of properties that may be verified in such a model are properties of both
the interactions and agents. Examples of verifiers in this category are presented in Sec-
tion 6.1.3. Of course, if a verifier can verify properties of both interactions and agents,
then it automatically falls into the other two categories of verifying either properties
of interactions or properties of agents. Therefore, the mechanisms of Section 6.1.3 are
extended to the remaining two cells of the bottom row of Table 6.1.
An interesting point to note is that the verification mechanisms that verify agent
specifications are also capable of verifying properties of interactions, as illustrated
by the middle row of Table 6.1. This is because these mechanisms usually rely on
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Model Verified
Verifying Properties of
Interactions Agents Interactions & Agents
Interaction Model Sections 6.1.1 & 6.1.4 Section 6.1.4 Section 6.1.4
Agents Models Section 6.1.2 Section 6.1.2 Section 6.1.2
Interaction & Agents Models Section 6.1.3 Section 6.1.3 Section 6.1.3
Table 6.1: Verification mechanisms of multiagent systems
combining all the agent models into one huge system model in the style a of finite state
machine before feeding it to the model checker. Naturally, this allows the verification
of temporal properties of the system.
The more unusual mechanisms are those verifying properties of both agents and
interactions in interaction models that do not take the agents specification into consid-
eration. These mechanisms are presented in Section 6.1.4 and occupy the cells of the
first row of Table 6.1. For example, they could verify properties about the evolution of
knowledge of some agent in a given interaction without the need for the agent’s spec-
ification. This is usually achieved by explicitly specifying the propositions that may
hold in a state and the rules under which they hold, offering a way to label states with
propositions.
With the currently available literature, the nine categories of Table 6.1 may be
cut down to only four categories: (1) mechanisms that verify interaction properties
of interaction models, (2) mechanisms that verify agents models, (3) mechanisms that
verify properties of a mesh of interaction and agents models, and (4) mechanisms that
verify both interaction and agent properties of interaction models. The mechanisms
of each of these four categories are presented in detail in the following four sections,
respectively.
6.1.1 Model Checking Interaction Models
Several attempts have been made in order verify the interaction layer of multiagent
systems. This section briefly introduces some of these techniques.
Wen and Mizoguchi (1999) make use of the  model checker (McMillan, 1993)
to verify a couple of multiagent scenarios. The  system is a freely available model
checker that verifies  temporal properties of finite Kripke structures. One of the
scenarios verified is a producer-consumer scenario, where two consumers would re-
quest a certain product from a producer (each under different circumstances) and the
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producer would deliver each requested item. The other scenario verified is a similar,
yet more complicated, scenario where requests may be cancelled, suspended, accepted,
declined, etc. The properties verified in both scenarios described liveness and safety
properties. For example, properties describe whether the producer will eventually de-
liver the product every single time it is requested by a consumer, the producer will
deliver products to both consumers infinitely often, the consumer would complete its
role in the interaction while the producer does not, the consumer will eventually either
cancel or resume a previously suspended request, etc.
The translation of the system model into the language of  is done by hand and
the task is a relatively straightforward task. Nevertheless, the model checker is very
efficient and properties are verified in a fraction of a second.
Walton (2004) addresses the same problem using different languages and an auto-
mated translation process. In his method, the system to be verified is specified in the
 language, a process calculus. In , an interaction is defined by a set of roles
where each role has its own method definition. Methods, also known as agent proto-
cols, are defined by the actions an agent can take. These actions could be a decision
action, a message output action, and a message input action. Protocols can get more
complex by making use of the sequence, choice, parallel, iteration, and recursion op-
erators. For performing the verification, the  model checker (Holzmann, 2003) is
used. It verifies whether  properties are satisfied in a system model specified in
Promela, the language of . However, instead of translating the system model from
 into Promela by hand, an automatic translator is created for performing this job.
The properties verified by Walton (2004) are traditional safety properties, such as those
describing the successful termination of programs.
Similar to Walton (2004), Huget (2002) also uses the  model checker for the
verification of multiagent interactions. However, in his approach, interactions are spec-
ified via the Agent  language. Agent  allows the graphical specification of inter-
actions by defining the agents’ roles, their message passing actions, the constraints on
messages, and how the protocol may be executed (i.e. the state graph of the protocol).
The textual version of an Agent  diagram is specified in an -based language.
This is then translated into Promela and the result is fed to  along with the  prop-
erties to be verified. The property verified by Huget (2002) is a reachability property
stating that all the states of a given interaction are reachable.
Cliffe and Padget (2002) present a similar mechanism for the verification of elec-
tronic institutions (Esteva et al., 2001). In their approach, the model checker used is
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Nu (Cimatti et al., 1999), a variant of . Similar to the two approaches pre-
sented above, the interactions are defined through the specification of generic agent
roles, along with a dialogical framework, scenes, performative structure, and norms.
The general idea behind electronic institutions is that acceptable actions are defined
for general agent roles. These roles may be instantiated at run time by various agents.
Their specifications compose the dialogical framework. Furthermore, one scene may
be composed of more than one dialogical framework and agents may jump between
scenes following specific rules. The performative structures are used to specify the
connections between scenes. Finally, the norms are used to specify the general rules
of what is permitted, prohibited, or obligatory.
A translator is used to convert the specification of an electronic institution into the
input language of Nu. The output of the translator is fed to the model checker
along with the properties that need to be verified. Again, verification turns out to be
efficient. For instance, the verification process of a fish market auction scenario against
properties expressing fairness and successful termination was completed in a fraction
of a second.
All of the mechanisms presented in this section relied on existing model checkers,
such as the , Nu, and  systems, for the verification of multiagent interac-
tions. The system model in each case was translated into the model checker’s language
either automatically (e.g. Walton (2004), Huget (2002), and Cliffe and Padget (2002))
or by hand (e.g. Wen and Mizoguchi (1999)). As expected, the results (when men-
tioned) were all in the range of fractions of a second.
Despite their efficiency, all techniques in this category share one major drawback.
They view multiagent interactions to be just another software program whose outcome
is predicted by solely analysing the program’s specification. They do not take into
consideration the autonomous agents that in reality are driving these interactions and
hugely affecting their outcome by directing them as they please. The mechanisms de-
scribed in the following section take completely the opposite approach by considering
only the agents model.
6.1.2 Model Checking Agents’ Metal States
Many researchers have showed more interest in verifying properties of the agents’
mental states than traditional temporal properties of the interaction. For example, in-
stead of verifying whether a seller will eventually deliver an item, one may verify that
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if the buyer believes the seller will eventually deliver the item, then the item will be
delivered.
Benerecetti et al. (1998) present a mechanism that allows the verification of an
agent’s mental state by treating belief atoms as propositional atoms. Therefore, they
can be verified like any other propositional atom in traditional model checking tech-
niques. In this mechanism, multiagent systems are specified through the  temporal
logic.  extends , the branching time propositional temporal logic, by the 
logic.  introduces a formalisation for  attitudes by allowing the specification of
agents’ beliefs, desires, and intentions. The main idea is that the notion of agents is
built on top of the traditional notion of processes. Each agent has its own beliefs, de-
sires, and intentions. The system is composed of a collection of views. An agent may
have at most three views that are used to express its beliefs (about itself and/or others),
desires, and intentions. In addition to the agent views, there is also a need for a global
view on a higher level that describes the view of an external observer. For example,
an agent may have false beliefs about others and a global view becomes necessary for
specifying the behaviour of the entire system.
 system models are translated into a multiagent finite state machine () be-
fore they are fed to the model checker for verification. The model checker’s algorithm
is similar to the  labelling algorithm (Edmund M. Clarke et al., 1999). However, it
is modified to take into account the data structures of the  language. In summary,
the model checker traverses the system’s state-space, labelling states that satisfy the
sub-formulae of the property to be verified. After inspecting all the states, the property
is said to be satisfied in the system only if the initial states of the system have been
labelled with this property. Benerecetti and Giunchiglia (2001) investigate the possi-
ble application of this mechanism to various multiagent system scenarios, focusing on
security protocols.
Wooldridge et al. (2002) introduce a different approach for the verification of agent
mental states. In their approach, the  language is used for specifying and ver-
ifying multiagent systems. The system is specified through the specification of the
various agents and their mental states, or their  logic. In addition to the specifica-
tion of agents,  allows the specification of claims. Claims describe the properties
that one is interested in verifying.
Both the agent models and the claims to be verified are specified in a simplified
version of LORA. LORA (Wooldridge, 2000) is a branching temporal logic that is
extended with both modal connectives specifying beliefs, desires, and intentions as
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well as concepts from dynamic logic for the specification of agents and the actions
they may perform. The logic contains operators that describe properties of states as
well as properties of paths. For example, the belief, desire, and intention operators
describe properties of states and one can specify whether a given belief holds or not
in a given state. On the other hand, traditional modal and temporal operators specify
properties of paths. For example, Happens α specifies that action α happens next.
Agent specifications make use of do instructions, while iterations, if-then selec-
tions, etc. For performing the verification,  uses the  model checker. The
 compiler takes as input a  system specification and its associated claims.
The compiler translates claims into  properties and the agents’ specifications into
. The output of the compiler is fed to the  model checker for verification.
An interesting example of the properties than can be verified states that “some agent
i eventually comes to believe that agent1 intends that i believes a has the value 10”.
Clearly, verifying such properties seems to be a limitation of our current  model
checker. This issue is investigated in more detail in Section 6.2.
An unconventional application to  is the verification of electronic institutions
(Esteva et al., 2001), as illustrated by Huguet et al. (2002). For specifying multiagent
systems, electronic institutions focus on the general organisational approaches, or the
social norms. These represent the rules of the game in the society. Instead of mod-
elling agents, the focus is on specifying a dialogical framework, scenes, performative
structure, and norms. As a result,  should be used in such a way that it focuses on
the specification of societal aspects as opposed to agents internal aspects. The trick is
to define the system through the specification of each agent role as a traditional 
agent. A translator is created to automatically perform this translation.
The result of the translation is appended to a set of basic  claims resulting in
the complete  specification. This specification is then fed to the  compiler
for translating the claims into  properties and the agent specifications into Promela.
The results of this second translation are fed to the  model checker for verification.
Unfortunately, Huguet et al. (2002) do not elaborate on the drawback of translating the
system twice, where each translator is performing a translation between two contrast-
ing models.
An example of the properties verified are those specifying that it is possible to
exit the system “cleanly” from any state in the system, or that whenever the system
is in state X, it is guaranteed that it will eventually reach state Y . We note that this
unconventional application of  focuses on verifying properties of the interaction,
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rather than properties of agents’ mental states. This makes this particular application
of  seem closer to the mechanisms of Section 6.1.1. Nevertheless, in practise,
these interactions are specified through agent models.
Along the same lines as model checking multiagent systems with , model
checking approaches have been applied in a fairly similar manner to multiagent sys-
tems specified via AgentSpeak. The main difference being that AgentSpeak is a logic-
based language, while  is an imperative language.
Bordini et al. (2003a) introduce the toolkit  for checking AgentSpeak pro-
grams. The toolkit provides an automatic translation from AgentSpeak to the input
languages of existing model checkers. Two different model checkers have been tested:
 and the 2 general purpose Java model checker.
The research carried out on verifying AgentSpeak via the  model checker is
presented in the published paper by Bordini et al. (2003b). Similar to , AgentS-
peak specifies multiagent systems through the specification of the various agents in the
system. In summary, an agent is created by specifying its set of base beliefs and its set
of plans. A belief atom is simply a first order predicate. A plan, however, is composed
of a triggering event, a set of belief literals, and a set of goals. A triggering event
specifies the event that triggers the plan. It could be the addition or deletion of mental
attitudes (i.e. beliefs or goals). The belief literals are used to specify the conditions for
executing the goals. Only if the belief literals are true is the specified goal executed.
Goals could either require the execution of actions, such as sending messages, printing
some data, etc., the fulfilment of certain goals, the testing of certain believes, or even
the addition/deletion of beliefs. Finally, intentions are viewed as plans that agents have
committed to. In practise, they are specified as partially instantiated plans.
To be able to perform the verification in , AgentSpeak(F) (a variant of AgentS-
peak that is used for restricting the system to finite state systems) should be translated
to Promela. The translation turns out to be a rather complicated process. This is
because Promela allows the specification of an interaction’s state-space and not the
specification of belief predicates and plans. Therefore, a slight modification to the use
of Promela’s channels is introduced. Channels are typically used in process calculus
to connect the various processes together. However, in multiagent systems, all the pro-
cesses/agents should be connected to each other. The sender and receiver of a certain
message is specified in the message itself and does not rely on a channel to direct it.
Therefore, only one channel m is used for inter-agent communication. All messages
are delivered to and collected from that channel. Other channels are then used to store
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the various data structures of AgentSpeak. For instance, channel b is used to store the
agent’s beliefs. Channel e is used to store events. Channel i is used for scheduling
intentions. And so on. For further technical details on the translation of AgentSpeak to
Promela and the use of Promela channels in this process, we refer the interested reader
to the published paper by Bordini et al. (2003b).
The research carried out by Bordini et al. (2003c) translates AgentSpeak to the
input language of 2, a general purpose Java model checker. The translation to a Java
model turns out to be much more elegant and straightforward than the translation to
Promela. For example, the Java model may use objects and their instances. This makes
the specification of plans and their instances, or intentions, a simple task. Furthermore,
having a plan library is easy in the Java mode and cumbersome in the Promela model.
Last, but not least, the use of 2 sounds more appealing simply because Java is the
language used in the implementation of many multiagent systems.
However, the true drawback of using 2 is its efficiency. Using  to verify
AgentSpeak was already seen to be demanding in terms of memory consumption and
processing time. Using 2 turned out to be even more demanding. A comparison
between the two techniques was carried out on the “Mars scenario” (Bordini et al.,
2003c), where one robot is responsible for collecting garbage and sending it to another
robot that places the garbage it receives in an incinerator. One of the properties verified
states that it is possible for the first robot to have the intention of continuing to check
for garbage and to believe that it is currently checking the slots for garbage. The
verification of this property took 65.78sec to complete and consumed 210.51 of
memory when verified by , while it took 18:49:16 hours to complete and consumed
366.68 of memory when verified by 2. In another setting, with the garbage placed
at different locations, the same property took 5.25sec to complete in  and 76.63sec
in 2.
As a result, the authors felt the need to investigate further techniques for improving
efficiency. In their following research, presented by Bordini et al. (2004), a slicing
mechanism for reducing the state-space is investigated. Slicing has originally been
used on logic programs (Zhao et al., 1994). It also has been used for a long time
in imperative programs (e.g. Berzins, 1995). The idea behind slicing is to eliminate
chunks of the system that are not relevant and do not affect the verification of the
property in question.
To perform this slicing mechanism, an environment should be specified in addition
to the traditional AgentSpeak agents. The environment is used in the slicing mecha-
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nism to link the plans of different agents together. It is represented as a set of rules.
The head of each rule is either an action or an empty head. The body specifies the
possible belief changes resulting in performing the action specified in the head.
In the first step of slicing, all dependencies are specified by linking the various goals
in each agent plan to the matching triggering event of the agent’s remaining plans. The
head of each of the environment rules is linked to the matching action in the various
agent plans. Each element in the body of an environment rule is linked to its match in
the agent plans. In the second step of slicing, an algorithm takes in the AgentSpeak
agent programs, the environment specification, the specified links generated from the
previous step, and the property to be verified. The property is broken down into atomic
sub-properties. For each of these sub-properties, the agents’ plans are traversed to
see which nodes are reachable, using the environment as a link between the plans of
different agents. Finally, all the plans that have not been marked in the previous step
are deleted. If one of the agents had all its plans deleted, then the entire agent may be
removed from the system.
In one example, slicing achieved a 25.6% reduction in time and 33% in memory
usage when using . In another example, slicing achieved a 26% reduction in time
and 21% in memory usage. However, using ’s built-in slicing algorithms did not
result in any reduction in the state-space.
All the mechanisms presented in this section have focused on the verification of
agent models. This might be useful in closed systems were the user performing the
verification has access to the agent specification. In open systems, however, this is
not feasible for several reasons, as discussed in Section 3.3.1. For example, agents
are usually weary of providing access to their internal specification. Moreover, even if
we assume that this does happen, agents are expected to be modelled in various ways
and the required information may not be expressed declaratively. In closed systems,
one may argue that the verifier can have access to the agents’ specification and be able
to extract and interpret the required information correctly. However, there still would
be an efficiency issue to be addressed. Relying purely on the agent constraints to
construct the system’s state-space results in massively sized system models, as shown
by the results of the techniques presented in this section.
For these reasons, mechanisms other than those focusing solely on either inter-
action or agent models are needed. The following section presents a third class of
mechanisms that consider a combination of interaction and agent models.
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6.1.3 Model Checking the Interaction/Agents Mesh
Giordano et al. (2003) identify the problems of using mental approaches for the veri-
fication of open multiagent systems. They argue that although the history of commu-
nication in open systems may be observable, the internal states of single agents is not.
Therefore, they propose a social approach which is based on the view that communica-
tion actions affect the social state of a system and not the internal states of agents. The
actions performed by agents are saved as part of the social state instead of individual
mental states.
Interaction protocols are modelled by specifying the actions, their pre-conditions,
their effects on the social state, and the resulting commitments. Interactions may fur-
ther be constrained by adding temporal formulae restricting the flow of the interaction.
The system model is specified in , a dynamic linear time temporal logic.
The verifier is capable of verifying four different types of properties. These are
defined by the following questions:
1. Will agents always satisfy their social facts (or requirements)?
2. Will an agent eventually reach its desired state?
3. Do certain properties of the interaction protocol hold?
4. Do agents respect social facts (or requirements) at run time?
The final question is answered by observing the history of communication and
verifying that it does not conflict with any of the rules of the interaction protocol. Note
that this does not predict whether agents will abide to social requirements. Verification
is not performed before the interaction is carried out, but after the execution of the
interaction to double check that agents have indeed followed the rules.
To answer the first question, the agent’s program code is required in order to verify
whether agents are actually capable of performing the actions they need to perform.
This brings us back to the main issue of verifying agent models. An agent’s program
code will most likely not be available for others to verify. However, every agent clearly
has access to its own program code. Therefore, answering this question is performed
by agents to help them decide whether they will be capable of performing the actions
requested from them before committing to the protocol.
The second and third questions are properties of the interaction, and they are inde-
pendent of any agent engaging in this interaction.
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Since both the system model and the properties to be verified are specified in a
dynamic temporal logic, then the verification problem becomes a satisfiability prob-
lem, as opposed to a traditional model checking problem. Verification is performed
using Büchi automaton techniques. The automaton of both the interaction protocol IP
(BIP) and the negation of the property P to be verified (B¬P) are constructed on the fly.
Finally, a verifier checks that the language accepted by the product of BIP and B¬P is
empty.
In their later published work (Giordano et al., 2004), the authors acknowledge that
such a technique is highly inefficient, since both the system model and the temporal
properties to be verified are represented as logical formulae. As a result, they suggest
a slight modification to their technique: instead of generating the automaton of the
interaction protocol BIP in the traditional way, the automaton describing all possible
computations is generated by making use of a transa(S ) function. This function is
responsible for transforming one state into the next, for a given action a. However, the
overall verification mechanism remains, more or less, the same.
The problem with this technique is that it does indeed acknowledge the pitfalls of
mental approaches, but does not provide any new mechanisms for addressing these
pitfalls. The reason behind this failure lies in the adopted view of multiagent systems:
communication actions are believed to affect the social state of the system and not
the internal states of agents. As a result, the verification of the properties described
by their second and third questions is similar to the mechanisms presented in Sec-
tion 6.1.1. This is because they only attempt to verify traditional temporal properties
of interactions. The contribution of verifying properties described by their first ques-
tion is not very strong. This is because an agent’s program is accessed by its owner
only to check whether the owner is capable of fulfilling certain requirements. Finally,
the contribution of verifying properties described by their fourth question is also weak.
This is because what is labelled as verification is in fact the process of observing the
outcome of an interaction, matching it to the rules, and checking whether some agent
has violated the rules or not.
The following section presents our final category of multiagent verification mech-
anisms. The mechanisms in this category seem to be more promising for our purposes
since they offer to verify both temporal properties of interactions as well as properties
of the agent mental states without any need for accessing the agent specifications.
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6.1.4 Model Checking Agent Properties in Interactions Models
The mechanism presented by Bentahar et al. (2006) for verifying dialogue game pro-
tocols seems to be extremely similar to that presented by Giordano et al. (2003) and
discussed in the preceding section. The interaction protocol is specified by *, an
extension to the * temporal logic. Similar to Giordano et al. (2003), both the sys-
tem model and the property specification are defined in one temporal language, *.
The specification is then translated into a Büchi automaton, and the model checking
problem is reduced to the verification of the emptiness of the automaton resulting from
the product graph of the system model and the property specification.
However, the * language used for specifying the system model and the tem-
poral properties is enriched with a list of predefined agent actions allowing the explicit
specification of an agent’s commitment towards another, along with other action for-
mulae describing the withdrawal, satisfaction, violation, acceptance, refusal, and chal-
lenge actions. Technically speaking, the verification mechanism is one that verifies
properties of the interaction models only, disregarding the possible agents involved.
Nevertheless, specifying the commitments on the interaction level presents one way of
verifying properties of agents, such as those describing their commitments.
The trick of enriching interaction models with non traditional interaction actions,
such as commitments, is one way for verifying agent properties in interaction models.
The remaining mechanisms of this section use an additional trick that enriches states
with propositions about those states, or state properties.
Penczek and Lomuscio (2003) present a bounded model checking technique for
the verification of epistemic properties of multiagent systems. To be able to verify
epistemic properties, the system should allow the specification of such notations. As
a result, the system is specified as an interpreted system. In addition to specifying ac-
tions, protocols, and transitions, interpreted systems make use of epistemic modalities
that are defined not on an abstract model, but on the actual instantiated model.
Encoding these models is largely done by hand. For each agent, the agent’s local
states, its actions, and its plans are specified. The system’s possible states are also
encoded in binary form by hand. Additional propositional formulae may be specified
to encode, for instance, the particular state of an agent. Propositions may be defined to
describe state properties, along with the rules under which they hold. Finally, proper-
ties to be verified are specified in .  extends the  temporal logic by adding
knowledge modalities describing an agent’s knowledge, common knowledge, global
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knowledge (or “everyone knows”), and distributed knowledge. As a result, the 
language permits the verification of temporal occurrences of knowledge over certain
propositions. For instance, in the attacking generals problem (Penczek and Lomuscio,
2003), one may verify that no general will attack before it is common knowledge that
they will both attack.
In summary, although the model checkers do not have access to the agent’s internal
structure, verifying their knowledge is made possible since the user would have speci-
fied all the states along with the propositions that would hold in each state (through the
specification of the rules under which each proposition holds). The semantics of 
are then sufficient for carrying out the verification.
Verification is performed on a bounded model of the system. All the possible runs
are bounded to a specific length. As a result, the model checking problem is reduced
to a satisfiability problem. The proof of the correctness of the transition from a model
checking problem to a satisfiability one is presented in the published paper by Penczek
and Lomuscio (2003). The system model and the property specification are translated
into propositional formulae that are fed to a  solver for verification.
This verification mechanism has been applied by Woźna et al. (2005) to verify
knowledge in real time, where timed autonomas are used for the specification of real
time interpreted systems and the  logic for the property specification. While
 extends the  logic with real time semantics,  extends  by introduc-
ing additional knowledge operators. Similar to the above technique, the system model
and the properties to be verified are translated into propositional formulae which are
fed to a  solver.
A limitation of these bounded approaches is that properties, when verified in un-
bounded system models, may either prove that a universal property is actually false
or that an existential property is valid. This imposes a severe limitation on the veri-
fication of many protocols, especially security protocols where it might be needed to
verify that some crucial security property will hold forever in the future. As a result,
Kacprzak et al. (2004) extend the work of Penczek and Lomuscio (2003) to permit un-
bounded model checking over unbounded system models. The  logic is extended
by introducing past operators and making use of fixed point semantics (the mu-calculus
semantics), resulting in p. Similarly to the techniques above, p properties are
also translated into propositional formulae and the model checking problem is once
again reduced to a satisfiability problem.
Raimondi and Lomuscio (2007) present a different mechanism for the verification
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of  properties in interpreted systems from that of Penczek and Lomuscio (2003).
In their approach, the interpreted system is translated into a set of boolean formulae.
The local states of agents, global states, and actions are all translated into boolean vari-
ables. The protocols of agents and the temporal transitions are translated into boolean
functions. The evaluation function that associates the global states to propositions and
the functions computing the initial and reachable states are also translated into differ-
ent boolean functions. A property is then said to be satisfied in a system model if the
property is satisfied in the initial states of the system model. To compute the set of
states in which a  property is satisfied, the verifier’s algorithm makes use of the
specified boolean functions to traverse the state-space and check the satisfaction of the
property at each state. The result is the  model checker for multiagent systems
(Lomuscio and Raimondi, 2006a).
One of the most interesting applications of the  model checker, in our view,
has been presented by Lomuscio and Raimondi (2006b). The goal is to verify strategies
of concurrent game structures. To achieve this, the  temporal logic is used for
the property specification. The  temporal logic extends  with one additional
operator, 〈〈 〉〉. An  formula 〈〈Γ 〉〉 φ is then read as “the set of players (or agents) Γ
can enforce the temporal property φ”. An exact interpretation of such properties raises
an important issue. Consider the following example, which is a simplified version
of that presented by Lomuscio and Raimondi (2006b). Road Runner could either be
in tunnel A or B. In order to achieve its goal of killing Road Runner, the Coyote
may place its ACME Inc. bomb either at the exit of tunnel A or at the exit of B
. The property 〈〈Coyote 〉〉 kill(RoadRunner) specifying that the Coyote can enforce the
killing of Road Runner is false, since the system is non-deterministic and Road Runner
could be in either of the tunnels. Nevertheless, a different and weaker interpretation
of 〈〈Coyote 〉〉 kill(RoadRunner) holds. It is true that due to non-determinism the Coyote
cannot enforce its goal; nevertheless, it is still Coyote’s actions that can bring about
this goal. The  model checker has been modified to verify properties expressing
notations of time, knowledge, and strategies. The user may invoke the model checker
with the option of specifying whether the model is to be considered deterministic or
not.
The most interesting aspect of the mechanisms presented in this section is their
ability to verify compelling properties of the agents without any need for accessing the
agents’ internal specification. Although most of these techniques are labelled as model
checking techniques, in practise a  solver is used instead of a model checker. The
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drawback of these approaches, in our opinion, lies in the complication of the verifica-
tion process and their inadequacy in presenting a fully automated technique. Further-
more, the system model is not specified through a clear process calculus, but through a
collection of states that are specified by hand. Usually, transition functions should also
be specified to link the states together. This complication in both the specification and
verification process might not be a problem when a user is verifying the system offline.
However, it surely raises lots of issues (including efficiency issues) when verification
needs to be performed by the agents at interaction time, as our thesis proposes.
6.2 Analysis and Synthesis
The previous section has presented a collection of the available literature on the ver-
ification of multiagent systems, focusing on model checking techniques in particular.
Each paper has proposed a different language for modelling the system, a different
temporal logic for the property specification, and a different verification mechanism.
These various mechanisms have contributed hugely to the fields of both multiagent
system specification and verification. However, it seems that the verification field of
multiagent systems has not reached solid grounds yet, and this is evident from the
limited application of the available mechanisms.
The multiagent verification problem can be traced back to the history of multi-
agent system development. Initial research on multiagent systems has followed a
bottom up approach for the specification of these systems. The initial focus was on
how to build intelligent agents that are autonomous, reactive, proactive, social, etc.
(Wooldridge, 2001), and  approaches gained tremendous popularity. However, with
time, researchers started realising that although having intelligent agents is crucial for
the success of these systems, defining global social norms, organisational approaches,
or distributed dialogues is also needed to address some of the most important issues,
such as achieving distributed coordination.
Naturally, verification followed in the footsteps of specification. For this reason,
this chapter has categorised the various verification techniques of the literature based
on the system models and the properties they verify. We overlook the verification
techniques in our categorisation because although we believe it is crucial to have a
reliable, fast, and efficient model checker (especially in our case of interaction time
verification), we also believe that verification is strongly dictated by the modelling
approaches of the system and the type of properties it can verify. Furthermore, we
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state that the system model is even more important that the property specification since
the type of properties verified are also dictated by the system model. For instance, one
cannot verify a property concerning an agent’s knowledge if the system model did not
contain any notions of this knowledge.
In comparison with the specification techniques, the mechanisms presented in Sec-
tion 6.1.2 have focused solely on the verification of the agents’  layer. These mech-
anisms offer the user the opportunity of verifying rich type of properties concerning
agent’s beliefs and intentions. Nevertheless, the limitation of such mechanisms is clear
when one tries to apply them to open systems, where agent specifications are not (and
should not be) made public.
On the other hand, the mechanisms of Section 6.1.1 followed a rather naive ap-
proach that applied the model checking techniques, used traditionally in hardware and
software systems, to multiagent systems without any modifications. The system model
is viewed as a finite state machine and agents are treated as traditional processes that
abide to their specifications. However, in reality, autonomous agents are not processes
that follow rules blindly. On the contrary, they are expected to have their own say in
interactions resulting in directing the flow of interactions as they see fit. This poses a
severe limitation to the kind of properties that users may want to verify.
The mechanism of Section 6.1.3 properly identifies the drawbacks of the earlier
mechanisms, although it fails to provide any tangible solutions.
In our view, the mechanisms of Section 6.1.4 seem to be the most promising. This
is because they provide the user with the chance of verifying interesting agent proper-
ties without the need for the agent specifications. However, for the verification mech-
anism of this thesis, we propose agents to be equipped with a suitable verifier that
allows them to automatically verify scenarios at interaction time. This is highly useful
in helping agents select appropriate scenarios to join. With the complicated specifica-
tion and verification mechanisms of Section 6.1.4, which require states and transition
functions to be specified by hand, clearly automatic verification is not an option.
But how does the proposed mechanism of this thesis deal with each of the interac-
tion and agent models? In our system model, the interaction layer is clearly separated
from the agent  layer. The verification process does not require access to the agent
models, but may use agent deontic constraints whenever necessary. While we argue
that an agent’s  layer is not accessible in open systems, we believe it is in the inter-
est of agents to make some of their deontic constraints public. For instance, it would
be wise for the seller in an electronic commerce scenario to publicly state its inability
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to accept any payments other than those made by credit cards. Furthermore, an agent
might learn about other agent’s constraints from previous experience. For instance,
after a couple of purchases from seller S , the buyer might decide that S is incapable of
delivering good quality goods. Such information could be used during the verification
process of future scenarios.
The model checker of this thesis uses a traditional process calculus approach for
modelling systems and a traditional temporal logic for the property specification. As a
result, it may seem incapable of verifying properties about agents’ knowledge, strate-
gies, etc. In what follows, we explore the capabilities of  in more detail.
Consider the cards game presented in Lomuscio and Raimondi (2006b) where a
player agent is playing against an environment agent. The game is played with three
cards in the deck: an Ace, a King, and a Queen. The rules of the game state that the
Ace wins over the King, the King wins over the Queen, and the Queen wins over the
Ace. In the first round, two cards are randomly chosen by the environment and one
is given to player while the other is kept for the environment. In the second and final
round, the player has the choice of either keeping its card or switching it with the third
and last card in the deck. The property stating that “the player has a strategy to win
the game in the initial state” is verified by Lomuscio and Raimondi (2006b). At first,
this property seems to be difficult to verify with our model checker. However, careful
inspection proves that the verification of such properties is indeed feasible.
Figure 6.1 presents the state graph of this game. The game starts at state s0.
The first action to be performed is to draw two cards from the deck, illustrated as
draw(X,Y), where X is the card handed to the player and Y the card kept for the en-
vironment. The player may then choose to either keep the card or switch it with the
remaining card in the deck. If the final state reached is s7 then the player wins the
game. However, if it is s8, then the player loses to the environment. The property of
whether the player has a strategy to win from the very beginning is a bit tricky. This
is because it is not sufficient to prove whether there exists a path in which the player
can win, but whether the player can actually enforce this path. Let us consider the
following µ-calculus equation1:
1Note that the action an agent can perform is either an input action specified as in(a(player, P), ),
an output action specified as out(a(player, P), ), or some internal computation specified as
#(a(player, P), ). To simplify things, we replace the list of all possible actions that the player can
perform with action(a(player, P), A). This states that the player agent can perform some action A.
















Figure 6.1: A simple card game: the interaction’s state graph




The equation states that either the player wins (wins(a(player, P))), or the player
can perform an action after which the same property should hold again
(〈action(a(player, P))〉X), or for every single action the environment can take the same
property will still hold ([action(a(environment, E)]X). Termination is guaranteed by
using the least fixed point operator (µX), which ensures that eventually the player is
guaranteed to win.
This property states that the player’s actions can indeed bring about its goal of
winning. However, it does not state whether the player can enforce its winning. For
instance, after receiving an Ace card, the player does not actually know whether it
is in state s1 or s2, since it does not know the environment’s card. It is true that its
action decides who wins. However, in each of these states the player should perform
a different action to win. Therefore, it seems that if the player does not know which
state it is in, then it cannot enforce its winning. Nevertheless, such a property can
be specified in the µ-calculus without the need to rely on the agent’s knowledge. To
achieve this, Equation 6.1 is slightly modified into Equation 6.2, as follows:
µX. wins(a(player, P)) ∨
(〈action(a(player, P), A)〉tt ∧ [action(a(player, P), A)]X) ∨
[action(a(environment, E), )]
(6.2)
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The only difference between the two equations is that the second equation does not
state that the player can perform an action after which the same property should hold
again (〈action(a(player, P))〉X), but that the player is capable of performing some ac-
tion A (〈action(a(player, P), A)〉tt) and that all the states resulting from performing ac-
tion A will have to satisfy the same property all over again ([action(a(player, P), A)]X).
The purpose of this example is to illustrate yet another aspect of novelty of our
proposed model checking technique. For instance, verifying the above two properties
using the  model checker requires the user to get into the trouble of hand cod-
ing all possible states, defining the transition relations, specifying the functions that
return the initial and reachable states, etc. However, all the  system requires is
an  specification of the state graph of Figure 6.1. This is a simple and direct task,
as in any process calculus. After the specification is ready, the first property is ver-
ified in the  system by feeding the system model to the model checker while
setting the state model option to deterministic. The second property is verified by
feeding the model checker the exact same property, but by setting the state model op-
tion to non-deterministic. In our approach, these two different properties are specified
by two different µ-calculus equations and fed to the model checker in the same man-
ner. Furthermore, the verification mechanism of  is fully automated, giving the
agents the opportunity to perform the verification themselves whenever needed. Last,
but not least, our model checker uses a basic process calculus for modelling systems
and a basic temporal logic for the specification of properties. Unlike the specification
languages of , the languages of  are not enriched with extra and explicit
modalities for the specification of knowledge, strategies, etc., yet they are capable of
verifying properties related to these notions.
We believe this issue to be one of the major drawbacks of some of the available
mechanisms. Almost every attempt in this field suggests a modification to existing
languages by adding new modalities. This is done to allow the model checker to verify
different classes of properties. The result, unfortunately, is that none of these tech-
niques have been widely used.
On the other hand, our proposed mechanism does not introduce new modalities to
the languages. For instance, the µ-calculus is a widely used traditional temporal logic.
The only modification done is to perceive constraints as actions performed by agents.
This minute modification to the language suffices to allow the verification of numerous
interesting properties of both interactions and agents. As for the  language, although
the syntax might be new to some, the notation is very similar to the most basic process
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calculus, . The result is a traditional, lightweight, efficient, and fully automated
verification mechanism that is capable of verifying compelling properties of interaction
and agent models.
Of course, further research is needed to investigate the full spectrum of properties
that could be verified by our system in comparison with those of the available literature.
However, to set the path for future research, we suggest that the languages of this model
checker remain intact as much as possible. We do not believe adding new modalities
for every new notion is a move in the right direction. Furthermore, additional notions
may be addressed on a different level. For example, consider the property verified
by Wooldridge et al. (2002) and states that “some agent i eventually comes to believe
that agent1 intends that i believes a has the value 10”. We view such notions to be
dependent on the agent’s own interpretation of messages. For instance, if agent i is
weary of agent 1, then receiving a message a = 10 from agent 1 might lead agent i to
believe that agent 1 would want it to belief that a = 10. However, in a different scenario
where agent i trusts agent 1, receiving a message a = 10 from agent 1 would simply
lead agent i to belief that a = 10. Therefore, a different interpretation of messages and
their effects on agent beliefs should be modelled on a different layer than that of the
model checker, especially that such layers might not be fixed and could change with
different agents or scenarios. At the time being, we leave this issue for future work.
6.3 Conclusion
In comparison with the available verification mechanisms of the literature, the research
conducted and introduced in this thesis presents two major aspects of novelty. First,
it overcomes the dilemma of interaction versus agent model verification by combining
interaction models to deontic models at run time. We argue that while the agent spec-
ification cannot be accessed by a verifier in open systems, deontic models that specify
some of the agent constraints and are crucial for the verification process may be made
available to the verifier. As a result, in addition to verifying static temporal properties
of interactions, the verifier is capable of verifying more dynamic properties of these
highly dynamic systems.
The second aspect of novelty is introducing interaction time verification for mul-
tiagent systems. This presents the agents with the opportunity of performing the ver-
ification themselves whenever needed. This is highly useful for allowing agents to
automatically decide which interaction model and which group of agents is suitable
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to join. Although not investigated in this thesis, the automated model checker could
also be used to aid the agent’s decision process in dialogue games or negotiation pro-
tocols by helping them decide which action would result in the best outcome. These
applications require further research, which we currently leave for future work.
Finally, we provide the first demonstration of the above two aspects of novelty
without requiring language extensions beyond traditional process calculi and temporal
logics. This thesis presents a successful minimalist approach for multiagent system
verification. One of the main problems of multiagent system verification is the contin-
uous introduction of new modalities for specifying various notations. We show how
a basic process calculus for modelling systems, a basic temporal logic for specifying
properties, and a basic model checking algorithm is sufficient for verifying a rich vari-
ety of properties of both interaction and agent models. For future research, we suggest
to increase the richness of these properties by allowing the verification of properties
addressing issues such as the change of agent’s beliefs within interactions. However,
to achieve this, we propose the extension to the current verification process to be made
on a layer different than that of the model checker for two main reasons. First, keep-
ing the model checker as basic and general as possible implies that the model checker
could be used for verifying a large group of multiagent systems. More additions to
the model checker’s languages would simply imply more restrictions on the set of ver-
ifiable systems. Second, we view such models to be agent dependent, i.e. different
agents could have different models for their beliefs. Our ultimate goal is to have a
general purpose model checker that could be used across a wide category of scenarios,
yet succeed in verifying various types of properties by making use of additional layers,
such as deontic, trust, belief, etc.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Multiagent system verification poses an interesting challenge on traditional verification
mechanisms, due to the highly dynamic nature of these systems. A multiagent scenario
is heavily influenced by the autonomous agents executing that scenario. This usually
implies that verifiers might need to take the agents specification into consideration
in order to produce more reliable results. However, assuming the verifier has access
to an agent’s internal specification is not feasible or practical in open systems where
agents are built independently with different implementation designs and languages.
Furthermore, such access raises crucial security, trust, and privacy concerns.
This thesis addresses the issue of multiagent system verification by allowing the
agents to perform the verification themselves, when the conditions for verification are
met. The verifier is a dynamic and fully automated model checker. The system model
fed to the model checker is a combination of a global interaction model and a set of
local deontic models. The argument is that while internal agent specifications cannot
be accessed by model checkers, a set of deontic constraints that could affect the inter-
action might need to be specified. This allows the prediction and prevention of failure,
which could be due to errors within the interaction model, conflicts between the inter-
action protocol and the agents’ requirements, as well as clash of interests between the
agents, as early as possible in an interaction.
The resulting model checker seems promising with its varied range of potential
applications, as illustrated by Section 7.2. However, the trust domain receives special
attention in this thesis. This is due to the criticality of the trust issue in distributed
open system, especially that this field lacks reliable solutions. When faced with new
and unexplored interactions, the  system can be used to help agents verify which
interaction along with which group of agents may be trusted.
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To conclude this thesis, Section 7.1 revisits the design and implementation plans,
discussing their effects on the resulting  verifier. Section 7.2 presents the range
of applications the  system may be applied to. Section 7.3 recapitulates the novel
contributions of this thesis. Lastly, Section 7.4 closes this thesis with a collection of
interesting and stimulating ideas for future work.
7.1 Results
One of the main contributions of this thesis is introducing interaction time verification.
The success of interaction time verification stems from the full automation, efficient,
and lightweight nature of the  model checker. Previous chapters have shown the
model checker to be remarkably efficient. Verification results are usually returned
in a fraction of a second, going up to a second or two in more complex scenarios. The
model checker resides on top of the  tabled Prolog system, which requires around
20 to install. However, the model checker itself is extremely compact. It is written
in around 200 lines of Prolog. Another important feature of success is the model
checker’s ability to verify a rich variety of properties in a wide range of scenarios
and applications. However, all these accomplishments are a direct consequence of the
selected design and implementation plans, which we discuss below.
The use of the  process calculus specifically is very appealing from a verification
point of view. This is because , which is used for modelling multiagent systems, is
also an executable process calculus. This allows the  model checker to avoid the
complexity of translating a system into another language, eliminating the possibility of
introducing errors in doing so. Many of the available verification mechanisms either
require the user to translate the system model by hand, or use an automatic translator
to translate between two contrasting modelling approaches. An example of the lat-
ter case are verifiers that translate between local agent models and global interaction
models. Unfortunately, it is not clear what kind of information is lost, or possibly
misrepresented, in such a translation.
By using the  executable language, the  system eliminates this troublesome
translation process altogether. This largely contributes to both increasing the efficiency
and decreasing the model checker’s complexity, hence promoting automation. Permit-
ting the verification of executable models provides a strong base for the success of
interaction time verification, allowing agents to easily extract the interaction protocol
and feed it to the verifier when needed.
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The extremely compact nature of the  system and its high efficiency are largely
due to two main things: the logic-based model checking algorithm and the choice of
the µ-calculus temporal logic.
The logic based nature of  provides the efficiency needed in computing con-
straints and complex data structures. This is crucial for verifying system models that
make heavy use of constraints and structured terms, such as . The result is an effi-
cient model checker that throws the actual burden of searching the state-space on the
underlying  system. The logic based algorithm coupled with the µ-calculus tempo-
ral logic results in a compact Prolog code. This is because the µ-calculus notations are
based on recursion. As a result, the core Prolog predicates of the model checker that
are responsible for specifying the rules of property satisfaction are written in less than
30 lines of Prolog code.
Furthermore, the addition of extra layers, such as general deontic or trust layers,
is done carefully in such a way that these layers do not increase the complexity of
the model checker. As illustrated by Sections 3.5.3.1 and 4.6, both the deontic and
trust constraints are equivalent to temporal properties of the interaction. Even if the
constraints are on specific agents, in practise they are verified by checking whether
the agents in question perform any illegal action in a given interaction. As a result,
the addition of these extra layers does not affect the model checker itself, but require
the addition of a simple and basic translator for mapping these constraints to the µ-
calculus.
7.2 Possible Applications
Like any other verification mechanism, the  system is used to prove the satisfaction
of certain properties in a given system. Traditionally, these properties have expressed
safety and liveness features of interactions. However, by treating some  constraints
as actions, similar to input and output actions, the  system is capable of verifying
a richer set of properties. The trustworthiness property of the auction system presented
in Section 4.5.2, which describes the interaction’s enforcement of truth telling on the
bidder agents, is one example. Furthermore, the addition of a deontic layer to the sys-
tem model contributes further to the richness of the properties, allowing the verification
of trust and other compatibility issues.
To broaden the type of properties that may be verified, one may introduce addi-
tional agent layers on top of the current  system. For instance, the addition of
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a belief meta layer could be useful for verifying the progress of agent beliefs within
interactions. Section 7.4, in which future work is discussed, elaborates further on this
issue.
Proving the satisfaction of properties in a given system could be useful in a variety
of applications. For instance, it could address issues such as collaboration and coalition
formation. This is achieved by allowing the agents to find a suitable set of collaborating
agents for a given interaction model, and vice versa. The suitability of scenarios is
calculated with respect to the verifying agent’s deontic and trust constraints.
Another useful application, which has not been investigated further in this thesis, is
using the  system for aiding an agent’s decision process. This could be very helpful
in dialogue games, negotiation protocols, argumentation, etc. This issue is revisited in
Section 7.4, when discussing possible future work.
7.3 Novel Contributions
This thesis presents two main aspects of novelty. First, it combines global interaction
models to local deontic models when addressing the interaction versus agent model
verification dilemma. Second, it introduces interaction time verification for multiagent
systems. Finally, it provides the first demonstration of the above without requiring
language extensions beyond traditional process calculi and temporal logics. The re-
mainder of this section discusses these issues in further detail.
The toughest challenge of multiagent system verification is addressing the strong
dependence of interaction models on the agents engaged in and directing those inter-
actions. Some of the available literature neglects the agents involved. This results
in the successful verification of global properties of interactions that could hold for
any group of agents. However, the major drawback of these mechanisms is that the
properties verified do not go beyond traditional safety and liveness properties. In such
highly dynamic and complex systems, the verification of these properties fail to catch
the interest of the agent community.
In contrast, other approaches neglect the interaction model. The focus is on the
agent’s  specification. The interaction’s state-space is automatically constructed
from the agent’s specification. This permits the verification of compelling properties
that deal with the change of an agent’s belief, desire, and intentions within a given
interaction. However, the major drawback of these approaches is that they assume
a verifier may have access to an agent’s internal specification. Although possible in
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closed systems, this is neither feasible nor acceptable, due to security, trust, and privacy
issues, in open systems.
The mechanism presented in this paper acknowledges the need for some way of
considering the agent’s constraints. For this, the  model checker is fed both the
global interaction model and agents deontic models, instead of their internal specifi-
cations. The argument is that while internal specifications should not be accessible, it
might be in the agent’s interest to make some of its deontic constraints public. In other
circumstances, agents might learn about each other’s capabilities, for instance, through
experience.
In summary, the combination of deontic models to the interaction model permits
the verification of richer properties of these complex systems. This, we believe, is one
of the main contributions of this thesis.
The second novel contribution lies in the successful introduction of interaction time
verification. Again, the dynamic nature of the system imposes further constraints on
verification. Many properties may only be verified at interaction time, when the condi-
tions for verification are met. The  systems provides the agents with the opportu-
nity of performing the verification themselves when needed. This proves to be a useful
tool for agents faced with new and unexplored interactions, since it aids the agent’s
decision process in selecting a suitable interaction model with a suitable group of col-
laborating agents. Interaction time verification is made possible due to the lightweight,
efficient, and fully automated nature of the  system. Nevertheless, automatic prop-
erty specification remains an open issue and is discussed in Section 7.4.
Finally, this thesis illustrates how these novel contributions may be achieved by
using a minimalist approach. It turns out that something as simple as a basic process
calculus and a temporal logic as simple as the traditional µ-calculus is sufficient for
proving compelling properties of these complex systems. For instance, Section 4.5.2
illustrates how the  system is used to verify the property stating that “an interaction
model enforces truth telling on the bidders”. Section 6.2 illustrates how the property
stating that “an agent has a winning strategy that it can enforce” may easily be specified
and verified by the  system. The trick lies in the addition of simple and basic 
constraints, which are dealt with by the model checker as agents’ internal actions.
We also note that one of the major advantages of sticking with a basic process
calculus for modelling systems is that it considerably restricts the state-space of the in-
teraction, a problem suffered by many multiagent verification mechanisms, especially
those relying solely on agent’s internal specification.
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Furthermore, keeping the specification language basic seems to leave more scope
for practical applications. The examples provided in this thesis, along with those pre-
sented by the OpenKnowledge project (www.openk.org), are proof of the language’s
expressive power. Many verifiers have fallen into the trap of endlessly expanding their
system specification language and their temporal logic. For every new notion that
needed to be verified, new modalities were added. The result was an increasing num-
ber of complex languages that were restricted to specific applications. Our proposed
solution is more basic and makes use of layering.
The model checker is kept as simple and basic as possible. For verifying a new
category of properties that could not be specified with the traditional µ-calculus, a new
layer is added to address the new notions. For instance, a deontic policy language may
be used to verify the possible violation of agent constraints. A trust policy language
may be used to verify trust constraints. Moreover, these additional layers do not affect
the model checking algorithm and its complexity. This is because they require the ad-
dition of a simple translator for translating each of these languages into the µ-calculus.
Further layers may be added as needed. For instance, in Section 7.4, we propose to
work on adding a belief meta layer to allow the verification of agent beliefs.
This simple and basic model checker is a general purpose model checker that could
be used across a wide category of scenarios. Yet, it is dynamic and powerful enough
to verify various types of properties by making use of additional deontic, trust, and
possibly other layers.
7.4 Improvements and Future Work
Throughout this thesis, different chapters have suggested different ideas for future
work, in the hope of introducing further improvements to the  model checker.
In this section, we recollect these suggestions into one long list. These are presented
in an increasing order of significance with respect to their contribution to academic
research.
F We suggest to apply the  system to different fields. For instance, the model
checker may be used by agents to help them decide their next move in an inter-
action. It would be interesting to see how much help could the model checker
offer agents in dialogue games, negotiation protocols, argumentation, etc.
Another offline application in the same field could help verify properties of
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these dialogue games, possibly aiding the design of argumentation or negotia-
tion strategies.
In the field of trust, the  system relies on the specification of existing trust
models. Therefore, we may integrate the  verifier with existing trust mech-
anisms, such as a reputation system, to achieve a realistic and complete running
scenario.
F An issue that is overlooked in this thesis is that of addressing conflicting rules
in  and  policy languages. This is usually a crucial issue in traditional
policy languages, where one needs to know whether access should be granted to
a given user or not. However, our verifier does not use the  or  languages
for performing crucial actions, such as granting access permissions. The purpose
of  and  constraints is to verify them against an interaction. Currently,
the  system verifies all constraints, whether conflicting or not. If any of the
constraints is not satisfied, then the system is not trusted. In other words, the 
system gives precedence to negative rules over positive ones. It also assumes that
any agent is trusted by default, unless stated otherwise. Future work can illustrate
how these defaults may be changed, and how different precedence rules may be
used, based on the verifying agent’s requirements. Probabilistic and stochastic
measures may also be useful in trust evaluation.
F A comprehensive study of possible scenarios, their interesting properties, and
the level of complexity that these could reach is needed to test the limits of the
model checker. The goal is to answer questions such as: What size of a system
model (or state-space) would break the model checker? What properties can not
be verified against a finite system model with a finite number of agents? If such
problems arise, are there any solutions that would work around them? etc.
F As the state-space grows, theorem proving could be used to encourage and fa-
cilitate compositional model checking. For example, consider interaction IM2
of Figure 5.5, where an inquirer needs to ask agents in the system some ques-
tion Q. It first plays the role inquirer1, to ask the f inder agents to find suitable
agents in the network for answering its question. It then plays the role inquirer2
to ask each of these agents its question Q. To verify that the inquirer will al-
ways receive an answer, the system is set to incorporate one inquirer, two finder
peers, and two responding agents. However, another solution would be to verify
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that the inquirer will always eventually play role inquirer2. This is followed by
verifying that inquirer2 will always receive an answer. As systems grow, such
compositional verification mechanisms could help address the state-space explo-
sion problem, when it arises. Theorem proving may then be used to verify the
transition from these sub-formulae to the general formula one intends to verify.
F To increase the richness of the verifiable properties, we suggest the addition of
an extra belief layer. This will allow agents to define the rules that govern the
change of their beliefs within interactions. For example, a naive rule may state
that if the message in f orm(m) is received, then the receiving agent will believe
m to be true. The addition of such a layer implies that the verifier will be able to
verify properties concerning the evolution of agent beliefs within interactions.
F Although verification has succeeded in being fully automated, the automation
of property specification is still far-fetched. Currently, the properties to be ver-
ified are specified by the human users and are fed by the agents to the model
checker. We believe that expecting agents to construct properties from scratch
is currently implausible. Therefore, we assume that in the future, properties will
be made available via services the same way interactions are introduced. We be-
lieve this to be a reasonable assumption, since it does not impose any additional
requirements on the system. However, it would be interesting if agents can mod-
ify available properties to suit their specific interaction models. This raises two
questions: (1) Can the agent learn which properties are important in a given sit-
uation? and (2) Can the agent specify such properties in an automated manner?
We believe further research needs to be carried out to address these two issues.
Nevertheless, we do propose some ideas for addressing the second question.
Many properties are general properties that may be applied to several scenar-
ios. For instance, the property stating that “an interaction model enforces truth
telling on the bidders” (Property 4.2 of Chapter 4) is a domain specific prop-
erty that may be verified against a range of auction interaction models. Never-
theless, every time the property is verified against a new auction model, some
modifications and tweakings are necessary. For example, this property assumes
that the message informing the winner W of the price P to be paid is speci-
fied as win(W, P). In a different interaction, this message could be specified as
in f orm win(W, I, P), where I stands for the item won. Therefore, there needs to
be a mapping between these two messages. We believe that current matching
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and ontology mapping technologies could be useful in addressing this issue.
Another interesting property to think about is one that guarantees the realisation
of a goal G. To modify such a general property, agents should be capable of
replacing G with the new goal G′. However, G′ should be tightly linked to
the interaction model that will be verified. Therefore, the agent should have
means for extracting the exact specification of the goal G′ from the interaction
model. This implies that the agent should have the appropriate tools for reading,
understanding, and extracting such information. One way to achieve this is by
spotting the variable in question (that is the variable relating to the goal G′) and




Some of the code presented in this thesis has been simplified to keep our examples short
and comprehensible. This appendix presents the exact , , , and µ-calculus
code that is fed to the model checker for verifying the various scenarios of this thesis.
The code of the travel agency scenario of Chapter 3 is presented in Section A.1, the
code of the auction scenario of Chapter 4 is presented in Section A.2, and the code of
the OpenKnowledge eResponse scenario of Chapter 5 is presented in Section A.3. We
note that the verification results that have been presented earlier in this thesis are the
results of verifying the code of this appendix.
A.1 The Travel Agency Scenario
A.1.1 The LCC Interaction Model
a(customer(T), C) ::=
vacation details(SD,ED,From,To) => a(travel agent( , , ),T)
<-- get vacation details(SD,ED,From,To) then
available flights(FL) <= a(travel agent2( , ),T) then
chosen flight(Fx) => a(travel agent2( , ),T)
<-- select flight(FL,Fx) then
available hotels(HL) <= a(travel agent2( , ),T) then
chosen hotel(Hx) => a(travel agent2( , ),T)
<-- select hotel(HL,Hx) then
due payment(TA,CD) <= a(travel agent2( , ),T) then
payment(PD) => a(travel agent2( , ),T)
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<-- get payment details(CD,PD) then
( confirm booking(FId,HId) <= a(travel agent2( , ),T)
or
fail payment(PD,R) <= a(travel agent2( , ),T) ).
a(travel agent(As,HD,CD),T) ::=
vacation details(SD,ED,From,To) <= a(customer( ),C) then
a(query airlines(As,SD,ED,From,To),T) then
a(get airline replies(As, [], [], FL,HD,CD),T) then
a(travel agent2(HD,CD),T).
a(query airlines(As, SD,ED,From,To),T) ::=
( flights(SD,ED,From,To) => a(airline,A1) <-- As=[A1|At] then
a(query airlines(At, SD,ED,From,To),T) )
or
null <-- As=[].
a(get airline replies(As, FL1, Ag, FL,HD,CD),T) ::=
( myappend([X],Ag,Ag2) and myappend(Flights,FL1,FL2) <--
flights(Flights) <= a(airline,X) then
a(get airline replies(As, FL2, Ag2, FL,HD,CD),T) )
or
null <-- all done(As,Ag).
a(travel agent2(HD,CD),T) ::=
available flights(FL) => a(customer( ),C) then
chosen flight(Fx) <= a(customer( ),C) then
null <-- query(HD,D,HL) then
available hotels(HL) => a(customer( ),C) then
chosen hotel(Hx) <= a(customer( ),C) then
null <-- calculate bill(Fx,Hx,TA)
and get airline agent(Fx,A)
and get hotel agent(Hx,H) then
due payment(TA,CD) => a(customer( ),C) then
payment(PD) <= a(customer(T), C) then
a(verify payment(PD,CD,PId,Sign,R),T) then
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( ( null <-- \+ PId=null and \+ Sign=null then
a(book flight(F,Fx,CD,PId,Sign,FId),T) then
a(book hotel(H,Hx,CD,PId,Sign,HId),T) then
confirm booking(FId,HId) => a(customer( ),C) )
or
( null <-- \+ R=null then
fail payment(PD,R) => a(customer( ),C) ) ).
a(verify payment(PD,CD,PId,Sign,R),T) ::=
verify payment(PD) => a(credit card,CD) then
( R=null <-- verified(PId,Sign) <= a(credit card,CD)
or
PId=null and Sign=null <-- not verified(R) <= a(credit card,CD) ).
a(book flight(F,Fx,CD,PId,Sign,FId),T) ::=
book(Fx,CD,PId,Sign) => a(airline booking,A) then
confirm flight(FId) <= a(airline booking,A).
a(book hotel(H,Hx,CD,PId,Sign,HId),T) ::=
book(Hx,CD,PId,Sign) => a(hotel booking,H) then
confirm hotel(HId) <= a(hotel booking,H).
a(credit card, CD) ::=
verify(PD,PId,Sign,R) <--
verify payment(PD) <= a(verify payment( , , , , ),T) then
( verified(PId,Sign) => a(verify payment( , , , , ),T)
<-- \+ PId=null and \+ Sign=null
or
not verified(R) => a(verify payment( , , , , ),T)
<-- PId=null and Sign=null ).
a(credit card2,CD) ::=
make payment(X,PId,Sign,Confirm) <--
get payment(X,PId,Sign) <= a(Role,Id) then
payment(Confirm) => a(Role,Id) then
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a(credit card2,CD).
a(airline,A) ::=
flights(SD,ED,From,To) <= a(query airlines( , , , , ),T) then
flights(Flights) => a(get airline replies( , , , , , ),T)
<-- get available flights(SD,ED,From,To, Flights).
a(airline booking,A) ::=
book(Fx,CD,PId,Sign) <= a(book flight( , , , , , ),T) then
get payment(X,PId,Sign) => a(credit card2,CD)
<-- require payment(Fx,X) then
payment(Confirmation) <= a(credit card2,CD) then
confirm flight(FId) => a(book flight( , , , , , ),T).
a(hotel booking,H) ::=
book(Hx,CD,PId,Sign) <= a(book hotel( , , , , , ),T) then
get payment(X,PId,Sign) => a(credit card2,CD)
<-- require payment(Hx,X) then
payment(Confirmation) <= a(credit card2,CD) then
confirm hotel(HId) => a(book hotel( , , , , , ),T).
A.1.2 The DPL Deontic Constraints
A.1.2.1 Deontic Rule D1
can(rule1, a(travel agent2( , ),T), #(query(HD, , )),+) <-
member(T,syta).
A.1.2.2 Deontic Rule D2
can(rule2, a(customer( ),C), #(get payment details(CD, )), +) <-
customer(C,CD).
A.1.2.3 Deontic Rule D3
must(rule3, a(customer( ),C), out(payment( ),a( , )), -) <-
encrypt(X) and not(X=openPGP).
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A.1.2.4 Deontic Rule D4
must(rule4, a(credit card,CD), , +) <-
authenticate(x509).
A.1.3 The µ-Calculus Temporal Properties
A.1.3.1 Property 3.1
get confirmation -=
















box(-[in(confirm booking( , ),a(travel agent2( , ), )),
in(fail payment( , ),a(travel agent2( , ), ))],prop(get result2)).
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A.2 The Auction Scenario
A.2.1 The LCC Interaction Model
a(auctioneer(I,R,Bs,Bx), A) ::=
( invite(I,R) => a(bidder,B) <-- Bs=[B|T] then
a(auctioneer(I,R,T,Bx), A) )
or
a(auctioneer2(Bx,[],R), A) <-- Bs=[].
a(auctioneer2(Bs,Vs,R), A) ::=
add bid([B,V], Vs, Vn) <-- bid(B,V) <= a(bidder,B) then
( a(auctioneer2(Bs,Vn,R), A) <-- not(all bid(Bs,Vn))
or
( won(Bx,Vx) => a(bidder,Bx)
<-- all bid(Bs,Vn) and winner(Vn,R,Bx,Vx) then
deliver(I,Bx) <-- payment(P) <= a(bidder,Bx) ) ).
a(bidder, B) ::=
invite(I,R) <= a(auctioneer( , , , ), A) then
bid(B,V) => a(auctioneer2( , , ), A) <-- valuation(I,V) then
won(B,V2) <= a(auctioneer2( , , ), A) then
payment(P) => a(auctioneer2( , , ), A) <-- payment(P).
A.2.2 The TPL Trust Constraints
A.2.2.1 Property 4.1
trust(trule1, interaction(IM), -) <-
verify temporal(IM,[deadlock]).
A.2.2.2 Property 4.2
trust(trule2, interaction(IM), +) <-
my valuation(V) and h competitor(Ch) and l competitor(Cl) and
pick(Vl,Cl,V) and pick(Vll, ,Cl) and
pick(Vh,V,Ch) and pick(Vhh,Ch, ) and
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verify temporal(IM,[bid case(b,c,V,Cl,b,X)]) and
(winner(c,Cl,b,V,b,X) or winner(b,V,c,Cl,b,X)) and
verify temporal(IM,[bid case(b,c,Vl,Cl,b,Y)]) and
(winner(c,Cl,b,Vl,b,Y) or winner(b,Vl,c,Cl,b,Y)) and
verify temporal(IM,[bid case(b,c,Vll,Cl,c, )]) and
(winner(c,Cl,b,Vll,c, ) or winner(b,Vll,c,Cl,c, )) and
verify temporal(IM,[bid case(b,c,V,Ch,c, )]) and
(winner(c,Ch,b,V,c, ) or winner(b,V,c,Ch,c, )) and
verify temporal(IM,[bid case(b,c,Vh,Ch,c, )]) and
(winner(c,Ch,b,Vh,c, ) or winner(b,Vh,c,Ch,c, )) and
verify temporal(IM,[bid case(b,c,Vhh,Ch,b,Z)]) and
(winner(c,Ch,b,Vhh,b,Z) or winner(b,Vhh,c,Ch,b,Z)) and
\+ Y<X and \+ Z<X.
A.2.2.3 Property 4.3
trust(trule3, a(auctioneer2( , , ),A), #(deliver(cd, )), -) <-
performance(a( ,A), #(deliver(cd, )), failure).
A.2.2.4 Property 4.4
trust(trule3, a(auctioneer2( , , ),A), #(deliver(dvd, )), -) <-
trusted(a( ,A), #(deliver(cd, )), -).
A.2.2.5 Property 4.5
trust(trule5, a(auctioneer( , , , ),A), +) <-
rating count(a(auctioneer( , , , ),A), Total) and Total>50 and
rating average(a(auctioneer( , , , ),A), Average) and Average>0.7 and
rating latest(a(auctioneer( , , , ),A), 20, Latest) and Latest>0.9.
A.2.3 The µ-Calculus Temporal Properties
A.2.3.1 Property 4.1
%% Property 4.1 is a TPL property with the following temporal constraint:
deadlock +=
diam(-[],prop(deadlock))
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or
( box(-[],ff) and not terminates(a( , )) ).
A.2.3.2 Property 4.2
%% Property 4.2 is a TPL property with the following temporal constraint:
bid case(B1,B2,V1,V2,W,P) -=
box([out(bid(B,V),a(auctioneer2( , , ), ))],
prop(bid case2(B,V,B1,B2,V1,V2,W,P)))
and
box(-[out(bid( , ),a(auctioneer2( , , ), ))],
prop(bid case(B1,B2,V1,V2,W,P))).
bid case2(B,V,B1,B2,V1,V2,W,P) +=
( satisfied(B=B1 and V=V1 and X=B2 and Y=V2)
or






box(-[out(bid( , ),a(auctioneer2( , , ), ))],
prop(bid case2(B,V,X,Y,W,P)))
and
box([out(bid(X,Y),a(auctioneer2( , , ), ))],
prop(bid case3(B,V,X,Y,W,P))).
bid case3(B,V,X,Y,W,P) +=
box([in(won(W,P),a(auctioneer2( , , ), ))],
satisfied(assert(winner(B,V,X,Y,W,P))))
and
box(-[in(won( , ),a(auctioneer2( , , ), ))],
prop(bid case3(B,V,X,Y,W,P))).
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A.3 The OpenKnowledge E-Response Scenario
A.3.1 The LCC Interaction Models
A.3.1.1 Interaction IM0
a(requester(Actions,Results),R) ::=










null <-- Actions=[] and NewResults=OldResults
or
( result(A,Result) <= a(performer,P) then
null <-- my select((P,A),Actions,Actions2) and
my append((P,A,Result), OldResults,IntResults) then
a(collector(Actions2,IntResults,NewResults),R) ).
a(informing completion(PeersSet),R) ::=





( action(transport(Object,N1,N2)) <= a(requester2( ),Co) then
( null <-- at(N1)
or
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a(performer(move(N0,N1,Path0,Vehicle),R1),C)
<-- at(N0) and not(N0=N1) and
realise goal(get path(N0,N1,Vehicle,Path0)) and
route details(Path,Vehicle,Fuel0,Time0) ) then
a(performer(pick(Object,N1),R2),C) <-- at(N1) then
a(performer(move(N1,N2,Path,Vehicle),R3),C)
<-- realise goal(get path(N1,N2,Vehicle,Path)) and
route details(Path,Vehicle,Fuel,Time) then
a(performer(drop(Object,N2),R4),C) <-- at(N2) then
result(transport(Object,N1,N2),R) => a(collector( , , ),Co)
<-- aggregate results([R1,R2,R3,R4],R) then
a(performer,C) )
or
( action(move(N2)) <= a(requester2( ),Co) then
a(performer(move(N1,N2,Path,Vehicle),R),C)
<-- at(N1) and realise goal(get path(N1,N2,Vehicle,Path)) and
route details(Path,Vehicle,Fuel,Time) then
result(move(N2),R) => a(collector( , , ),Co) then
a(performer,C) )
or
done <= a(informing completion( ),R).
a(performer(Action,Result),Id) ::=
action(Action) => a(simulator,S) <-- simulator id(S) then
ok <= a(simulator,S) then
null <-- perform(Action,Result).
a(simulator,S) ::=
action(Action) <= a(performer( , ),Id) then
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=> a(route service,RS) <-- route service id(RS) then
route(Path) <= a(route service,RS).
a(route service,RS)::=
request route(L1,L2,V,RRoads) <= a(route finder( , , , , ),Id) then
( route(Result) => a(route finder( , , , , ),Id)
<-- find route(L1,L2,V,RRoads,Result)
or
route([]) => a(route finder( , , , , ),Id) ).
A.3.1.3 Interaction IM2
a(inquirer(Question,Result), I) ::=
( null <-- trusted agents(Question,Agents)
or
a(inquirer1(Question,Finders,[],Agents),I)




( request suitable peers(Q) => a(finder,F)
<-- Fs=[F|NewFs] then
my append(Ps,As,NewAs) <--
suitable peers(Q,Ps) <= a(finder,F) then
a(inquirer1(Q,NewFs,NewAs,FinalAs),I) )
or
null <-- Fs=[] and FinalAs=As.
a(inquirer2(Q,Rs,Result),I) ::=
null <-- empty(Rs) and Result=nil
or
( question(Q) => a(responder,R) <-- Rs=[R|NewRs] then
( answer(Result) <= a(responder,R)
or
( no answer <= a(responder,R) then
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a(inquirer2(Q,NewRs,Result),I) ) ) ).
a(finder,F) ::=
request suitable peers(Q) <= a(inquirer1( , , , ),I) then
( suitable peers(Q,Ps) => a(inquirer1( , , , ),I)
<-- fetch suitable peers(Q,Ps)
or
suitable peers(Q,[]) => a(inquirer1( , , , ),I) ).
a(responder,R) ::=
question(Q) <= a(inquirer2( , , ),I) then
( answer(A) => a(inquirer2( , , ),I) <-- answer(Q,A)
or
no answer => a(inquirer2( , , ),I) ).







can(timing, a(performer( , ),civilian), #(perform(Action, )),+) <-
my time limit(L) and
verify temporal(request perform actions,
[timing(performer,civilian,0,0,L)]).
A.3.3 The TPL Trust Constraints
A.3.3.1 Property 5.3
trust(trule im0, interaction(IM0), +) <-
verify temporal(IM0,[sending results]).
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A.3.3.2 Property 5.4
trust(trule im2, interaction(IM2), +) <-
verify temporal(IM2,[get all replies]).
A.3.4 The µ-Calculus Temporal Properties
A.3.4.1 Property 5.2
%% Property 5.2 is a DPL property with the following temporal constraint:
timing(Role,Id,X,Y,Limit) +=
satisfied(Z is X+Y) and




box([#(route details( , , ,T),a(Role,Id))],
prop(timing(Role,Id,Z,T,Limit)))
and
box(-[#(route details( , , , ),a(Role,Id))],
prop(timing(Role,Id,Z,0,Limit))) ) ).
A.3.4.2 Property 5.3
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A.3.4.3 Property 5.4
%% Property 5.4 is a TPL property with the following temporal constraint:
get all replies +=
box([in(answer( ),a( , ))], prop(get all replies2))
and
box(-[in(answer( ),a( , ))], prop(get all replies)).
get all replies2 +=
diam(-[],tt)
and
box(-[#(empty( ),a( , )),out(question( ),a( , ))],
prop(get all replies2)).
A.3.4.4 Property 5.5
















box(-[#(perform(drop(O,N), ),a( , ))],
prop(transport performed(O,N))).
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%% Note that Properties 5.6 and 5.8 are both defined in the same way.
%% Property 5.6 is verified against interaction IM1, and the property
%% is verified by instantiating its variables as follows: ‘terminates(
%% a(route finder( , , , , ), Id))’. Property 5.8 is verified against
%% interaction IM2, and the property is verified by instantiating its
%% variables as follows: ‘terminates(a(inquirer( , ), Id))’.





%% Again, Properties 5.7 and 5.9 are both defined in the same way.
%% Property 5.7 is verified against interaction IM1, and the property
%% is verified by instantiating its variables as follows: ‘realises goal(
%% in(route( ),a(route service, )))’. Property 5.8 is verified against
%% interaction IM2, and the property is verified by instantiating its
%% variables as follows: ‘realises goal(in(answer( ),a(responder, )))’.

Appendix B
The MCID Model Checker
This appendix presents the model checker’s main code. As illustrated by Figure 3.14,
the model checker is composed of three different entities: (1) a deontic (or trust) to
temporal translator, (2) the µ-calculus proof rules, and (3) the  transition rules. The
code for each of these entities is presented in the following three sections, respectively.
B.1 Deontic/Trust to Temporal Translator
%%% The following predicates present the deontic to temporal translation
d2t(can(X,Y,Z,S), RuleID) :-
d2t(can(X,Y,Z,S) <- tt, RuleID).
d2t(must(X,Y,Z,S), RuleID) :-
d2t(must(X,Y,Z,S) <- tt, RuleID).




assert rule(RuleID += (satisfied(Condition) and prop(RuleID2)) or
(not satisfied(Condition) and prop(RuleID3))),
assert rule(RuleID2 += diam(Action2,tt) or diam(-[],prop(RuleID2))),
assert rule(RuleID3 -= box(Action2,ff) and box(-[],prop(RuleID3))).
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concat list([RuleID,’ 3’],RuleID3),
assert rule(RuleID += (satisfied(Condition) and prop(RuleID2)) or
(not satisfied(Condition) and prop(RuleID3))),
assert rule(RuleID2 -= diam(-Action2,prop(RuleID2)) or box(-[],ff)),
assert rule(RuleID3 += box(-Action2,prop(RuleID3)) and diam(-[],tt)).




assert rule(RuleID += (satisfied(Condition) and prop(RuleID2)) or
(not satisfied(Condition) and prop(RuleID3))),
assert rule(RuleID2 += box(-Action2,prop(RuleID2)) and diam(-[],tt)),
assert rule(RuleID3 -= diam(-Action2,prop(RuleID3)) or box(-[],ff)).




assert rule(RuleID += (satisfied(Condition) and prop(RuleID2)) or
(not satisfied(Condition) and prop(RuleID3))),
assert rule(RuleID2 -= box(Action2,ff) and box(-[],prop(RuleID2))),
assert rule(RuleID3 += diam(Action2,tt) or diam(-[],prop(RuleID3))).
%%% The following predicates present the trust to temporal translation
d2t(trust(X,Y,S), RuleID) :-
d2t(trust(X,Y,S) <- tt, RuleID).
d2t(trust(X,Y,Z,S), RuleID) :-
d2t(trust(X,Y,Z,S) <- tt, RuleID).
d2t(trust(RuleID,interaction( IM),+) <- Condition, RuleID) :-
assert rule(RuleID += satisfied(Condition) or
(not satisfied(Condition) and prop(ff))).
d2t(trust(RuleID,interaction( IM),-) <- Condition, RuleID) :-
assert rule(RuleID += (satisfied(Condition) and prop(ff)) or
not satisfied(Condition)).
d2t(trust(RuleID,Agent,+) <- Condition, RuleID) :-
B.1. Deontic/Trust to Temporal Translator 175
Action2=[in( ,Agent),out( ,Agent),#( ,Agent)],
concat list([RuleID,’ 2’],RuleID2),
assert rule(RuleID += satisfied(Condition) or
(not satisfied(Condition) and prop(RuleID2))),
assert rule(RuleID2 -= box(Action2,ff) and box(-[],prop(RuleID2))).
d2t(trust(RuleID,Agent,-) <- Condition, RuleID) :-
Action2=[in( ,Agent),out( ,Agent),#( ,Agent)],
concat list([RuleID,’ 2’],RuleID2),
assert rule(RuleID += (satisfied(Condition) and prop(RuleID2)) or
not satisfied(Condition)),
assert rule(RuleID2 -= box(Action2,ff) and box(-[],prop(RuleID2))).
d2t(trust(RuleID,Agent,Action,+) <- Condition, RuleID) :-
agent action set(Agent,Action,Action2),
concat list([RuleID,’ 2’],RuleID2),
assert rule(RuleID += satisfied(Condition) or
(not satisfied(Condition) and prop(RuleID2))),
assert rule(RuleID2 -= box(Action2,ff) and box(-[],prop(RuleID2))).
d2t(trust(RuleID,Agent,Action,-) <- Condition, RuleID) :-
agent action set(Agent,Action,Action2),
concat list([RuleID,’ 2’],RuleID2),
assert rule(RuleID += (satisfied(Condition) and prop(RuleID2)) or
not satisfied(Condition)),
assert rule(RuleID2 -= box(Action2,ff) and box(-[],prop(RuleID2))).
%%% The following are other minor predicates used by d2t/2
agent action set(a(Role,Id), Var, Actions) :-
var(Var), !,
Actions=[in( ,a(Role,Id)),out( ,a(Role,Id)),#( ,a(Role,Id))].
agent action set(a(Role,Id),in(M),[in(M,a(Role,Id))]).
agent action set(a(Role,Id),out(M),[out(M,a(Role,Id))]).
agent action set(a( Role, Id),in(M,X),[in(M,X)]).
agent action set(a( Role, Id),out(M,X),[out(M,X)]).
agent action set(a(Role,Id),#(Constraint),[#(Constraint,a(Role,Id))]).






rule id(Rule,Id) :- Rule = +=(Id, ).
rule id(Rule,Id) :- Rule = -=(Id, ).
concat list([X], X).
concat list([H|T], Atom) :-
\+ T = [],
concat list(T, AT),
concat(H, AT, Atom).







convert to atomic(H,H) :- atomic(H),!.
convert to atomic(H,Hname) :- term to atom(H,Hname).
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B.2 µ-Calculus Proof Rules
satisfies( P, satisfied(X), Mi) :- agent call( ,X).
satisfies( P, not satisfied(X), Mi) :- \+ agent call( ,X).
satisfies(S, terminates(a(Role,Id)), Mi) :- terminates(a(Role,Id),S).
satisfies(S, not terminates(a(Role,Id)), Mi) :- \+ terminates(a(Role,Id),S).
satisfies( S, tt, Mi).
satisfies(P, prop(F), Mi) :-
\+ F=tt,
clause(F += FDef, ),
satisfies(P, FDef, Mi).
satisfies(P, prop(F), Mi) :-
clause(F -= FDef, ),
comp(FDef, GDef),
sk not(satisfies(P, GDef, Mi)).
satisfies(P, neg prop(F), Mi) :-
clause(F += FDef, ),
sk not(satisfies(P, FDef, Mi)).
satisfies(P, neg prop(F), Mi) :-
clause(F -= FDef, ),
comp(FDef, GDef),
satisfies(P, GDef, Mi).
satisfies(S, F1 or F2, Mi) :-
satisfies(S, F1, Mi) ; satisfies(S, F2, Mi).
satisfies(S, F1 and F2, Mi) :-
satisfies(S, F1, Mi) , satisfies(S, F2, Mi).
satisfies(S, diam(L, F), Mi) :-
get transition(S, L, NS, Mi, Mo), satisfies(NS, F, Mo).
satisfies(S, box(L, F), Mi) :-
findall(satisfies(NS,F, Mo),
get transition(S, L, NS, Mi, Mo),
SatisfiesClauses),
all true(SatisfiesClauses).
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%%% The following are other minor predicates used by satisfies/3
comp(tt, ff).
comp(ff, tt).
comp(F1 and F2, G1 or G2) :- comp(F1, G1), comp(F2, G2).
comp(F1 or F2, G1 and G2) :- comp(F1, G1), comp(F2, G2).
comp(diam(L, F), box(L, G)) :- comp(F, G).







get transition(S, L, NS, Mi, Mo) :-
transition(S, A, NS, Mi, Mo), member check(A, L).
member check(A, L) :- \+ var(A), member(A, L).
member check(A, -L) :- \+ var(A), \+ member(A, L).
all true([]).
all true([H|T]) :- call(H), all true(T).
terminates(a( Role, Id),nil).
terminates(a(Role,Id), S /// P) :-
terminates(a(Role,Id), S), terminates(a(Role,Id), P).
terminates(a(Role,Id), a(Role2,Id2)) :-
check variables(Role,Id,Role2,Id2).
terminates(a(Role,Id), a(Role2,Id2) ::= ) :-
check variables(Role,Id,Role2,Id2).
check variables(Role,Id,Role2,Id2) :-
( \+ var(Role) ; \+ var(Id) ) ,
( ( \+ var(Role), \+ Role2 = Role ) ; var(Role) ) ,
( ( \+ var(Id), \+ Id2 = Id ) ; var(Id) ).
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B.3 LCC Transition Rules
transition(P, A, Q, Mi, Mo) :-
clause(P :: PDef, ),
transition(PDef, A, Q, Mi, Mo).
transition(a(R,Id), A, Q, Mi, Mo) :-
clause(a(R, Id) ::= PDef, ),
transition(a(R, Id) ::= PDef, A, Q, Mi, Mo).
transition(a(R,Id) ::= a(R,Id), A, Q, Mi, Mo) :-
transition(a(R, Id), A, Q, Mi, Mo).
transition(a(R,Id) ::= a(R2,Id2), A, a(R,Id) ::= Q, Mi, Mo) :-
(\+ R2=R ; \+ Id2=Id),
transition(a(R2, Id2), A, Q, Mi, Mo).
transition(a( R, Id) ::= (a(R2,Id2) ::= X), A, nil, Mi, Mo) :-
transition(a(R2, Id2) ::= X, A, nil, Mi, Mo).
transition(a(R,Id) ::= (a(R2,Id2) ::= X), A, a(R,Id) ::= Q, Mi, Mo) :-
transition(a(R2, Id2) ::= X, A, Q, Mi, Mo),
\+ Q = nil.
transition(P /// Q, A, P1 /// Q, Mi, Mo) :-
transition(P, A, P1, Mi, Mo).
transition(P /// Q, A, P /// Q1, Mi, Mo) :-
transition(Q, A, Q1, Mi, Mo).
transition(a(R, Id) ::= P1 then P2, A, Q, Mi, Mo) :-
transition(a(R, Id) ::= P1, A, a(R2,Id2) ::= Q1, Mi, Mo),
\+ Q1 = nil,
( ( R2=R,Id2=Id,
Q = (a(R,Id) ::= Q1 then P2)) ;
( (\+ R2=R; \+ Id2=Id ),
Q = (a(R, Id) ::= (a(R2,Id2) ::= Q1) then P2) ) ).
transition(a(R, Id) ::= P1 then P2, A, a(R, Id) ::= P2, Mi, Mo) :-
transition(a(R, Id) ::= P1, A, nil, Mi, Mo).
transition(a(R, Id) ::= P1 or P2, A, Q, Mi, Mo) :-
transition(a(R, Id) ::= P1, A, Q, Mi, Mo) ;
transition(a(R, Id) ::= P2, A, Q, Mi, Mo).
transition(a( , ) ::= null, #, nil, Mi,Mi).
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transition(a(R, Id) ::= M <= A, in(M,A), nil, Mi, Mo) :-
select([A, M, a(R,Id)], Mi, Mo).
transition(a(R, Id) ::= C <-- M <= A, in(M,A), nil, Mi, Mo) :-
select([A, M, a(R,Id)], Mi, Mo),
agent call(a(R,Id), C).
transition(a(R, Id) ::= M => A, out(M,A), nil, Mi, [[a(R,Id),M,A]|Mi]) :-
length(Mi, L), L<50.
transition(a( , ) ::= M => A, out(M,A), nil, Mi, Mi) :-
length(Mi, L), \+ L<50,
print MSG(’ABORTING: limit of message list exceeded...’), fail.
transition(a(R, Id) ::= P <-- C, #(X,a(R,Id)), a(R, Id) ::= P, Mi, Mi) :-
element(X,C),
agent call(a(R,Id), C).
%%% The following are other minor predicates used by transition/5
element(X,X).
element(X, Y and Z) :- element(X,Y) ; element(X,Z).
element(X, Y or Z) :- element(X,Y) ; element(X,Z).
agent call( ,tt) :- !.
agent call( , true( )) :- !.
agent call(A,realise goal(G)) :- !, achievable goal(A,G).
agent call(a(R,Id), assert(C)) :- !, assert(known(a(R,Id),C)).
agent call(a(R,Id), retract(C)) :- !, retract(known(a(R,Id),C)).
agent call(a(R,Id), not(C)) :- !, \+ agent call(a(R,Id), C).
agent call(a(R,Id), A and B) :- !, agent call(a(R,Id),A), agent call(a(R,Id),B).
agent call(a(R,Id), A or B) :- !,
( agent call(a(R,Id), A) ; agent call(a(R,Id), B) ).
agent call(a( , ), C) :-
( predicate property(C, loaded); predicate property(C, built-in) ),
!, call(C).
agent call(a(R,Id), C) :- known(a(R,Id), C).
agent call(a(R,Id), C) :- known(a(R,Id), C <-- X), agent call(a(R,Id), X).
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